No-lose targets as an option to integrate non-Annex I countries in global emission reduction efforts - A game-theoretical analysis by Duscha, Vicki
No-lose targets as an option to integrate
non-Annex I countries in global emission
reduction efforts
A game-theoretical analysis
Zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines
Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
(Dr. rer. pol.)
der Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften
des Karlsruher Instituts für Technologie (KIT)
genehmigte
Dissertation
von
Dipl.-Wirt.-Math. Vicki Duscha
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 28.06.2012
Referent: Prof. Dr. K-M. Ehrhart
Korreferentin: Prof. Dr. M. Uhrig-Homburg

Abstract
Substantial greenhouse gas emission reductions of 50% and more below 1990
levels by 2050 are necessary, to limit mean temperature increase below 2◦C
above pre-industrial levels. While the Kyoto Protocol foresees emission reduc-
tion targets for Annex I countries only, current and projected greenhouse gas
emissions, as well as the growing economic importance of emerging economies
call for an integration of non-Annex I countries in global reduction efforts.
No-lose targets set emission reduction targets and define incentives for
meeting the target, in contrast to binding reduction targets that use penal-
ties to ensure compliance. One form of incentive is the participation in an
international emissions trading market. While a few conceptual and quan-
titative analyses of no-lose targets can be found in the literature, economic
analyses have not been carried out so far.
In this thesis, two theoretical frameworks are introduced to analyze the
potential of no-lose targets to contribute to global emission reduction efforts.
First, a two-player, two-stage model is developed to model a non-Annex I
country’s participation decision and derive the contribution to global emission
reductions. Then a two-player participation game is introduced to analyze
the effects that the participation decision of one non-Annex I country has
on another non-Annex I country also facing a no-lose target. Two market
forms, a perfectly competitive market, and a market with market power on
the side of the non-Annex I country are analyzed. In order to complement
the highly stylized theoretical frameworks, a quantitative analysis applying
marginal abatement cost curves is conducted to estimate the contribution of
no-lose targets to reaching the 2◦C target.
The analyses show that no-lose targets can result in substantial contribu-
tions from non-Annex I countries to global emission reductions, in particular
if the reduction potential in the non-Annex I countries is large, compared to
that of the Annex I community. Market power on the part of the non-Annex
I countries is found to further increase these contributions. Yet large certifi-
cate transfers via the carbon market are necessary to make the no-lose targets
profitable.
This thesis is based on my research conducted at the Fraunhofer Institute
for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI) in Karlsruhe under the supervision
of Professor K.-M. Ehrhart at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
and is written in English.

Zusammenfassung
Eine zentrale Herausforderung für den internationalen Klimaschutz besteht
darin, Nicht-Annex-I-Länder in globale Emissionsminderungsanstrengungen
einzubeziehen. Im Gegensatz zu bindenden Emissionszielen stellen no-lose-
Ziele unverbindliche Emissionsminderungsvorgaben dar, die gleichzeitig Anrei-
ze für die Zielerreichung setzen, z.B. durch die Teilnahme am internationalen
Emissionshandel.
Anhand von zwei theoretischen Modellen werden die ökonomischen Wirk-
weisen von no-lose-Zielen und deren potentieller Beitrag zur Erreichung von
globalen Emissionszielen untersucht. Zunächst findet die Analyse eines einzel-
nen Nicht-Annex-I-Landes mit no-lose-Ziel unter der Prämisse von vollkomme-
nemWettbewerb bzw. Marktmacht des Nicht-Annex-I-Landes statt. Es werden
zwei Fälle der Lastenteilung von Minderungszielen (bottom-up und top-down)
betrachtet.
Da die Teilnahmeentscheidung eines nicht-Annex I-Landes die Profitabili-
tät des no-lose-Ziels eines anderen Nicht-Annex I-Landes über den Zertifikat-
preis beeinflussen kann, wird in einem zweiten Schritt die strategische Situa-
tion zweier Nicht-Annex-I-Länder unter Zuhilfenahme einer spieltheoretischen
Komponente (“participation game”) analysiert. Die Untersuchung wird wieder-
umg für zwei verschiedene Marktformen durchgeführt.
Ergänzt werden die theoretischen Untersuchungen um eine quantitative
Analyse basierend auf Grenzvermeidungskostenkurven. Ein speziell dafür ent-
wickelter Algorithmus ermöglicht die Bestimmung von stabilen Marktsituatio-
nen, bei denen für alle am Markt teilnehmenden Nicht-Annex-I-Ländern die
Erfüllung des no-lose-Ziels einen positiven Gewinn ergibt und gleichzeitig ein
möglichst hoher Beitrag von Nicht-Annex-I-Ländern zu globalen Emissions-
minderungen erzielt wird. Die quantitative Untersuchung beschränkt sich auf
den Wettbewerbsfall.
Die Analysen zeigen, dass no-lose-Ziele einen substantiellen Beitrag von
Nicht-Annex-I-Ländern zu globalen Emissionsminderungen insbesondere bei
einem hohen Emissionsminderungspotential ermöglichen. Das Vorliegen von
Marktmacht steigert diesen Beitrag sogar noch. Allerdings sind große Zertifi-
kattransfers über den Emisssionshandelsmarkt notwendig, um eine Profitabi-
lität der Ziele zu erreichen.
Die Arbeit wurde von Herrn Prof. Dr. K.-M. Ehrhart am Institut für Wirt-
schaftstheorie und Statistik betreut. Sie ist in englischer Sprache verfasst.

Contents
List of Figures vi
List of Tables vii
List of Abbreviations and Variables ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 No-lose targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Objective and approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 No-lose targets and the participation decision 11
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Theoretical modeling of no-lose targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.1 The basic model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.2 The participation decision of the non-Annex I country . 15
2.2.3 Participation conditions in a competitive market . . . . . 17
2.2.4 Participation conditions in the case of market power . . . 20
2.3 The optimal no-lose target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4 The no-lose target in a bottom-up environment . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5 The no-lose target in a top-down environment . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.6 Welfare effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.7 Case study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3 Interaction of two non-Annex I countries 41
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 Modeling no-lose targets in a two-player game . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2.1 Modeling framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
i
3.2.2 The participation game for two symmetric non-Annex I
countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2.3 Nash equilibria in a competitive market . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2.4 Nash equilibria in a market with market power . . . . . . 53
3.3 Characteristics of non-Annex I countries’ payoffs . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4 Effects of increased participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5 Optimal no-lose targets and their impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.5.1 The optimal no-lose target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.5.2 Implications for global emission reduction targets . . . . 74
3.5.3 Implications for the emissions trading market . . . . . . 79
3.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4 Can no-lose targets contribute to the 2◦C target? 85
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.2.1 Trading markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.2.2 The modeling of no-lose targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2.3 Marginal abatement cost curves and data . . . . . . . . . 94
4.2.4 Country groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.3 “IPCC” scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.3.1 “IPCC” scenario definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.3.2 Results for “IPCC” scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.4 Alternative scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.4.1 Results for scenarios with lenient no-lose targets . . . . . 103
4.4.2 Results for scenarios with individual no-lose targets for
large emitters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.4.3 Results for alternative burden-sharing scenarios . . . . . 106
4.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5 Conclusions and outlook 113
5.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.2 Critical reflection and outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
A Emissions by country 121
B Derivation of formula and proofs to chapter 3 125
B.1 Derivation of optimality conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
B.2 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
C Appendix to chapter 4 137
C.1 Solution algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
C.2 Sensitivity analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
C.3 Results for BIC scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Bibliography 143

List of Figures
2.1 Optimal no-lose targets under a bottom-up target-setting ap-
proach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2 Emission reductions in the bottom-up approach with optimal
no-lose target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3 Optimal no-lose targets under a top-down target-setting approach 30
2.4 Emission reductions in the top-down approach with optimal no-
lose target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.1 Payoff matrix for two symmetric non-Annex I-countries . . . . . 48
3.2 Payoffs Π˜CN and ΠCN for two non-Annex I countries in a compet-
itive market game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3 Payoffs Π˜PN and ΠPN for two non-Annex I countries in a game
with market power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4 Non-Annex I country’s payoff for two (left), respectively one
(right) participating non-Annex I countries in a competitive
market for TA = 4 and TN = 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.5 Non-Annex I country’s payoff for two (left), respectively one
(right) participating non-Annex I countries in a market power
case for TA = 4 and TN=1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.6 Optimal no-lose targets for one and two participating non-Annex I
countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.1 Types of markets and the flow of traded certificates . . . . . . . 90
4.2 Abatement costs and revenues from trading for a no-lose target
country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3 Participation and emission reductions from NAI_NLT countries
under a 40% reduction scenario for AI countries in 2020 - Sen-
sitivity analysis for no-lose targets levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
v
4.4 Prices and changes in costs compared to IPCC_low in 2020 -
Sensitivity analysis for no-lose targets levels . . . . . . . . . . . 105
C.1 Sensitivity analysis for the domestic quota in the IPCC_low
scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
C.2 Sensitivitiy analysis for the offsetting limit in the IPCC_low
scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
List of Tables
2.1 Emissions and emission reductions in 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.2 Estimation of China’s optimal no-lose reduction target . . . . . 37
4.1 Historic and baseline GHG emissions from 1990 - 2020 by coun-
try groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.2 Global and regional emission reduction targets for 2020 in the
“IPCC” scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3 Participation and emission reductions by NAI_NLT in 2020 in
“IPCC” scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.4 Prices and compliance costs in 2020 in “IPCC” scenarios . . . . 100
4.5 Global and regional emission reduction targets for 2020 in the
alternative scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.6 Alternative burden-sharing scenarios for a 2 ◦C stabilization sce-
nario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.7 Global emission reductions and costs in the alternative burden-
sharing scenarios compared to the IPCC_low scenario . . . . . 109
A.1 Annex I countries’ historic and projected emissions . . . . . . . 122
A.2 Non-Annex I countries’ historic and projected emissions . . . . . 123
C.1 Sensitivity analysis for “hot air” in the IPCC_low scenario . . . 139
C.2 Results for the BIC_10 scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
vii

List of Abbreviations and
Variables
Abbreviations
AAU Assigned Amount Unit
AI Annex I
BIC Brazil, India, China
CAIT Climate Analysis Indicators Tool
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CO2 Carbon Dioxid
CO2e Carbon Dioxid Equivalents
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GHG Greenhouse Gases
Gt Gigatons
Mt Million tons
NAMAs Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
IEA International Energy Agency
IETM International Emissions Trading Market
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JI Joint Implementation
LULUCF Land-Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry
NAI Non-Annex I
OM Offsetting Market
POLES Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems
R&D Research and Development
REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
UNFCCC United Nations Convention on Climate Change
ix
Countries
ARG Argentina
BRA Brazil
CHN China
EGY Egypt
IDN Indonesia
IND India
IRN Iran
KAZ Kazakhstan
KOR Republic of Korea
MEX Mexico
MYS Malaysia
NGA Nigeria
PAK Pakistan
SAU Saudi Arabia
THA Thailand
TWN Taiwan
USA United States of America
VNM Vietnam
ZAF South Africa
Variables
α Annex I community’s and non-Annex I country’s rela-
tive reduction potential
αA slope of the Annex I community’s marginal aggregated
abatement costs
αN , αN1, αN2 slope of the non-Annex I country’s marginal abatement
costs
Πi non-Annex I country i’s payoff
ΠCN non-Annex I country’s optimal payoff for one participat-
ing non-Annex I country in a competitive market
Π˜CN non-Annex I country’s optimal payoff for two participat-
ing non-Annex I countries in a competitive market
ΠPN non-Annex I country’s optimal payoff for one participat-
ing non-Annex I country in case of market power
Π˜PN non-Annex I country’s optimal payoff for two participat-
ing non-Annex I countries in case of market power
CA Annex I community’s aggregated abatement costs
CN , CN1, CN2 non-Annex I country’s abatement costs
DQi Annex I country i’s domestic quota
ECj,i emission certificates sold from Annex I country j to An-
nex I country i
h(rN), h(rN1, rN2) Annex I’s reaction to the non-Annex I country’s emis-
sion reductions for one participating non-Annex I coun-
try
h˜(rN1, rN2) Annex I’s reaction to the non-Annex I countries’ emis-
sion reductions for two participating non-Annex I coun-
tries
MCA Annex I community’s marginal aggregated abatement
costs
MCN , MCN1, MCN2 non-Annex I country’s marginal abatement costs
NAI_NLT non-Annex I countries facing no-lose targets
NAI_REST non-Annex I countries not facing any emission reduction
targets
OLi Annex I country i’s offsetting limit
p market price for emission certificates
p0 market price for emission certificates without non-
Annex I country participation for a competitive market
pC equilibrium market price for emission certificates for one
participating non-Annex I country in a competitive mar-
ket
p˜C equilibrium market price for emission certificates for two
participating non-Annex I countries in a competitive
market
pP equilibrium market price for emission certificates for one
participating non-Annex I country in case of market
power
p˜P equilibrium market price for emission certificates for two
participating non-Annex I countries in case of market
power
pPC market price for emission certificates for a global reduc-
tion target T P for one participating non-Annex I country
in a competitive market
qC equilibrium market price for offsetting credits in a com-
petitive market
rA Annex I community’s joint emission reductions below
baseline
r0A Annex I community’s joint emission reductions below
baseline without non-Annex I country participation for
a competitive market
r∗A Annex I community’s joint optimal emission reductions
below baseline
rCA Annex I community’s joint optimal emission reductions
for one participating non-Annex I country in a compet-
itive market
r˜CA Annex I community’s joint optimal emission reductions
for two participating non-Annex I countries in a com-
petitive market
rPA Annex I community’s joint optimal emission reductions
for one participating non-Annex I country in case of
market power
r˜PA Annex I community’s joint optimal emission reductions
for two participating non-Annex I countries in case of
market power
rN , rN1, rN2 non-Annex I country’s emission reductions below base-
line
r∗N , r
∗
N1, r
∗
N2 non-Annex I country’s optimal emission reductions be-
low baseline
rCN , rCi non-Annex I country’s optimal emission reductions be-
low baseline for one participating non-Annex I country
in a competitive market
r˜CN1, r˜CN2 non-Annex I country’s optimal emission reductions be-
low baseline for two participating non-Annex I countries
in a competitive market
rPN ,rPi non-Annex I country’s optimal emission reductions be-
low baseline for one participating non-Annex I country
in case of market power
r˜PN1, r˜PN2 non-Annex I country’s optimal emission reductions be-
low baseline for two participating non-Annex I countries
in case of market power
T global emission reduction target for one participating
non-Annex I country
T¯ exogenous global emission reduction target for one par-
ticipating non-Annex I country
T˜ global emission reduction target for two participating
non-Annex I countries
TC global emission reduction target applying the optimal
no-lose target for one participating non-Annex I country
in a competitive market
T˜C global emission reduction target applying the optimal
no-lose target for two participating non-Annex I coun-
tries in a competitive market
T P global emission reduction target applying the optimal
no-lose target for one participating non-Annex I country
in case of market power
T˜ P global emission reduction target applying the optimal
no-lose target for two participating non-Annex I coun-
tries in case of market power
TA Annex I community’s aggregated emission reduction tar-
get
TCA endogenous Annex I community’s aggregated emission
reduction target for one participating non-Annex I coun-
try in a competitive market
T PA endogenous Annex I community’s aggregated emission
reduction target for one participating non-Annex I coun-
try in case of market power
T¯A exogenous Annex I community’s aggregated emission re-
duction target
TN , TN1, TN2 non-Annex I country’s no-lose target
TCN non-Annex I country’s optimal no-lose target for one
participating non-Annex I country in a competitive mar-
ket
T˜CN non-Annex I country’s optimal no-lose target for two
participating non-Annex I countries in a competitive
market
T PN non-Annex I country’s optimal no-lose target for one
participating non-Annex I country in case of market
power
T˜ PN non-Annex I country’s optimal no-lose target for two
participating non-Annex I countries in case of market
power
TC global total (compliance) costs
TC0 global total (compliance) costs without non-Annex I
country participation for a competitive market
TCPC global total (compliance) costs for a global reduction
target T P for one participating non-Annex I country in
a competitive market
TCA Annex I community’s aggregated total (compliance)
costs
TC0A Annex I community’s aggregated total (compliance)
costs without non-Annex I country participation for a
competitive market
TCCA Annex I community’s aggregated total (compliance)
costs for one participating non-Annex I country in a
competitive market
TCPA Annex I community’s aggregated total (compliance)
costs for one participating non-Annex I country in case
of market power
TCN non-Annex I country’s total (compliance) costs
TCi country i’s total (compliance) costs
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
In recent years, climate change has emerged as an important issue, not only
in science, but also in politics. Following the European Council and the G8,
recent international climate summits in Copenhagen and Cancun have rec-
ognized the goal to keep mean temperature increase below 2◦C above pre-
industrial levels (United Nations, 2009, 2010). The international community
thereby followed the recommendations of the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC), which warns that mean temperature changes of more
than 2◦C “would result in an increasing number of key impacts [...] such as
widespread loss of biodiversity, decreasing global agricultural productivity and
commitment to widespread deglaciation of Greenland and West Antarctic”
(Parry, Canziani, Palutikof, van der Linden, & Hanson, 2007). According to
science, substantial reductions in global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of
at least 50% below 1990 levels by the middle of the century are necessary to
stabilize the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere at a level compatible
with reaching a 2◦C target (Rogelj et al., 2010, 2011).1
The framework of the Kyoto Protocol foresees emission reduction targets
for Annex I countries2 only (UNFCCC, 1997). In order to achieve cost effi-
1In order to limit mean temperature increase to 2◦C above the pre-industrial level, the
concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere needs to be stabilized at around 450ppm CO2e.
According to science, that can be achieved if global emissions peak by 2015 and decline
thereafter. By 2050 global CO2 emissions need to be 50% to 85% below 2000 levels (Metz,
Davidson, Bosch, Dave, & Meyer, 2007).
2Annex I countries are all countries listed in Annex I of the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change – mainly industrialized countries and countries in transition. A list of
1
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ciency, the Kyoto Protocol provides the Annex I countries with three flexible
mechanisms that are supposed to help lower the costs for reaching the emission
reduction targets: an international emissions trading market allows Annex I
countries to trade emission certificates called Assigned Amount Units (AAUs).
Hence, emission reductions should occur in those Annex I countries where emis-
sion reductions are least expensive. In addition, the Joint Implementation (JI)
allows one Annex I country to finance abatement measures in another Annex I
country. As compensation, the financing Annex I country receives AAUs from
the Annex I country where the emission reductions occur.
Non-Annex I countries are integrated in the Kyoto Protocol via the third
flexible mechanism, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). It allows An-
nex I countries to fulfill part of their emission reductions by financing emission
reductions in non-Annex I countries. Own contributions of non-Annex I coun-
tries towards reaching the global reduction target do not exist in the Kyoto
framework.
Current and projected GHG emissions show, however, that non-Annex I
countries, which currently (2010) have a share of 60% in world-wide CO2
emissions (Boden & Blasing, 2011), are becoming increasingly important in
reaching global emission reduction targets. Also, the growing importance of
non-Annex I countries, in particular emerging economies like China and India,
in world trade and in the world financial markets tend to make Annex I coun-
tries reluctant to commit to own emission reduction targets. They fear they
will become less competitive as long as non-Annex I countries do not agree to
similar efforts (T. Stern, 2011).
Emission reduction efforts under the first commitment period of the Kyoto
Protocol end in 2012. Recent international negotiations under the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen,
Cancun and Durban on finding a follow-up agreement to the Kyoto Proto-
col showed once more how difficult it is for countries to agree on ambitious
national emission reduction targets in the context of an international agree-
ment. One fundamental issue that makes finding an international agreement
so difficult is the absence of a supranational institution which could enforce
cooperation (Finus, 2002). Instead, an agreement of this kind would have to
be self-enforcing. Under self-enforcing conditions, however, agreements that
achieve substantial emission reductions over and above the non-cooperative
the Annex I countries and their GHG emissions can be found in Appendix A of this thesis.
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level and that include a large number of countries do not exist as several the-
oretical studies show (Barrett, 2003; Carraro & Siniscalco, 1993).
Another obstacle to finding an international agreement is that substan-
tial differences exist between nations, a fact that is neglected in many of the
theoretical studies. Emerging developing countries fear that binding emis-
sion targets will inhibit future economic growth, implying that per capita in-
come will continue to stay substantially below the level observed in industri-
alized countries. The most common arguments made by non-Annex I coun-
tries against own contributions to emission reductions are that binding targets
might constrain economic growth and that the larger share of historical emis-
sions stem from today’s industrialized nations. Thus, they consider combating
climate change predominantly as the responsibility of the industrialized na-
tions (Spence, 2009). Consequently, acknowledging the differences between
industrialized and developing nations, the UNFCCC emphasizes the principle
of “common but differentiated responsibility” (United Nations, 1992).
Hence, new instruments need to be found to extend the number of countries
contributing to global emission reductions beyond the Annex I community.
Scientific literature on this topic has emerged over the last decade, which is
concerned with the theoretical and - more recently also quantitative - analy-
sis of possible design elements of an international agreement scheme including
both Annex I and non-Annex I countries (Carraro & Siniscalco, 1998; Carraro,
Eyckmans, & Finus, 2006; Aldey, Barrett, & Stavins, 2003; Aldey & Stavins,
2007; Bosetti & Frankel, 2009; Frankel, 2009). A number of new instruments
have been proposed with a special focus on integrating non-Annex I countries
and resulting in non-Annex I countries’ contributing to global emission reduc-
tions. Sector-based approaches propose reduction targets for single sectors,
instead of covering the whole economy of a country right from the beginning
(Bosi & Ellis, 2005; J. Schmidt, Helme, Lee, & Houdashelt, 2008; Ward et al.,
2008; Schneider & Cames, 2009). Concentrating on single sectors might make
reduction targets more acceptable (Philibert & Pershing, 2001; J. Schmidt
et al., 2008). Relative or intensity-based targets try to overcome the fear of
non-Annex I countries that accepting emission reduction targets might con-
strain economic growth. They do not apply a fixed emission target, but define
emission targets based on output levels like production or gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) (Ellerman & Wing, 2003; Pizer, 2005; Quirion, 2005). Similarly,
“no-lose‘” targets try to overcome that fear by refraining from penalties in
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the case that a target is not met and creating incentives instead (Bodansky,
2003; Philibert, 2000; J. Schmidt et al., 2008). A more direct way to encour-
age participation of non-Annex I countries in emission reduction efforts are
transfer payments, as discussed by Hoel and Schneider (1997), Altamirano-
Carbrera and Finus (2006) and Carraro et al. (2006). Issue-linkages between
GHG reduction measures and other international topics like technology and
R&D cooperation is another approach, also using incentives for non-Annex I
countries to participate in emission reduction efforts by offering enhanced co-
operation between industrialized and developing countries (Martinot, Sinton,
& Haddad, 1997; Barrett, 2002; Viguier, 2004). Instead of defining reduction
targets some argue that agreeing to implement certain policies and measures
is a better way to include non-Annex I countries (Philibert & Pershing, 2001;
Baumert & Winkler, 2005).
In contrast to the binding reduction targets applied under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, some of these newly proposed instruments create incentives for non-
Annex I countries to contribute to global emission reductions (Kuik et al.,
2008). They thus try to overcome the problem that participation by non-
Annex I countries is voluntary in nature. One of these instruments are no-lose
targets.
1.2 No-lose targets
No-lose targets have been proposed as a possible measure to overcome the
dichotomy of Annex I and non-Annex I countries, while at the same time
safeguarding non-Annex I countries from emission targets that may inhibit
economic development (Philibert, 2000; Philibert & Pershing, 2001). Simulta-
neously with setting a reduction target, no-lose targets provide incentives for
the non-Annex I country to meet the target. In contrast to binding targets,
no-lose targets do not use penalties as a threat in case a target is not met.
Hence, they offer a safety valve against high costs.
The incentives can take on various forms. J. Schmidt et al. (2008) pro-
pose assistance to reach the target through a “Technology Finance and As-
sistance Package” including assistance in the deployment of advanced tech-
nologies, capacity-building activities and financing of pilot and demonstration
projects. Help would mainly be provided by financing mechanisms such as soft
loans, direct grants and other special lending provisions. The idea is to help
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cover the incremental costs of applying advanced low-emission technologies
instead of conventional technologies.
The analyses in this thesis focus on the idea of an “emission budget” as intro-
duced and discussed by Philibert (2000) and Philibert and Pershing (2001)3.
The basic idea is to use participation in the international emissions trading
market as an incentive for countries to fulfill their no-lose targets. In detail,
the emission budget works as follows: a non-Annex I country agrees on a par-
ticular emission target. If its actual emissions are above the agreed emission
target (e.g. because of strong economic growth or because demand for emission
certificates is low relative to supply), it is neither punished nor is it allowed
to enter the international emissions trading market. If its actual emissions
are below the agreed emission target, however, the non-Annex I country is al-
lowed to enter the emissions trading market as a seller of emission certificates.
The number of certificates it can trade if the non-Annex I country manages
to over-achieve its reduction target is defined by the difference between its
actual emissions and its emission target. These revenues can compensate the
non-Annex I country for associated abatement costs.
For a financial net benefit (“profitable no-lose target”) the revenues from
selling emission certificates need to over-compensate a country’s abatement
costs. Two effects determine the net benefit. On the one hand, there are the
costs incurred for meeting the no-lose target level. A lenient (stringent) no-lose
target means low (high) abatement costs and, hence, increases (decreases) the
probability that the target is profitable and that the country will decide to
participate in the emissions trading market (cost effect). On the other hand,
there is the revenue from selling emission certificates which is determined by
the supply of excess emission certificates and the market price for certificates
(revenue effect). While lenient targets increase the supply of emission certifi-
cates, they lower the market price. Hence, the direction of the revenue effect
is ambiguous. For only one non-Annex I country facing a no-lose target, it
can determine the market price for certificates and hence decide to participate
or not. The revenue effect is of particular interest if more than just one non-
Annex I country faces a no-lose target. In that case, a lenient no-lose target
of a competing non-Annex I country, while not affecting their own abatement
3Bosi and Ellis (2005), Amatayakul, Berndes, and Fenhann (2008), J. Schmidt et al.
(2008), Ward et al. (2008), Schneider and Cames (2009) and Hofmann (2010) discuss a
similar approach, which is however limited to certain sectors of the economy.
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costs, lowers the price as well as the number of certificates to sell for other
non-Annex I countries. Hence, in that case the lenient no-lose target of the
competing non-Annex I country clearly has a negative effect on the profitabil-
ity of the other non-Annex I countries’ no-lose targets. That is, the market
price which affects the revenues links a country’s participation decision to the
no-lose target and the participation decision of other countries facing no-lose
targets.
Two characteristics arise that determine the difference between binding and
no-lose targets. First, the decision to accept a no-lose target and the decision
to comply with the target are not directly linked. Hence, applying a no-lose
target does not guarantee that a given global emission target will be met.
Instead, a non-Annex I country will contribute towards reaching the global
emission target if it decides to fulfill its no-lose target. Therefore, setting the
target level for no-lose targets is crucial. Second, the role of the non-Annex I
country facing a no-lose target in the international emissions trading market
is determined beforehand. It can only participate in the emissions trading
market if it over-achieves its no-lose target. Hence, the non-Annex I country
is always a seller of emission certificates.
Analyses of no-lose targets in the literature are limited and can be differ-
entiated into conceptual work and quantitative analyses. Conceptual work by
Philibert (2000) introduces the idea of a no-lose target and discusses aspects
of integrating no-lose targets in the UNFCCC framework. Among others, the
study investigates the practical realization of combining binding and no-lose
targets in a single emissions trading market. He finds that, as long as at least
one entity facing a binding target is part of the system to act as potential buyer
of emission certificates, an integration in a joint market is possible. He further
states that no-lose targets have the advantage of easing the target negotiations
and preventing the emergence of “tropical hot air”4.
A central problem discussed by Philibert is how to ensure that only excess
certificates are traded to protect the environmental integrity of the trading
system. He identifies three options to solve this problem: (i) a no-lose target
is treated as a binding target (and ensuing compliance and penalty provisions)
4“Hot air” refers to a situation in which the emission target is above the baseline emis-
sions, i.e. excess emission certificates exist without abatement options. This was the case for
example for Russia and other states from the former Soviet Union under the first commit-
ment period of the Kyoto Protocol. “Tropical hot air” refers to “hot air” from non-Annex I
countries.
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once a country starts to trade certificates in the market; (ii) a country can
only trade certificates once they are verified, i.e. a country would have to wait
until the next period to be able to sell its emission certificates in the market;
or (iii) a country would have to buy back the amount of certificates sold up to
the no-lose target should the target turn out to be missed ex-post. A fourth
option proposed by Philibert is to introduce a dual target instead of a no-
lose target, i.e. the target consists of a lower target which, if fulfilled, allows
selling of emission certificates (selling target). A second, higher target (buying
target) would, if missed, require countries to buy emission certificates up to
that target.
Philibert and Pershing (2001) compare non-binding targets with four other
instruments proposed to integrate non-Annex I countries in emission reduction
efforts. These instruments are binding targets, intensity targets, sectoral tar-
gets and policies and measures. They find that, while no-lose targets provide
a low certainty of emission reductions, they might be useful to deal with prob-
lems of carbon leakage5 or growth rebound effects. They identify the fact that
the danger of constraining economic growth is low as another advantage. For
similar reasons, Bodansky (2003) terms no-lose targets a “useful transitional
device” while acknowledging that non-Annex I countries will have to commit
to binding reduction targets in the long run. He further proposes to combine
no-lose targets with other instruments, like intensity targets.
Hofmann (2010) discusses main issues that would arise from implementing
sectoral no-lose targets. These are the definition of an emissions baseline, de-
termining an adequate no-lose target and ensuring the environmental integrity
by measurement, reporting and verification of emissions. She also tackles ques-
tions on the legal and regulatory framework and concludes that a no-lose target
framework could build on the existing Kyoto framework.
Quantitative analyses of no-lose targets mostly relate to sectors rather than
countries. J. Schmidt et al. (2008) analyze sectoral no-lose targets for the ce-
ment, iron and steel and electricity sector. The study applies financing mecha-
nisms while certificate trading by the non-Annex I countries is not considered.
Amatayakul et al. (2008) propose a method for setting the baseline and
the target level and estimate the potential for emission reductions applying
5Carbon leakage refers to the effect that GHG emissions in one country increase as a result
of emission reductions in another country due to stricter climate policies. For a discussion
of carbon leakage, see e.g. Babiker (2004).
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no-lose targets in the electricity sector for seven large developing countries.
Their approach builds on the existing methods for calculating the baseline of
a CDM project. They estimate a no-lose reduction target of about 10% below
baseline for the electricity sector.
den Elzen, Hoehne, and Moltmann (2010) allow developing countries to par-
ticipate, among others, in international emissions trading via national no-lose
targets prior to accepting an agreement involving binding reduction targets.
The no-lose character of the targets is, however, not taken into account in the
modeling exercise.
Finally, R. C. Schmidt and Marschinski (2010) explore the potential of a
binding national target for China, to result in positive revenues from partici-
pation in emissions trading with the USA and the EU. The analyses show that
a reduction target of up to 1.5Gt CO2e can be optimal in the case of a link
to the EU ETS alone. Widening the emissions trading market to include the
USA and an offsetting market, however, results in optimal reduction targets
which are higher than China’s baseline emissions. Hence, these reduction tar-
gets would lead to “hot air” rather than to own contributions from China to
global emission reductions.
Economic analyses of no-lose targets based on theoretical frameworks do
not exist so far. Hence, the question arises, whether no-lose targets are a
suitable economic instrument to integrate non-Annex I countries in global
emission reduction efforts. The environmental effectiveness and the economic
impacts on the emissions trading market are of particular interest.
1.3 Objective and approach
The main objective of this thesis is to determine whether no-lose targets are
a suitable instrument to integrate non-Annex I countries in global emission
reduction efforts and to explore their economic impacts on the emissions trad-
ing market. The analyses focus on no-lose targets using participation in an
emissions trading market as incentive system for non-Annex I countries. The
main assumption for the following analyses is that a non-Annex I country
will decide to fulfill its target and participate in the emissions trading market
only if fulfilling the target is profitable. Hence, revenues from selling emission
certificates need to be higher than the country’s abatement costs.
The analyses focus on applying theoretical economic frameworks to fill the
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gap that exists in understanding the economic effects of no-lose targets and
the impacts on the emissions trading market, in contrast to binding reduction
targets. These analyses will help to deepen the economic understanding of
on-lose targets and will hence complement the existing conceptual and quanti-
tative work. As the theoretical frameworks present highly stylized models, the
analyses will be complemented by analyses with a global partial equilibrium
model.
In particular, the analyses focus on three main aspects of no-lose targets.
First, they attempt to quantify the contribution of no-lose targets to global
emission reduction efforts. In that context, the analyses also consider the ef-
fects that the integration of no-lose targets in an international emissions trad-
ing market has on the Annex I community’s emission reductions and market
prices.
Given the fact that non-Annex I countries facing no-lose targets compete
as sellers of emission certificates in the market, a second aspect analyzed in
more detail in this thesis are the effects that the integration of more than one
non-Annex I country applying no-lose targets has. The competition as sellers
in the emissions trading market affects the level of the no-lose targets as well as
the global emission reduction target. The interaction of non-Annex I countries
introduces a game-theoretical aspect into the analysis. Understanding the
interaction of non-Annex I countries facing no-lose targets is of particular
interest, if no-lose targets are introduced as an instrument in international
climate agreements, as this would imply that the instrument is applied for
more than just one non-Annex I country.
The third aspect that is of particular interest for this thesis is the market
power aspect in the emissions trading market and its effects on no-lose targets.
While a competitive market can be assumed for small non-Annex I countries,
the countries’ GHG emissions vary widely in size. Two large non-Annex I
countries in particular, China and India, who are often discussed as poten-
tial participants in an international agreement on climate change. They have
shares of 25% and 6% respectively in global CO2 emissions in 2010 (Boden &
Blasing, 2011) which can be assumed to further increase in the future (IEA,
2007; IEA, 2010). At the same time, China in particular is predicted to have
large emission reduction potentials (McKinsey & Company, 2009; Hoehne et
al., 2008). It seems reasonable to assume that those countries can act strategi-
cally, if integrated in the international emissions trading market. The analyses
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focus on the effects that market power on the part of a non-Annex I country
has in contrast to a competitive market if applying no-lose targets.
This thesis is organized in three main sections. Chapter 2 focuses on quan-
tifying the potential of no-lose targets to contribute to global emission reduc-
tions. A two-player, two-stage model is introduced to analyze the decision of
one non-Annex I country facing a no-lose target to participate in an inter-
national emissions trading market with the Annex I community. The model
allows analyses of the non-Annex I country’s contribution towards meeting a
global reduction target and the effects that the participation of a non-Annex I
country has on the Annex I community. Two different paradigms to define
emission reduction targets, the bottom-up and the top-down approach, are
considered and the model is constructed assuming a perfectly competitive mar-
ket for emission certificates, as well as an emissions trading market with market
power on the part of the non-Annex I country.
In chapter 3, the situation of two non-Annex I countries facing a no-lose
target is modeled in a two-player participation game. The interaction with
the Annex I community in an international emissions trading market allows
us to determine the payoffs of the non-Annex I countries. An analysis of the
Nash equilibria of the participation game allows conclusions to be drawn on
the effects that the competition of the non-Annex I countries as sellers of emis-
sion certificates has on their participation decision. It also allows conclusions
regarding the effects of increased participation on global emission reductions.
Again, the analysis presents findings for a competitive market as well as for the
case of market power, but is restricted to symmetric non-Annex I countries.
Hence, the two non-Annex I countries have similar marginal abatement cost
curves and face similar no-lose target levels.
A quantitative analysis of no-lose targets is provided in chapter 4. In this
chapter the analyses move away from the highly stylized theoretical frameworks
used for the analyses in chapters 2 and 3. It presents estimates of the amount
of emission reductions that can be generated by applying no-lose targets to the
18 largest non-Annex I countries. Based on marginal abatement cost curves
from a global partial equilibrium model and starting with the burden-sharing
proposal by the IPCC, contributions from non-Annex I countries to global
emission reductions necessary to reach the 2◦C target are quantified.
The thesis concludes with a critical reflection on the methodological ap-
proaches and the obtained results and an outlook to future research.
Chapter 2
No-lose targets and the
participation decision1
2.1 Introduction
The analyses in this chapter focus on the potential of no-lose targets to act as
a suitable instrument to integrate a non-Annex I country in an international
agreement on climate change. Suitable means that, on the one hand, it is an
instrument that provides an incentive for the non-Annex I country to partic-
ipate in emission reduction efforts. On the other hand, it is meant to lead to
real emission reductions on the part of the non-Annex I countries. Hence, a
main goal is to quantify the contribution of no-lose targets to global emission
reduction efforts. In addition, the impact of the no-lose target on the emissions
trading market will also be analyzed.
The analyses will be based on the simplest constellation of one non-Annex I
country facing a no-lose target and interacting with the Annex I community in
a joint emissions trading market. Hence, the analyses focus on the definition
of an incentive-compatible no-lose target while effects from interaction of more
than just one country facing a no-lose target are neglected. This aspect will
be introduced to the model and analyzed in a later chapter. The situation of
modeling only one non-Annex I country can also be interpreted as modeling
the potential of all non-Annex I countries as a group neglecting the differences
between the countries that might hinder exploiting the full emission reduction
1This is a preprint of an article submitted for consideration in the Journal of Environ-
mental Economics and Management
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potential from no-lose targets.
A two-player two-stage model will be introduced to model the participation
decision of the non-Annex I country facing a no-lose target. In the first stage
of the model, the non-Annex I country decides if it wants to fulfill its no-lose
reduction target. If deciding to fulfill its target the non-Annex I country will
participate in the emissions trading market with the Annex I community in the
second stage. This framework will be used to derive participation conditions
for the non-Annex I country based on the assumption that the non-Annex I
country will only participate if the no-lose target is profitable. Further taking
into account that if a lenient no-lose target is applied, the contribution of the
non-Annex I country to global emission reductions is small and the large supply
of cheap emission certificates in the emissions trading market may hinder real
emission reductions in other parts of the world we propose the definition of an
“optimal no-lose target”.
The analyses consider two different paradigms for defining emission reduc-
tion targets: the bottom-up and the top-down approach (Criqui et al., 2003).
In the bottom-up approach the individual targets are set in the first step, which
together add up to the global reduction target. An example are the recent ne-
gotiations on a Post-Kyoto agreement on climate change in Copenhagen and
Cancun where Annex I as well as non-Annex I countries pledged reduction tar-
gets or nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs). In the top-down
approach, first a global reduction target is defined, which is then split-up by
an effort-sharing rule. Examples of the top-down approach are the reduction
target under the Kyoto Protocol or the effort-sharing of the EU target.
The main difference between the two approaches is which targets are ex-
ogenous and which are endogenous. In the bottom-up approach the individual
Annex I countries’ targets are assumed to be exogenously given and the no-
lose targets are derived endogenously. Thus, the global target is endogenously
defined too. In the top-down approach, the global reduction target is set ex-
ogenously while the distribution of the global target is derived endogenously.
Since the two approaches have different implications for setting the no-lose
target, they are analyzed separately.
In addition, two market forms will be considered. First, the market for
emission certificates is assumed to be perfectly competitive and the countries
act as price takers. In addition, to better model the situation of large de-
veloping countries like China and India we will also consider the case of a
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strategically acting non-Annex I country.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.2, a basic
two-player game of emissions trading is adapted to allow modeling of no-lose
targets and participation conditions for the competitive market as well as for
a non-Annex I country with market power are derived. The definition of the
optimal no-lose target and its characteristics follows in Section 2.3. Results for
the bottom-up and the top-down approach are presented in Section 2.4 and
Section 2.5. To highlight the most important findings and their relevance in
the present political situation a small case study is presented in Section 2.7.
Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical modeling of no-lose targets
2.2.1 The basic model
Our model involves two players: first, the community of Annex I countries,
and, second, a non-Annex I country. The parameters and variables of the
Annex I community are labeled by index A, those of the non-Annex I country
by N .
Each country of the Annex I community is obliged to reach a national
reduction target (with respect to baseline emissions) and is allowed to bar-
gain emission certificates on the international emissions trading market.2 The
national reduction targets add up to the joint target TA3 of the Annex I com-
munity, whose joint emission reductions below their baseline emissions are
denoted by rA4. The marginal (aggregated) abatement costs of the Annex I
community are assumed to be linearly increasing with slope αA > 05, i.e.
MCA(rA) = αArA. Hence, the (aggregated) abatement costs of the Annex I
community (neglecting fixed costs) are of the form6 CA(rA) = αA2 r
2
A.
2This describes – in simple terms and excluding the CDM – the situation of the Kyoto
Protocol where all countries facing targets are allowed to participate in a common emissions
trading market.
3given in absolute terms below baseline, i.e. in Mt CO2e
4given in absolute terms below baseline, i.e. in Mt CO2e
5The abatement cost curves concentrate on net investment, operating and maintenance
costs. They do not consider positive effects like energy savings or other positive benefits.
Hence, it is assumed that abatement costs are always positive. For further discussions on
no-regret options see e.g. Bréchet and Jouvet (2009) or Kesicki and Strachan (2011).
6Note that all results qualitatively hold even for weaker conditions for the abatement
costs MC > 0 and MC ′ ≥ 0 and also if fixed costs are taken into consideration.
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In the case that the non-Annex I country does not participate, the Annex I
community has to achieve its target TA entirely by own emission reductions,
i.e. r0A = TA. We assume that the Annex I countries act as price takers on the
international emissions trading market, which is thus assumed to be perfectly
competitive if the non-Annex I country does not participate. In this case, the
market price for emission certificates p0 is equal to the marginal abatement
costs at the target, i.e.
p0 = MCA(r
0
A) = αATA . (2.1)
For integrating the non-Annex country in an agreement on climate change
with an own contribution to emission reductions a no-lose target TN ≥ 0 has
to be fixed.7 If the non-Annex country decides to accept the no-lose target and
succeeds to reduce its emissions according to its target, it is allowed to inter-
act with the Annex I community in a special type of restricted international
emissions trading. More precisely, the following interactions are permitted: if
the non-Annex I country’s emissions8 are below the predetermined target, i.e.
rN > TN , the country is rewarded for the additional reductions by emission
certificates that it may sell to the Annex I community. The Annex I commu-
nity, on the other hand, can benefit from buying these certificates if the price
is below its own marginal abatement costs. However, in contrast to conven-
tional emissions trading games, the non-Annex I country is not permitted to
buy certificates from the Annex I community.9
For the non-Annex I country we also assume linearly increasing marginal
abatement costs with slope αN > 0, i.e. MCN(rN) = αnrN and CN(rN) =
αN
2
r2N .
In our analyses, we take into account that the Annex I community and the
non-Annex I country dispose of different reduction potentials10. As a measure
7For simplicity reasons, the no-lose target is assumed to be given as an absolute target
in absolute emission reductions below baseline in Mt CO2e and not a relative one based on
efficiency or output. On the analysis of intensity targets see Ellerman and Wing (2003),
Quirion (2005) or Marschniski and Edenhofer (2010).
8also given in absolute terms below baseline, i.e. in Mt CO2e
9For simplicity, the option of buying offsets (e.g. CDM credits) from other countries
outside the emissions trading market is not explicitly modeled here. However, including a
limit on offsets which was binding due to price restrictions, would result in a lower Annex I
community’s target and thus lower the price for certificates. Qualitatively, the results would
not be affected.
10The reduction potential follows the concept of “mitigation potential” as described in the
IPCC 2007 assessment report (Metz et al., 2007). It defines mitigation potential as “the
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of the relative reduction potentials we propose the ratio α = αA/αN . That is,
the higher the potential of the non-Annex I country compared to the Annex I
community is, the higher is the value of α. From αA > 0, αN > 0 immediately
follows α > 0.
2.2.2 The participation decision of the non-Annex I coun-
try
A characteristic of a no-lose target is that the decision to accept a target is not
directly linked to complying with the accepted target. In contrast, a country
can tentatively accept a no-lose emission reduction target and then decide later
whether to comply with the target or not, i.e. to try to reach the target or
not. If it reaches the target, it is allowed to enter into a restricted emissions
trading market with the Annex I community as described above.
We simplify the decision process of the non-Annex I country by assuming
that it does not differentiate between the decision to accept the target and
the decision to comply with the target. This simplification is based on the
assumption that the non-Annex I country only accepts the target if complying
with it is profitable. Accordingly, we introduce a two-stage decision model for
the non-Annex I country, in which the two sequent decisions of accepting and
complying are combined to the decision of accepting the target. That is, on the
first stage, the non-Annex I country faces the two strategic options of accepting
the no-lose target or not accepting it. Accepting the target automatically
implies that the non-Annex I country complies with the target and, thus, enters
second stage, where it reduces its emissions and is allowed to sell certificates to
the Annex I community. Hence, on the second stage both players decide on the
amount of emissions to reduce domestically and thus determine the number of
certificates traded in the market.
The first stage of the non-Annex I country’s two-stage decision process
is described by two conditions, which take the no-lose characteristic of the
reduction target into account. With the first condition
p(r∗A, r
∗
N)(r
∗
N − TN)− CN(r∗N) ≥ 0, (2.2)
scale of GHG reductions that could be made, relative to emission baselines, for a given level
of carbon price”. In contrast, a technical definition of reduction potential does not take into
account the costs but focuses on the amount of emission reductions.
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the non-Annex I country checks whether the no-lose target TN is profitable or
not. For this purpose, it compares the costs CN(r∗N) of reducing its emissions
by the optimal amount r∗N , which is together with r∗A determined on the sec-
ond stage in the emissions trading market, with the revenues from selling the
emission certificates on the emissions market at market price p(r∗A, r∗N).11 The
non-Annex I country will only accept the no-lose target if it suffers no finan-
cial loss from participating in the emissions trading market. We therefore call
condition (2.2) the participation constraint. Since the non-Annex I country is
only allowed to sell certificates on the market, condition
r∗N − TN ≥ 0 (2.3)
has to be fulfilled in any cases for the non-Annex I country to accept the target.
For deriving more precise conditions for participation, we have to consider the
decision problem on the second stage.
In the second stage, the countries interact in an emissions trading market
and thereby decide on their emission reductions by minimizing their total costs
from emissions reduction and trading for achieving their target, i.e.
TCk = Ck(rk) + p(rA, rN) · (Tk − rk)→ min
rk
(2.4)
for k ∈ {A,N}. The target function of the non-Annex I country N is denoted
as its incentive compatibility condition.
The optimization problem has to be amended by the market clearing con-
ditions. If the non-Annex I country decides to accept the no-lose target and
participate in the market, the market clearing condition
rA + rN = TA + TN (2.5)
has to be fulfilled, i.e. total emission reductions of all market participants have
to match the global reduction target. However, if the non-Annex I country
does not accept the no-lose target on the first stage, rN = 0 holds and (2.5) is
replaced by
11The environmental benefits resulting from global emission reductions are neglected in
this model for the purpose of focusing on an economic analysis of no-lose targets and are
therefore not included in the optimization problem. For estimations on damage/social costs
see e.g. N. Stern (2007) or Tol (2009).
2.2 Theoretical modeling of no-lose targets 17
rA = TA. (2.6)
In this case the non-Annex I country does not reduce its emissions compared
to baseline and, thus, does not sell certificates to the Annex I community.
The interaction of the cost-minimizing countries in the emissions trading
market, according to (2.4), determine their individually optimal reductions r∗A
and r∗N and the market price p(r∗A, r∗N).
The two-stage decision process is solved by backwards induction. Antici-
pating the outcome of emissions trading on the second stage, the non-Annex I
country decides on its behavior on the first stage, i.e. to accept the no-lose
target if the total costs in the second stage are non-positive or reject it other-
wise.12
In the remainder of this section, we solve the optimization problem of the
non-Annex I country and derive the participation conditions under which this
country has an incentive to accept the no-lose target TN and, thus, participate
in the emissions trading market. In Section 2.2.3 we consider the case of
a competitive emissions trading market, which represents the situation of a
small non-Annex I country acting as a price taker on the emissions trading
market. This applies for most non-Annex I countries, which have a rather low
share of world GHG emissions. However, there is a small number of countries,
including China and India, that account for a large share of the world-wide
GHG emissions. We therefore assume that those countries may not simply
act as price takers but may decide strategically on the international emissions
trading market. Hence, in Section 2.2.4 we consider the case of a non-Annex I
country with market power in the emissions trading market.
2.2.3 Participation conditions in a competitive market
In the competitive market framework, endogenously determined variables are
labeled by C. In the competitive market all countries act as price takers.
Therefore, the first order conditions of the minimization problem (2.4) yield a
certificate market price equal to the marginal abatement costs,
pC = MCA(r
C
A) = αArA = MCN(r
C
N) = αNrN . (2.7)
12This kind of anticipatory behavior of a country seems to be in line with what can be
expected from a country within a negotiation process.
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The combination of (2.7) and the market clearing condition (2.5) then deter-
mines the non-Annex I country’s optimal amount of emission reductions in the
case of participation
rCN − TN =
αATA − αNTN
αA + αN
=
αTA − TN
1 + α
. (2.8)
This condition generally applies to competitive emissions trading markets.
That is, the optimal emission reductions by the non-Annex I country depend
on the ambition level of both targets as well as the slope of the marginal abate-
ment cost curves, but are independent of the emission reductions realized by
the Annex I community. Rearranging (2.8) to solve for rCN ,
rCN =
α(TA + TN)
1 + α
=
αT
1 + α
, (2.9)
confirms that the optimal amount of emission reductions in a competitive
market is only depending on the total amount of emission reductions T =
TA + TN , but not on the reduction targets of the countries (Hahn, 1984).
By deciding on accepting the no-lose target on the first stage of the game,
the non-Annex I country takes the expected outcome of the second stage into
account, i.e. the market price (2.7) and its optimal emissions (2.9) in case of
accepting the no-lose target and participating in emissions trading.
We have to consider the fact that the non-Annex I country may only sell
certificates on the emissions trading market. Combining (2.3) and (2.8) yields
αNTN ≤ αATA (2.10)
as a necessary condition for participation. For the non-Annex I country to
act as a seller, the marginal abatement costs at the target of the non-Annex I
country need to be lower than of the Annex I community. That is, the Annex I
community will only buy emission certificates if they are less expensive than
emission reductions at home.
For deriving a more precise condition for participation, we apply (2.7) to
the participation constraint (2.2), which leads to
rCN
(
αN(rN − TN)− αN
2
rN
)
≥ 0. (2.11)
Since rCN ≥ 0, the expression in brackets needs to be greater than zero, which
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together with (2.8) yields
TN
TA
≤ αA
αA + 2αN
=
α
2 + α
(2.12)
as necessary and sufficient participation condition. According to this con-
dition, the ratio of burden-sharing TN/TA is restricted by an upper bound,
which is determined by the slopes of the marginal abatement cost curves of
the two countries. It is obvious that condition (2.12) is more restrictive than
(2.10). That is, for the non-Annex I country to participate, its marginal abate-
ment costs need be lower than the half of the Annex I community’s marginal
abatement costs at their respective targets. Moreover, since the term on the
right-hand side of (2.12) is smaller than one, the absolute amount of the no-
lose target TN has to be strictly smaller than the Annex I community’s target
TA and is independent of the values of αA and αN . Thus, for the non-Annex I
country to accept the no-lose target, this has to be less strict than the Annex I
community’s target.
Condition (2.12) allows us to calculate the ratio of burden sharing in de-
pendence of the relative reduction potentials of the two countries. For compa-
rability, we first consider the symmetric case α = 1 (αA = αN). The right-hand
side of (2.12) then becomes 1/3. That is, in order to induce the non-Annex I
country to accept the no-lose target, it can carry not more than 25% of the to-
tal emission reduction burden and, thus, the Annex I community has to carry
at least 75%, although both dispose of the same emission reduction potential.
For the asymmetric cases, let us first consider the case of α < 1 (αA < αN) in
which the Annex I community has a higher emission reduction potential than
the non-Annex I country. This can in particular be the case for small and least
developed non-Annex I countries. Here, the steeper the marginal abatement
cost curve of the non-Annex I country is (compared to this of the Annex I
community), the smaller is its maximal share of emission reductions. In the
other case of α > 1 (αA > αN), the non-Annex I country is willing to carry
more than 25% of the reduction burden without loosing the incentive to par-
ticipate. This case applies to large non-Annex I countries which have already
reached a certain economic development standard. In general, the maximum
ratio of the targets TN/TA for a non-Annex I country accepting the no-lose
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target and participating in emissions trading continuously increases in α with
TN
TA
≤

1 for α→∞
1
3
for α = 1
0 for α→ 0
. (2.13)
2.2.4 Participation conditions in the case of market power
Instead of a competitive emissions trading market, we now assume that the
non-Annex I country disposes of market power. Endogenously determined
variables are labeled by P .
As discussed before, this constellation is considered to be relevant for large
developing countries like China or India, which produce a large share of world-
wide GHG emissions. Both countries are feasible candidates for an inclusion in
an international agreement on climate change due to the size of their emissions
and the state of their economic development.
The non-Annex I country with market power takes the Annex I commu-
nity’s price-taking behavior into account when deciding on its emission reduc-
tions rN and thus the number of certificates to be sold. The Annex I commu-
nity’s “reaction” to rN is described by the functional relation rA = h(rN) with
h(rN) = TA − (rN − TN) = T − rN . (2.14)
The solution of the non-Annex I country’s minimization problem (2.4) then
leads to
pP = MCA(r
P
A) = αAr
P
A > MCN(r
P
N) = αNr
P
N (2.15)
as condition for the market price pP and results in the non-Annex I country’s
optimal emission reductions
rPN − TN =
αATA − αNTN
2αA + αN
=
αTA − TN
1 + 2α
(2.16)
and
rPN =
α(TA + 2TN)
1 + 2a
=
α(T + TN)
1 + 2a
. (2.17)
Note that other than in the case of a competitive market (2.9), where the
emissions reductions rCN only depend on the global target T , in the case of
market power, the no-lose target has an additional impact on non-Annex I’s
emissions reductions (Hahn, 1984).
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By considering the first stage of the decision process, let us first apply the
optimal emissions in the case of market power (2.16) to condition (2.3). As in
the case of a competitive market, this also yields condition (2.10) as a necessary
condition for the non-Annex I country to participate in the emissions trading
market. That is, for the non-Annex I country to be able to sell emission
certificates to the Annex I community, its marginal abatement costs at the
no-lose reduction target TN need to be lower than the Annex I community’s
abatement costs at the reduction target TA.
Applying condition (2.16) to condition (2.2) yields
TN
TA
≤
√
1
4
+
α2A +
1
2
αAαN
α2N + 2αAαN
− 1
2
=
√
1 + 2α− 1
2
(2.18)
as a necessary and sufficient participation condition for the non-Annex I coun-
try under a no-lose target in the case of market power. As before, the condition
only includes the slopes of the marginal abatement cost curves of the two coun-
tries.
Obviously, condition (2.18) differs from the corresponding competitive mar-
ket condition (2.12). In the symmetric case α = 1 (αA = αN), the burden shar-
ing ratio TN/TA may not exceed (
√
3 − 1)/2 ≈ 0.366 in order to provide the
non-Annex I country an incentive to participate, which is slightly higher than
in the symmetric competitive market case, where it is equal to 1/3. Hence,
this implies that in the case of market power, the non-Annex I country can
carry a higher share of the emission reduction burden.
As in the competitive market case, the upper bound of the burden sharing
ratio continuously increases in α with
TN
TA
=

∞ for α→∞√
3−1
2
for α = 1
0 for α→ 0
. (2.19)
2.3 The optimal no-lose target
Before analyzing the effects of a no-lose target in the two considered target-
setting approaches of bottom-up and top-down (Section 2.4 and 2.5), we first
discuss the “correct” stetting of a no-lose target and on this basis propose the
“optimal” no-lose target.
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The participation conditions derived in Section 2.2 define a range for appli-
cable no-lose targets rather than one precise target. For a more distinguished
analysis of the no-lose reduction targets we want to propose, in a first step,
a precise no-lose target, i.e. “optimal” no-lose target, by taking two major
aspects of the concept of the no-lose target within the framework of inter-
national climate protection agreements into consideration. First, the no-lose
target representing the non-Annex I country’s contribution to emission reduc-
tions should be as large as possible. Second, the idea of the no-lose target is
that the costs of emission reductions are carried solely by the countries of the
Annex I community. Therefore, financial transfers to the non-Annex I country
via the carbon market should only be used to finance the emission reductions
in the non-Annex I country. Accordingly, we propose the following definition
for the optimal no-lose target:
Definition 1. A no-lose target is called optimal if it meets the following two
requirements:
(i) The no-lose target is as ambitious as possible.
(ii) The sum of the non-Annex I country’s costs and revenues from emission
reduction and trading are zero.
It is easy to see that the upper limit for the no-lose target meets these
requirements.
Proposition 1. The optimal no-lose target TCN in a competitive market is
determined by the upper limit of (2.13) and the optimal no-lose target T PN in
the case of market power of the non-Annex I country is determined by the
upper limit of (2.19).
Proof. The upper limit of the no-lose target is the highest no-lose target that
the non-Annex I country accepts and, thus, requirement (i) is met. Since the
upper limit of the no-lose target is determined by the zero-profit condition,
requirement (ii) is fulfilled.
In general, the two characteristics that define the optimal no-lose target
play an important role in making an integration of non-Annex I countries using
no-lose targets politically more acceptable for Annex I countries. Although
the nature of the no-lose target implies that all costs have to be carried by
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the countries of the Annex I community, setting the no-lose target optimally
guarantees that, on the one hand, the non-Annex I country’s contribution to
emission reductions is as large as possible. Hence, the no-lose target fulfills the
Annex I countries’ call for own contributions by non-Annex I countries. On
the other hand, the zero-profit condition prevents that large financial profits
can be generated by the non-Annex I country via the carbon market.13 Thus,
the two characteristics provide good reasons that if a no-lose target is to be
defined it is set as close as possible to the optimal no-lose target.
2.4 The no-lose target in a bottom-up environ-
ment
In our framework, the bottom-up environment is characterized by an exogenous
Annex I community’s target T¯A and an endogenous no-lose target and, thus,
an endogenous global target. According to Proposition 1 together with (2.12)
and (2.18), the optimal no-lose target in the competitive case is then given by
TCN =
α
2 + α
T¯A (2.20)
and in the market power case by
T PN =
√
1 + 2α− 1
2
T¯A . (2.21)
Hence, the respective global targets are
TC = T¯A + T
C
N , (2.22)
T P = T¯A + T
P
N . (2.23)
The comparison of the two considered competition levels with respect to
the optimal no-lose target and the global target yields the following result.
Proposition 2. In the bottom-up approach with a fixed Annex I community’s
target T¯A and under the condition of an optimal no-lose target the following
holds:
13Alternative (market or non-market-based) mechanisms could be used to generate addi-
tional monetary transfers for e.g. adaptation or as compensation for damages from climate
change.
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(i) The optimal no-lose target (and thus the global target) positively depends
on α in the case of a competitive market as well as in the case of market
power of the non-Annex I country.
(ii) The optimal no-lose target (and thus the global target) in the market
power case is always higher than in the competitive market case, i.e.
T PN > T
C
N for every α > 0, and the ratio T PN /TCN increases with α.
Proof. For a fixed Annex I community’s target T¯A, the derivatives of the op-
timal no-lose targets (2.20) and (2.21) with respect to α are
dTCN
dα
=
2
(2 + α)2
T¯A > 0 (2.24)
dT PN
dα
=
1
2
√
1 + 2α
T¯A > 0 (2.25)
which are also the derivatives of the global targets (2.22) and (2.23) with
respect to α. Thus, (i) is proved.
For the first part of (ii) with (2.20) and (2.21) we have to show
√
1 + 2α− 1
2
>
α
2 + α
for all α > 0. This leads to
(2 + α)
√
1 + 2α > 2 + 3α
⇔ (2 + α)2(1 + 2α) > (2 + 3α)2
⇔ 4 + 12α + 9α2 + 2α3 > 4 + 12α + 9α2
⇔ 2α3 > 0
which is true because of α > 0. For the second part of (ii) we have to prove
d
(
TPN
TCN
)
dα
=
dTPN
dα
TCN − T PN dT
C
N
dα
(TCN )
2
> 0
which with (2.24) and (2.25) leads to
α
2(2 + α)
√
1 + 2α
>
2(
√
1 + 2α− 1)
2(2 + α)2
⇔ α(2 + α) > 2(1 + 2α)− 2√1 + 2α
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⇔ α2 + 2√1 + 2α > 2(1 + α)
⇔ α4 + 4α2√1 + 2α + 4(1 + 2α) > 4 + 8α + 4α2
⇔ α2(α2 + 4(√1 + 2α− 1)) > 0
which is true because of α > 0 and, thus, the second part of (ii) is proved.
The first part of statement (ii) has its origin in the fact that in the market
power case the non-Annex I country can profit from its dominant position in
the emissions trading market. Hence, the ability of the non-Annex I country
to sell its certificates at a high price and thus increase its revenue can be
used to increase its contribution to emission reductions. The optimal no-lose
target accounts for this by capturing all revenues from emissions trading and
thus preventing the non-Annex I country to benefit from its market position
by increasing the ambition of the target. That is, the benefits from market
power are used to force higher global emission reductions. The reason for
the second part of statement (ii) is that the impact of α = αA/αN on the
optimal target in the case of market power is stronger than in the case of a
competitive market. Hence, for significantly larger reduction potentials in the
non-Annex I country compared to the Annex I community’s the no-lose target
in the case of market power can be more ambitious compared to the optimal
no-lose target in a competitive market than for similar reduction potentials
or if reduction potential in the Annex I community is larger than in the non-
Annex I country. This is of particular interest for countries like China or
India with high emissions and large reduction potential. It implies that the
market power can be used to significantly increase the contribution from these
countries to global reduction efforts (see Figure 2.1).
We now consider the effect of the optimal no-lose target on actual emission
reductions in the bottom-up setting. In the competitive market case with
(2.9) and (2.20), the emission reductions of the non-Annex I country under
the optimal no-lose target yields
rCN =
2α
2 + α
T¯A (2.26)
and in the market power case with (2.17) and (2.21)
rPN =
α√
1 + 2α
T¯A . (2.27)
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Figure 2.1: Optimal no-lose targets under a bottom-up target-setting approach
The following proposition states interesting properties of non-Annex I coun-
try’s emission reductions induced by the optimal no-lose target.
Proposition 3. In the bottom-up approach with a fixed Annex I community’s
target T¯A and under the condition of an optimal no-lose target, the actual
emission reductions of the non-Annex I country both in the competitive market
case rCN and in the market power case rPN positively depend on α with
rPN T rCN for α T 4 .
Proof. The derivatives of (2.26) and (2.27) with respect to α are
drCN
dα
=
4
(2 + α)2
T¯A > 0
drPN
dα
=
2 + 3α
2
√
(1 + 2α)3
T¯A > 0
which proves the first part of the proposition.
For proving the second part of the proposition we compare (2.26) and
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(2.27). Hence, rPN T rCN is fulfilled if and only if
2 + α T 2
√
1 + 2α
⇔ 4 + 4α + a2 T 4 + 8α
⇔ α(α− 4) T 0
⇔ α T 4
which completes the proof.
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Figure 2.2: Emission reductions in the bottom-up approach with optimal no-
lose target
According to Proposition 3, using the bottom-up approach and applying
the optimal no-lose targets, the non-Annex I country’s actual emission reduc-
tions in the case of market power are higher than in the case of a competitive
market if the relative reduction potential of the non-Annex I country is suffi-
ciently high, i.e. α > 4 (see also Figure 2.2). The finding is interesting, because
the country with market power is usually expected to reduce less emissions in
order to offer fewer certificates and, in turn, the certificates-buying Annex I
community has to reduce more. However, if the no-lose target is set optimally
in relation to a given Annex I’s target T¯A, this need not be the case if the
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non-Annex I country’s emission reduction potential is high enough compared
to the Annex I community. Here, the higher emission reductions are forced by
a more ambitious optimal no-lose target in the market power case (Proposition
2). That is, market power has a positive effect on global emission reductions
if a bottom-up target-setting is chosen as it allows higher global emission re-
ductions than the competitive market.
In section 2.6 we will see that this result does not hold for overall abatement
costs. That is, the higher global emission reductions in the market power case
are achieved through higher costs due to market inefficiencies.
2.5 The no-lose target in a top-down environ-
ment
We now focus on the top-down approach in which the global reduction target is
exogenous and denoted by T¯ . In contrast to the bottom-up approach, both the
optimal no-lose target and the Annex I community’s target are endogenously
determined in the competitive market case and the market power case:
TCA + T
C
N = T¯ (2.28)
T PA + T
P
N = T¯ (2.29)
Applying Proposition 1 to (2.12) with (2.28) leads to
TCN =
α
2(1 + α)
T¯ (2.30)
in the competitive market case of the top-down approach and its application
to (2.18) with (2.29) to
T PN =
√
1 + 2α− 1√
1 + 2α + 1
T¯ . (2.31)
in the market power case of the top-down approach. The Annex I community’s
target is then endogenously determined by TCA = T¯ − TCN and T PA = T¯ − T PN ,
respectively.
The comparison of the two market forms with respect to the optimal no-lose
targets shows that similar properties apply as in the bottom-up approach.
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Proposition 4. In the top-down approach with a fixed global target T¯ and
under the condition of an optimal no-lose target the following holds:
(i) The optimal no-lose target positively depends on α in the case of a com-
petitive market as well as in the case of market power of the non-Annex I
country.
(ii) The optimal no-lose target in the market power case is always higher than
in the competitive market case, i.e. T PN > TCN for every α > 0, and the
ratio T PN /TCN increases with α.
Proof. The derivatives of the optimal no-lose targets (2.30) and (2.31) with
respect to α are
dTCN
dα
=
2
4(1 + α)2
T¯ > 0 (2.32)
dT PN
dα
=
2√
1 + 2α(
√
1 + 2α + 1)2
T¯ > 0 (2.33)
which proves (i).
For the first part of (ii) with (2.30) and (2.31) we have to prove
√
1 + 2α− 1√
1 + 2α + 1
>
α
2(1 + α)
for all α > 0. This leads to
(2 + α)
√
1 + 2α > 2 + 3α
⇔ (2 + α)2(1 + 2α) > (2 + 3α)2
⇔ 4 + 12α + 9α2 + α3 > 4 + 12α + 9α2
⇔ 2α3 > 0
which is true because of α > 0. For the second part of (ii) we have to show
d
(
TPN
TCN
)
dα
=
dTPN
dα
TCN − T PN dT
C
N
dα
(TCN )
2
> 0
which with (2.32) and (2.33) leads to
2α
2(1 + α)
√
1 + 2α(
√
1 + 2α + 1)2
>
2(
√
1 + 2α− 1)
4(1 + α)2(
√
1 + 2α + 1)
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⇔ 8α(1 + α) > 4√1 + 2α(√1 + 2α− 1)(√1 + 2α + 1)
⇔ 1 + α > √1 + 2α
⇔ (1 + α)2 > 1 + 2α
⇔ 1 + 2α + α2 > 1 + 2α
⇔ α2 > 0
which is true because of α > 0 and, thus, the second part of (ii) is proved.
Because of (2.28) and (2.29) the opposite of Proposition 2 holds for the
endogenous target of the Annex I community: TCA and T PA negatively depend
on α, T PA < TCA for every α > 0 and the ratio T PA /TCA decreases with α (see
Figure 2.3).
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Figure 2.3: Optimal no-lose targets under a top-down target-setting approach
The actual emission reductions of the non-Annex I country in the competi-
tive market case (2.9) under the optimal no-lose target (2.30) in the top-down
setting are given by
rCN =
α
1 + α
T¯ (2.34)
and in the market power case, the emission reductions, determined by (2.17)
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and (2.31), are given by
rPN =
2α
1 + 2α +
√
1 + 2α
T¯ . (2.35)
While the no-lose target has the same properties in the bottom-up and top-
down approach, this does not hold for the actual emission reductions of the
non-Annex I country.
Proposition 5. In the bottom-up target-setting approach with optimal no-lose
target, the actual emission reductions of the non-Annex I country both in the
competitive market case rCN and in the market power case rPN positively depend
on α with rCN > rPN for all α > 0.
Proof. The derivative of (2.34) with respect to α is
drCN
dα
=
1
(1 + α)2
T¯ > 0 (2.36)
and the derivative of (2.35) is
drPN
dα
=
2 + 2
√
1 + 2α− 2α√
1+2α
(1 + 2α +
√
1 + 2α)2
T¯ . (2.37)
Derivative (2.37) is positive for α > 0 if
√
1 + 2α + 1 + 2α− α > 0
⇔ 1 + α +√1 + 2α > 0
which is true and, thus, with (2.36) proves the first part of the proposition.
For the second part of the proposition, we compare (2.34) and (2.35).
Hence, rCN > rPN is fulfilled if and only if
1 + 2α +
√
1 + 2α > 2 + 2α
⇔ √1 + 2α > 1
which holds for α > 0 and, thus, completes the proof.
Although in the top-down setting the optimal no-lose target is always higher
in the market power case than in a competitive market, for the non-Annex I
country’s emission reductions it is the other way round. Hence, the Annex I
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community’s emission reductions in the case of market power are always higher
than in a competitive market (see Figure 2.4). The reason for this is the fixed
global target in the top-down setting, which prevents non-Annex I’s emission
reductions in the market power case to become higher than in the competitive
market. Hence, although market power results in a higher contribution of
the non-Annex I country to global emission reductions determined by the no-
lose target it does not lower the actual emission reductions by the Annex I
community but rather increases them.
1.2
1.0
0 6
0.8
0.4
.
0.2
0.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
r1* r2* r1** r2**
Figure 2.4: Emission reductions in the top-down approach with optimal no-lose
target
2.6 Welfare effects
In the following we compare the before considered cases, particularly with
respect to overall total costs TC = TCA + TCN , which occur from the total
emission reductions of the Annex I community and the non-Annex I country.
Our comparison includes the case without the non-Annex I country (labeled
by 0), the case of a participating non-Annex I country as price taker in a
competitive market (labeled by C), and the case of a participating non-Annex I
country with market power (labeled by P ). Here, we account for both target-
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setting approaches of bottom-up and top-down.
Since the non-Annex I country does not participate in the first case and due
to the definition of the optimal no-lose target for the latter two cases (Definition
1), the Annex I community bears all costs from emission reductions in each
case, i.e. TC0 = TC0A, TCC = TCCA , and TCP = TCPA .
Proposition 6. Under both target-settings, the bottom-up approach with a
fixed Annex I community’s target T¯A and the top-down approach with a fixed
global target T¯ , the ordering of the certificate market price is
p0 > pP > pC (2.38)
and of the total costs
TC0 > TCP > TCC (2.39)
for every α > 0.
Proof. In case of non-participation, the Annex I countries have to achieve their
target with their own emission reductions, i.e. r0A = TA, and the certificate
price is determined by the Annex I community’s marginal abatement costs at
their target (2.1), i.e. p0 = MC(r0A) = αATA. In case of participation, the
non-Annex I country bears no costs, i.e. TCN = 0, and sells certificates to
the Annex I countries, both in the competitive market case and in the market
power case. Therefore, the Annex I community reduces less emissions than in
the case of non-participation, i.e. rA < TA, and closes the gap to the target with
certificates bought from the non-Annex I country. Since the Annex I countries
act as price taker, the certificate price is equal to the Annex I community’s
marginal abatement costs (2.1), i.e. p = MC(rA) = αArA. Hence, p < p0 and
TCA < TC
0
A and thus TC < TC0.
For the comparison of the competitive market case with the market power
case, we fist consider the top-down setting. It is well known that a given
global target T¯ is efficiently achieved (i.e. minimum total abatement costs) in a
competitive market, while this is not the case for market power (Hahn, 1984).
Hence, TCP < TCC . In the market power case, the non-Annex I country
reduces less emissions than in the competitive market case (Proposition 5)
and, thus, the Annex I community reduces more emissions, i.e. rPA > rCA . Since
in both cases the market price is equal to the Annex I’s marginal abatement
costs, (2.7) and (2.15), and since MC ′(rA) > 0, i.e. the marginal abatement
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costs strictly increase in emission reductions, pP > pC holds.
In the bottom-up setting, the global target in the case of market power is
always higher than in the competitive market (Proposition 2), i.e. T P > TC for
every α > 0. Assume that T P is achieved efficiently in a competitive market
with market price pPC and total costs TCPC . Since in a competitive market,
the price is equal to the countries’ marginal abatement costs, which strictly
increase in their emission reductions, pPC > pC and TCPC > TCC hold. Then,
according to the top-down argumentation before, pP > pPC and TCP > TCPC
and, thus, pP > pC and TCP > TCC .
The two effects stated in Proposition 6 are well-known characteristics of
emissions trading markets but nonetheless important: first, broader partici-
pation leads to lower prices and lower reduction costs. Second, market power
leads to less efficient results than a competitive market, hence, for fixed tar-
gets costs and prices are higher in the market power case than they are in the
competitive market. Particularly the first characteristic is interesting for the
case of no-lose targets. Independent of the emission reduction contributions of
the non-Annex I country, the participation of the non-Annex I country reduces
the total costs of emission reductions which are covered by the Annex I com-
munity. Hence, the integration of the non-Annex I country is beneficial from
a social perspective as well as for the Annex I community even if the no-lose
target is little ambitious. 14
2.7 Case study
The following numerical example shall help to illustrate the implications and
interpretations. The community of the Annex I countries includes all countries
listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol excluding the USA. A large non-
Annex I country, namely China, is to be included in the emission reduction
activities applying a no-lose target. The reduction target for the Annex I
14More specifically, the Annex I community’s aggregated costs are decreasing by integrat-
ing the non-Annex I country. Looking at the individual countries of the Annex I community
participating in the emissions trading market there are Annex I countries that are negatively
affected by the participation of the non-Annex I country. Only those Annex I countries ben-
efit from broader participation that are certificate buyers in the market. Annex I countries
that can sell emission certificates are worse of as they have greater competition and, hence,
have to sell less certificates at lower prices.
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community is assumed to be 30% below 1990 levels by 2020.15 This leads to
necessary emission reductions of 1.9 GtCO2e in the Annex I countries in 2020
(see Table 2.1). Emission projections for 2020 are taken from calculations with
the energy systems model POLES. The underlying scenario assumptions are
taken from the World Energy Outlook 2010 (IEA, 2010). Marginal abatement
costs are a linear approximation of marginal abatement cost curves from the
POLES model. Slopes are given in Table 2.2. Including the USA and their
high low-cost reduction potential lowers the slope of the Annex I countries
from 38 to 21 ke/(MtCO2e)2.
1990* 2005* 2020
Emissions [GtCO2e]
AI incl. USA 18.7 17.7 17.8
AI excl. USA 12.6 10.7 11.0
China 3.6 7.3 14.8
Emission target [GtCO2e]
AI incl. USA 13.1
AI excl. USA 8.8
Reduction target [GtCO2e]
AI incl. USA 4.7
AI excl. USA 2.2
* Historic emission data for 1990 and 2005 are taken from CAIT 8.0 .
Table 2.1: Emissions and emission reductions in 2020
Choosing a bottom-up approach for target-setting, the Annex I countries’
reduction target is given exogenous. In our example, reductions are 4.7 and
2.2 GtCO2e including, respectively excluding the USA. Emission reductions
from China are additional to the Annex I countries’ emission reductions leading
to global emission reductions of 6.4 and 3.3 GtCO2e respectively in the case of a
competitive market. If factoring in market power for China, the global emission
reductions can be increased by 0.2 and 0.3 GtCO2e respectively. Hence, in
both cases the emission reduction targets for China are significantly lower
than emission reduction targets for the Annex I countries.
Optimal emission reductions lead to trading of emission certificates for
1.7 GtCO2e and 1.1 GtCO2e respectively from China to the Annex I countries
15The IPCC indicates that a reduction of 25 to 40% below 1990 levels by 2020 from Annex I
countries is necessary to keep global temperature increase below 2◦C above pre-industrial
levels (Metz et al., 2007).
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in the case of a competitive market. In case of market power, the certificates
traded between China and the Annex I countries are lower although the overall
reduction target is higher. Comparing the numbers traded shows that China
always sells less certificates in the case of market power than in the competitive
market. This highlights the market-dominant position of China as a seller of
certificates.
In contrast, in the case of the top-down approach, the global reduction
target is exogenous and set to 4.7 and 2.2 GtCO2e respectively including and
excluding the US. Splitting the reductions between the Annex I countries and
China leads to emission reductions of 1.3 and 0.7 GtCO2e respectively for
China in the case of a competitive market. Remaining reduction targets for
the Annex I countries are 3.4 and 1.5 GtCO2e. That means, in the case of
participation of the USA China carries about 28% of the overall emission re-
duction burden. Excluding the USA the higher emission reduction costs in the
remaining Annex I countries leads to China being able to carry about 32% of
the overall emission reduction burden. The certificates traded between China
and the Annex I countries are equivalent to 1.3 and 0.7 GtCO2e respectively
in the case of a competitive market. In case of market power significantly less
emission certificates are traded while the reduction target of China is again
more ambitious than in the competitive market case. Interestingly, as in the
case of Annex I excl. USA the reduction potential in China is more than twice
as high than the reduction potential in the Annex I countries, optimal emis-
sion reductions in China in the case of market power are higher than optimal
emission reductions in the Annex I countries although the reduction target is
significantly lower.
2.7
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Competitive market Market power
AI incl. USA AI excl. USA China AI incl. USA AI excl. USA China
Slopes [1000e/(MtCO2e)2] 20.66 37.62 17.85 20.66 37.62 17.85
Bottom-up approach
global target [GtCO2e] 6.4 3.3 6.6 3.6
optimal target [GtCO2e] 4.71 2.21 1.7/ 1.1 4.71 2.21 1.9/ 1.4
optimal reductions [GtCO2e] 3.0 1.1 3.4/ 2.3 3.6 1.6 3.0/ 2.0
certificates traded [GtCO2e] 1.7 1.1 -1.7/ -1.1 1.1 0.6 -1.1/ -0.6
Top-down approach
global target [GtCO2e] 4.71 2.21 4.71 2.21
optimal target [GtCO2e] 3.4 1.5 1.3/ 0.7 3.3 1.3 1.4/ 0.9
optimal reductions [GtCO2e] 2.2 0.7 2.5/ 1.5 2.6 1.0 2.1/ 1.2
certificates traded [GtCO2e] 1.3 0.7 -1.3/ -0.7 0.8 0.4 -0.8/ -0.4
1exogenous
Table 2.2: Estimation of China’s optimal no-lose reduction target
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2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, a two-stage decision process was introduced to analyze the
potential of no-lose targets to act as a suitable instrument to integrate a non-
Annex I country in international emission reduction efforts. The main goal was
to estimate the contribution from a non-Annex I country to global emission
reduction efforts applying a no-lose target while being incentive-compatible.
We derived conditions for the no-lose target to incentivize participation of the
non-Annex I country.
The analysis of the participation conditions shows for case of symmetric
countries in a perfectly competitive market that the maximum (optimal) no-
lose target is given by a burden-sharing between the non-Annex I country and
the Annex I community of 1 to 3. That means, even in the case of similar
reduction potentials high certificate transfers are necessary to induce the non-
Annex I country to participate. Likewise, only a relatively small part of the
global reduction burden can be carried by the non-Annex I country applying
no-lose targets. Although the analyses show that for a high reduction potential
of the non-Annex I country the burden-sharing is less badly balanced, the no-
lose target always needs to be lower than the target of the Annex I community
in the case of a competitive market.
In contrast, in the case of market power not only a more ambitious no-lose
target is possible compared to a competitive market, the no-lose target may
also exceed the aggregated target of the Annex I community. Furthermore, for
bottom-up target-setting and applying the optimal no-lose target, the actual
emission reductions of the non-Annex I country were found to be lower in
the case of market power than in the competitive market if the abatement
potential of the non-Annex I country is at least four times as high as the
Annex I community’s.
Using the participation conditions derived we argue that an optimal def-
inition of a no-lose target fulfills the participation conditions with equality,
thus leading to the highest possible contribution to emission reductions by the
non-Annex I country and not allowing for any financial profits being gained
via the carbon market. This characteristic remains unchanged in the case of
market power when gains from the market-dominant position can be used to
induce a higher contribution to emission reductions by the non-Annex I coun-
try. Therefore, no-lose targets may be politically more acceptable to integrate
2.8 Conclusion 39
in particular large non-Annex I countries like China and India in an emissions
trading market. On the one hand, the financial burden lays solely with the
Annex I countries. On the other hand, preventing financial profits for large
non-Annex I countries even in the case of market power, while at the same time
resulting in own emission reduction contributions, could make such a target
more acceptable for Annex I countries.
The above analyses are restricted to one non-Annex I country facing a
no-lose target. While this allows some general statements on the effects of no-
lose targets and their ability to contribute to global emission reductions one
important factor is excluded from the analyses. If more than one non-Annex I
country faces a no-lose target, they compete in supplying emission certificates
in the emissions trading market. Hence, the participation decision affects the
supply of emission certificates and, thus the market price. Via the revenue
effect the market price in turn affects the participation decision of the non-
Annex I countries. In the following chapter, the model will thus be expanded
to include two non-Annex I countries facing no-lose targets.
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Chapter 3
Interaction of two non-Annex I
countries
3.1 Introduction
In section 1.2, two effects were introduced that influence whether a no-lose
target is profitable: the cost effect and the revenue effect. The cost effect is
solely determined by the level of the no-lose target and the form of a country’s
abatement cost curve, i.e. whether a country’s abatement potential is high
and cheap or low and expensive. In contrast, the revenue effect depends on
the level of the no-lose target, but also on the price for emission certificates
in the emissions trading market. The target level determines the number of
excess emission certificates a country can sell. This, and the price for emission
certificates, determine a country’s revenues (see the non-Annex I country’s
total costs given in (2.4)).
The various aspects of defining a profitable no-lose target for one non-
Annex I country were analyzed in the last chapter. In the case of one non-
Annex I country facing a no-lose target, the non-Annex I country can determine
the market price for emission certificates and, hence, has all the information
it needs to decide whether it is profitable to fulfill the no-lose target and
participate in the emissions trading market. In the case where more than just
one non-Annex I country is facing a no-lose target, determining the market
price for emission certificates is more difficult. In that case, the market price is
affected by each non-Annex I country’s decision to participate in the emissions
trading market or not.
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In this chapter, we expand the analysis to the simplest case of interaction
between non-Annex I countries, i.e. the case of two symmetric non-Annex I
countries facing a no-lose target. Limiting the number of non-Annex I countries
to two allows us to determine the main effects of interaction, while reducing
the complexity of the model and the corresponding equations.
The modeling framework introduced in this chapter is an extension of the
modeling framework applied in the last chapter. The non-Annex I countries’
payoffs are again determined by their interaction with the Annex I community
in an international emissions trading market. To model the link between the
two non-Annex I countries’ participation decision and the market price, a
game-theoretical dimension, is added in the form of a participation game of
the two non-Annex I countries. The game-theoretical extension reflects that
the payoffs are affected by each non-Annex I country’s decision to fulfill the
no-lose target. The resulting payoffs are used to determine the Nash equilibria
of the participation game.
Introducing a second non-Annex I country facing a no-lose target allows us
to widen the analysis of no-lose targets with respect to the number of partici-
pants in the emissions trading market. While, in general, wider participation
in the emissions trading system increases the economic efficiency of the trad-
ing system (see e.g. Boemare & Quirion, 2002), the framework will be applied
to determine the impacts of broader participation in the special case of no-
lose targets. In particular, we will analyze the effects of broader participation
on the optimal no-lose targets introduced in the last chapter and on global
emission reduction efforts.
Two cases are distinguished in the following analysis. We begin by ap-
plying the same fixed no-lose target in the case of one and two participating
non-Annex I countries. This allows us to determine the effects from increased
participation in the emissions trading market and the implications for the An-
nex I community. However, applying the same fixed no-lose target in the case
of one and two participating non-Annex I countries does not take into account
whether the no-lose target is profitable and, hence, induces participation by
even one of the non-Annex I countries. In a second step, we therefore determine
the “optimal no-lose targets” that take into account that no-lose targets have
to be profitable to induce participation by one, respectively two non-Annex I
countries. The impacts of the optimal no-lose targets on the emissions trading
market and the Annex I community are analyzed. In addition, the optimal
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no-lose targets also allow an analysis of the environmental effectiveness of one,
respectively two, participating non-Annex I countries.
As in chapter 2, two market forms are analyzed: a perfectly competitive
market where all market participants are price takers and a market with market
power on the part of the non-Annex I countries. The analyses are, however,
restricted to the case of a bottom-up target-setting approach.
The chapter proceeds as follows: in section 3.2 the two-player participa-
tion game is introduced and the Nash equilibria based on the non-Annex I
countries’ payoffs for the two market forms are derived. In section 3.3, char-
acteristics of the main decision parameter, the non-Annex I countries’ payoffs,
are determined. Results for fixed no-lose targets follow in section 3.4. The op-
timal no-lose targets are introduced and their implications for the international
emissions trading market are presented in section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Modeling no-lose targets in a two-player game
The following chapter presents an extension to the modeling framework intro-
duced in chapter 2.2 for two non-Annex I countries facing a no-lose target.
The model and the subsequent analyses are restricted to two symmetric non-
Annex I countries. The section proceeds as follows: in section 3.2.1, the general
modeling framework for two non-Annex I countries facing no-lose targets is in-
troduced. In section 3.2.2, the general framework is restricted to symmetric
non-Annex I countries and the participation game is introduced, incorporating
a game-theoretical component into the modeling framework. In sections 3.2.3
and 3.2.4, the non-Annex I countries’ payoffs are determined by solving the
previously introduced model. The resulting payoffs are then used to determine
the Nash equilibria of the participation game, i.e. determine the constellations
that are individually optimal strategies for both non-Annex I countries. Sec-
tion 3.2.3 presents results for the competitive market case, while section 3.2.4
presents results for the case of market power on the side of the non-Annex I
countries.
3.2.1 Modeling framework
Let us consider two players, labeled N1 and N2, representing two non-Annex I
countries (instead of one). The two countries’ emission reduction levels below a
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given baseline are denoted ri ≥ 0, i ∈ {N1, N2}, that is, a country’s emissions
cannot be higher than its baseline emission level. Reducing emissions below
baseline causes costs.1 The country’s marginal abatement costs MCi(ri) =
dCi
dri
(ri) = αiri are assumed to be linearly increasing with slope αi > 0. Hence,
country i’s abatement costs (neglecting fixed costs) are of the form2 Ci(ri) =
αi
2
r2i .
Both non-Annex I countries face a no-lose reduction target given by TN1
and TN2. Independent of each other, each non-Annex I country has to decide
on either complying with the no-lose target or not. If a country decides not to
comply with the target, it does not reduce its emissions (ri = 0) and, hence,
its abatement costs are zero (Ci(0) = 0). If a country decides to comply
with its target, it reduces its emissions (ri > 0). Meeting the no-lose target
induces abatement costs Ci(Ti). As a reward for meeting the no-lose target, the
non-Annex I country can, as before, participate in a restricted international
emissions trading market.
In the restricted international emissions trading market the non-Annex I
countries interact with the community of Annex I countries. The parameters
and variables of the Annex I community are labeled by index A. Each country
of the Annex I community is obliged to reach a national reduction target (with
respect to baseline emissions) and is allowed to freely bargain emission certifi-
cates in the international emissions trading market.3 The national reduction
targets add up to the joint target TA of the Annex I community. Their joint
emission reductions below baseline emissions are denoted by rA. The marginal
(aggregated) abatement cost curve MCA(rA) = dCAdrA = αArA is assumed to be
linearly increasing. Hence, the (aggregated) abatement cost curve (neglecting
fixed costs) is of the form CA = αA2 r
2
A.
The restriction in the interaction between the non-Annex I countries and
the community of Annex I countries is such that the non-Annex I countries
can only act as certificate sellers in the international emissions trading mar-
1As before, the abatement cost curves concentrate on net investment, operating and
maintenance costs and do not consider positive effects like energy savings or other positive
benefits. Hence, it is assumed that abatement costs are always positive.
2Note that all of our results qualitatively hold, even for weaker conditions for the abate-
ment costs MCi > 0 and dMCidri =MC
′ ≥ 0 and also if fixed costs are taken into considera-
tion.
3This describes - in simple terms and excluding the CDM - the situation of the Kyoto
Protocol where all countries facing reductions targets are allowed to participate in a common
emissions trading market.
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ket. Therefore, the non-Annex I country’s marginal abatement costs at the
no-lose reduction target need to be lower than the Annex I community’s ag-
gregated abatement costs at their aggregated reduction target. Hence, a neces-
sary condition for the non-Annex I country i to become a net-seller of emission
certificates is given by
Ti
TA
<
αA
αi
for i = N1, N2 . (3.1)
In addition, to become a net-seller of certificates in the market, the non-Annex I
country’s emission reductions ri need to exceed the no-lose target Ti,
ri − Ti ≥ 0 for i = N1, N2 . (3.2)
As a reward for meeting the no-lose target, the non-Annex I country i gets
emission certificates for the emission reductions above its target, i.e. ri − Ti.
These emission certificates can freely be sold in the international emissions
trading market. The market price for emission certificates, given by p, is
determined by the Annex I community’s aggregate reduction target and the
certificates the non-Annex I countries decide to sell, i.e. p = p(rA, rN1, rN2).
As before, all countries facing reduction targets (i.e. the Annex I coun-
tries as well as the two non-Annex I countries facing a no-lose target) act
in a cost-minimizing manner. Hence, country k’s optimization problem, k ∈
{A,N1, N2}, is given by
TCk = Ck(rk)− p(rA, rN1, rN2)(rk − Tk)→ min
rk
. (3.3)
The target function of the non-Annex I country is denoted as its incentive
compatibility condition.
The optimization problems have to be amended by a market clearing con-
dition which ensures that global emission reductions equal the global emission
target. Due to the no-lose character of the two non-Annex I countries’ targets,
the market clearing conditions depend on the decisions of the non-Annex I
countries to comply or not to comply with their targets. If both non-Annex I
countries decide to comply with their no-lose target, the market clearing con-
dition
rA + rN1 + rN2 = TA + TN1 + TN2 (3.4)
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has to hold. In that case, the global emission target is given by the Annex I
community’s aggregated target plus both non-Annex I countries’ targets. In
case only one of the two non-Annex I countries, country i, decides to comply
with its target, while the other non-Annex I country, country j, decides not to
reduce its emissions (i.e. rj = 0), the market clearing condition is given by
rA + ri = TA + Ti . (3.5)
If both non-Annex I countries decide not to comply with their no-lose targets
(i.e. rN1 = rN2 = 0), the market clearing condition is given by
rA = TA . (3.6)
Since the non-Annex I countries do not reduce their emissions compared to
baseline emissions, they cannot act as certificate sellers on the international
emissions trading market. Hence, the Annex I community has to fulfill its
reduction target “domestically”, i.e. without certificates from the non-Annex I
countries.
As before, the interaction of the Annex I community and the non-Annex I
countries in the international emissions trading market, according to (3.3),
determine their individual optimal emission reductions r∗N1, r∗N2 and r∗A and
the market price p(r∗A, r∗N1, r∗N2).
In the next section, this framework will be complemented by the partici-
pation game of the two non-Annex I countries.
3.2.2 The participation game for two symmetric non-
Annex I countries
For simplicity’s sake, we assume for the following analyses that the two non-
Annex I countries are symmetric, i.e. they have similar abatement costs and
face similar no-lose reduction targets. The non-Annex I countries’ parameters
and variables are labeled N . In particular, αN = αN1 = αN2 and TN = TN1 =
TN2.
As a measure of the abatement potential relation between a non-Annex I
country and the Annex I community, we, similar to chapter 2, define α as
the ratio of the abatement potentials of the Annex I community and a non-
Annex I country , i.e. α = αA
αN
. That is, the higher the non-Annex I country’s
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abatement potential is, compared to the Annex I community’s, the higher is
the value of α.
In order to analyze the participation decision of the two non-Annex I coun-
tries, we formulate the game as follows: two players, the non-Annex I countries
N1 and N2, can decide to participate (p) or not to participate (n) as certificate
sellers in the international emissions trading market. If a country decides to
participate, it has to meet its no-lose target. Additional emission reductions
can then be sold to the Annex I community. A non-Annex I country’s payoff,
the decision variable, is given by the negative of the total costs (3.3)
Πi = −TCi , i ∈ {N1, N2} . (3.7)
For participation to be the optimal choice, the payoff Πi needs to be pos-
itive, i.e. the abatement costs Ci(r∗i ) for reducing emissions by the optimal
amount r∗i need to be smaller than the revenues a country can generate by
selling emission certificates. Hence, similar to chapter 2
Πi ≥ 0 (3.8)
is the participation constraint of the non-Annex I country. If a non-Annex I
country chooses (n), i.e. does not participate in the international emissions
trading market, its total costs TCi are zero and, hence, Πi = 0.
In the case of one participating non-Annex I country i, the payoff ΠN of the
participating non-Annex I country is defined by the optimization problems of
the Annex I community and the participating non-Annex I country i applying
the market clearing condition (3.5). Similarly, in the case of two participating
non-Annex I countries, the non-Annex I countries’ payoffs Π˜N are defined by
all countries’ optimization problems and market clearing condition (3.4). The
general form of the payoff matrix of the game is given in Figure 3.1.
In the following, we will derive the payoffs ΠN and Π˜N for the case of
one and two participating non-Annex I countries to derive the Nash equilibria
of the game. In section 3.2.3 we solve the model, assuming that the market
for emission certificates is competitive. Following the analysis in the case of
a competitive market, we solve the model, assuming that the non-Annex I
countries can act as oligopolists in the international emissions trading market
in section 3.2.4.
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Player N1
Player N2
p n
p
Π˜N
Π˜N
0
ΠN
n
ΠN
0
0
0
Figure 3.1: Payoff matrix for two symmetric non-Annex I-countries
3.2.3 Nash equilibria in a competitive market
Endogenously determined variables in case of a perfectly competitive market
are labeled by C. Variables in case of two participating non-Annex I countries
are in addition marked with a tilde.
We start by analyzing the case of two participating non-Annex I countries.
To derive the non-Annex I countries’ payoffs Π˜N , we solve the Annex I and
non-Annex I countries’ minimization problems given by equation (3.3). Market
clearing condition (3.4) applies.4
The first order conditions yield a certificate market price equal to all coun-
tries’ marginal abatement costs, i.e.
p˜C = αAr˜
C
A = αN r˜
C
N1 = αN r˜
C
N2 . (3.9)
By rearranging market clearing condition (3.4) to
r˜CN1 = r˜
C
N2 =
TA + 2TN − rA
2
,
we derive the optimal emission reductions of the Annex I community as
r˜CA =
αN
2αA + αN
(TA + 2TN) =
1
2α + 1
T˜ (3.10)
with T˜ = TA+2TN being the global reduction target in case of two participating
non-Annex I countries as before. Applying (3.10) to (3.2.3) results in the
4A step-by-step derivation of the formula can be found in Appendix B.
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optimal emission reductions of the non-Annex I countries being given by
r˜CN1 = r˜
C
N2 =
αA
2αA + αN
(TA + 2TN) =
α
2α + 1
T˜ . (3.11)
From equation (3.9) it follows that the market price p˜C in equilibrium is given
by
p˜C =
αAαN
2αA + αN
(TA + 2TN) =
αA
2α + 1
T˜ . (3.12)
The above equations confirm that in a competitive market the price and opti-
mal emission reductions are only determined by the total amount of emission
reductions T˜ and the slope of the countries’ marginal abatement cost curves,
but are independent of the individual countries’ targets.
Having derived the equilibrium price and the optimal emission reductions,
we can now determine the non-Annex I countries’ payoff Π˜CN in a competitive
market by combining (3.10), (3.11) and (3.12) with (3.7). This yields
Π˜CN =
αA
2α + 1
(
α
2(2α + 1)
T˜ 2 − T˜ TN
)
. (3.13)
Unlike optimal emission reductions and the market price for emission cer-
tificates, the non-Annex I countries’ payoff depends not only on the global
reduction target T˜ , but also on the non-Annex I countries’ target and the
slope of the Annex I community’s marginal abatement cost curve. Hence, for
the non-Annex I countries’ payoff and, thus, the incentive to participate in
the international emissions trading market, the no-lose target and the Annex I
community’s abatement potential have an important role in addition to the
relative abatement potential α and the global reduction target.
For participation in the international emissions trading market to be prof-
itable for both non-Annex I countries, the payoff Π˜CN needs to be positive. From
equation (3.13) it follows that the participation constraint for two non-Annex I
countries in a competitive market is fulfilled for
TN
TA
≤ αA
2(αA + αN)
=
α
2(α + 1)
. (3.14)
We now turn to the case of only one participating non-Annex I country.
Results in the case of one participating non-Annex I country are the same as
the results derived in section 2.2.3 in the last chapter. They nevertheless are
included here again for the sake of completeness. However, we refrain from
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presenting a detailed derivation of the formula.
To derive the participating non-Annex I country’s payoff ΠCN , we apply
the same logic as before. In case of one participating non-Annex I country,
market clearing condition (3.5) applies. Solving the minimization problems of
one non-Annex I country and the Annex I community leads to
pC = αAr
C
A = αNr
C
i . (3.15)
Applying (3.5) to (3.15) yields
rCA =
αN
αA + αN
(TA + TN) =
1
α + 1
T (3.16)
as optimal emission reductions for the Annex I country with T = TA + TN
describing the global reduction target in the case of one participating non-
Annex I country. The optimal emission reductions of the participating non-
Annex I country are given by
rCi =
αA
αA + αN
(TA + TN) =
α
α + 1
T (3.17)
and the market price in equilibrium is given by
pC =
αAαN
αA + αN
(TA + TN) =
αA
α + 1
T . (3.18)
As in case of two participating non-Annex I countries, the equations show
that the optimal emissions and the market price depend on the slope of the
countries’ marginal abatement cost curves and the global emission target T ,
but are independent of the no-lose target and the Annex I countries’ targets.
Applying the equations (3.16), (3.17) and (3.18) to (3.7) yields the payoff
ΠCN for one participating non-Annex I country in a competitive market as
ΠCN =
αA
α + 1
(
α
2(α + 1)
T 2 − TTN
)
. (3.19)
As before, the non-Annex I country’s payoff not only depends on the ra-
tio α and the global reduction target, but also on the slope of the Annex I
community’s marginal abatement cost curve and the no-lose target.
For the participation constraint to be fulfilled for one non-Annex I country,
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the following condition can be derived from (3.19)
TN
TA
<
αA
αA + 2αN
=
α
α + 2
. (3.20)
The resulting payoff matrix for the two non-Annex I countries is given in
Figure 3.2.
To derive the Nash equilibria5 of the participation game, we need to further
specify the payoffs Π˜CN and ΠCN . Comparing relations (3.13) and (3.19), it can
be seen that the payoff in the case of two participating non-Annex I countries
given by relation (3.13) is lower than the payoff in the case of one participating
non-Annex I country given by relation (3.19).6 Thus, a profitable no-lose target
can be more ambitious in case of one participating non-Annex I country than
in case of two participating non-Annex I countries.
With the derived payoffs, three cases can be distinguished:
(i) Π˜CN < 0,ΠCN < 0, i.e. the no-lose target is neither profitable in the case
of two nor in the case of one participating non-Annex I countries;
(ii) Π˜CN > 0,ΠCN > 0, i.e. the no-lose target is profitable if one as well as two
non-Annex I countries participate;
(iii) Π˜CN < 0,ΠCN > 0, i.e. the no-lose target is profitable if one non-Annex
I country participates, but not profitable if both non-Annex I countries
participate.
In the first case, the payoffs Π˜CN and ΠCN are negative. This yields non-
participation as being the dominant strategy for the two non-Annex I countries.
That is, a non-Annex I country can never profit from participating in the
international emissions trading market independent of the other non-Annex I
country’s decision. Hence, the Nash equilibrium is given by (n,n). From the
participation constraint for one non-Annex I country (3.14) follows that this
case results if
TN
TA
>
α
α + 2
(3.21)
5The Nash equilibrium is defined as a profile of strategies such that each player’s strategy
is an optimal response to the other players’ strategies. For a more formal definition, see e.g.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1996).
6The proof is provided in Appendix B.
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applies for the ratio of the Annex I community’s target and the no-lose target.
Resulting payoffs for the two non-Annex I countries are (0, 0).
Similarly, in the second case, all payoffs are positive and, hence, partici-
pation is the dominant strategy for both non-Annex I countries, i.e. the best
strategy independent of the other non-Annex I country’s decision. Thus, the
resulting Nash equilibrium is given by (p,p). From (3.20) follows that the
second case results if
TN
TA
<
α
2(α + 1)
(3.22)
holds. Payoffs for the non-Annex I countries are (Π˜CN , Π˜CN).
The third case is characterized by two asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equi-
libria7 given by (p,n) and (n,p). Thus, participation of one non-Annex I coun-
try is only profitable if the other non-Annex I country decides to stay out of
the market. Otherwise, demand for emission certificates is not high enough to
cover the costs from the no-lose targets for both non-Annex I countries. Case
3 occurs for
α
α + 2
>
TN
TA
>
α
2(α + 1)
. (3.23)
The non-Annex I countries’ payoffs are given by (ΠCN , 0) and (0,ΠCN) respec-
tively.8
In contrast to the non-Annex I countries’ payoffs, the conditions for one,
respectively two, participating non-Annex I countries being the Nash equilib-
rium of the participation game are determined by α only, i.e. the abatement
ratio of the non-Annex I countries and the Annex I community. Further, the
relations (3.21) and (3.22) show that profitable no-lose targets, even if they
are only profitable in the case of one participating non-Annex I country, can-
not be more ambitious than the Annex I community’s aggregated reduction
target. In the case of two participating non-Annex I countries being the Nash
equilibrium, reductions from the individual no-lose targets are even lower than
1/2 of the Annex I community’s reduction target. Hence, total contributions
7In addition, a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium exists with participation being played
with a probability of Π
C
N
Π˜CN+Π
C
N
. The mixed-strategy equilibrium will not be included in this
analysis.
8 The third case is identical to the hawk-dove game introduced by Smith and Price (1973).
In contrast to coordination games like the battle of sexes, anti-coordination is the preferable
situation for both players in this game.
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from no-lose targets remain below the Annex I community’s share.
3.2.4 Nash equilibria in a market with market power
In this section, we analyze the participation game introduced before assuming
market power on the part of the non-Annex I countries instead of a competi-
tive market. Market power is modeled in the form of a Cournot duopoly. That
is, the non-Annex I countries take the price-taking behavior of the Annex I
community into account when determining their payoffs. Non-Annex I coun-
tries compete in quantities (in this case of emission certificates) rather than
in prices (Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, 1995). All endogenously deter-
mined variables are labeled by P . As before, parameters for two participating
non-Annex I countries are marked with a tilde.
To derive the non-Annex I countries’ payoffs ΠPN and Π˜PN , we start by deter-
mining optimal emission reductions and market prices for emission certificates
for one and two participating non-Annex I countries. The non-Annex I coun-
tries take the price-taking behavior of the Annex I community into account
when deciding on their emission reductions and, hence, the number of emission
certificates to be sold. From the market clearing conditions (3.4) and (3.5) it
follows that the Annex I community’s emission reductions are described by the
functional relation rA = h(rN1, rN2) with
h˜(rN1, rN2) = TA − (rN1 − TN)− (rN2 − TN) = T˜ − rN1 − rN2 (3.24)
in case of two participating non-Annex I countries and
h(ri) = TA − (ri − TN) = T − ri (3.25)
in case of one participating non-Annex I country i.
We start by analyzing the case of two participating non-Annex I countries.
A detailed derivation of the formula is provided in Appendix B.
The solution to the Annex I community’s optimization problem (3.3) as-
suming price-taking behavior and applying (3.24) yields
p˜P = αAr˜
P
A = αA(TA − (r˜PN1 − TN)− (r˜PN2 − TN)) . (3.26)
To solve the optimization problem of the non-Annex I country N1, we
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apply (3.26) to (3.3). Equating the first derivative to zero results in
r˜PN1 =
αA
2αA + αN
(TA + 3TN − r˜PN2) =
α
2α + 1
(TA + 3TN − r˜PN2) . (3.27)
Due to symmetry between the two non-Annex I countries, optimal emission
reductions of N2 are given by
r˜PN2 =
α
2α + 1
(TA + 3TN − r˜PN1) . (3.28)
Applying (3.27) to (3.28) results in optimal emission reductions of the non-
Annex I countries of
r˜PN1 = r˜
P
N2 =
αA
3αA + αN
(TA + 3TN) =
α
3α + 1
(T˜ + TN) . (3.29)
Applying (3.29) to (3.24) yields optimal emission reductions of the Annex I
community of
r˜PA =
αN
3αA + αN
(TA + 2TN) +
αA
3αA + αN
TA
=
1
3α + 1
T˜ +
α
3α + 1
TA . (3.30)
Applying (3.30) to (3.26) yields a market price of
p˜P =
αAαN
3αA + αN
(TA + 2TN) +
α2A
3αA + αN
TA
=
αA
3α + 1
T˜ +
ααA
3α + 1
TA . (3.31)
Note that in contrast to the case of a competitive market, where opti-
mal emission reductions only depend on the global reduction target, the non-
Annex I countries’ no-lose target has an additional impact on the countries’
optimal emission reductions in case of market power and, hence, also on the
market price for emission certificates.
Applying (3.29), (3.30) and (3.31) to (3.7) yields a non-Annex I country’s
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payoff in case of two participating non-Annex I countries of
Π˜PN =
αA
(3αA + αN)2
((
α2A +
1
2
αAαN
)
T 2A −
(
2αAαN + α
2
N
)
TATN
−
(
9
2
αAαN + 2α
2
N
)
T 2N
)
. (3.32)
For the participation constraint in case of two non-Annex I countries in the
market power case to be fulfilled, the following condition has to hold
TN
TA
<
αA
αN + (3αA + αN)
√
αN
2αA+αN
=
α
√
2α + 1
3α + 1 +
√
2α + 1
. (3.33)
We now turn to the case of one participating non-Annex I country. Again,
the results in case of one participating non-Annex I country are the same as
the results derived in section 2.2.4 of the last chapter, but are included here
again for the sake of completeness.
In the case of one participating non-Annex I country, the participating non-
Annex I country can act as monopolist in the international emissions trading
market, i.e. it is the only non-Annex I country supplying emission certificates
to the market. Applying (3.25) and solving the Annex I community’s mini-
mization problem (3.3) results in
pP = αAr
P
A = αA
(
TA −
(
rPi − TN
))
. (3.34)
Applying (3.34) to (3.3) and solving the non-Annex I country’s optimiza-
tion problem yields optimal emission reductions of
rPi =
αA
2αA + αN
(TA + 2TN) =
α
2α + 1
(T + TN) . (3.35)
Applying (3.35) to market clearing condition (3.5) yields optimal emission
reductions of the Annex I community of
rPA =
αN
2αA + αN
(TA + TN) +
αA
2αA + αN
TA
=
1
2α + 1
T +
α
2α + 1
TA . (3.36)
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Hence, the market price is given by
pP =
αAαN
2αA + αN
(TA + TN) +
α2A
2αA + αN
TA
=
αA
2α + 1
T +
ααA
2α + 1
TA . (3.37)
Applying (3.35), (3.36) and (3.37) to (3.7) yields a payoff for one partici-
pating non-Annex I country of
ΠPN =
αA
2αA + αN
(
1
2
αAT
2
A − αNTATN − αNT 2N
)
. (3.38)
For the participation constraint in case of one non-Annex I country with
market power to be fulfilled, the following relation has to hold
TN
TA
<
αA
αN +
√
2αAαN + α2N
=
α
1 +
√
2α + 1
. (3.39)
Having derived the payoffs Π˜PN and ΠPN , we can specify the payoff matrix
in case of market power (see Figure 3.3).
To determine the Nash equilibria in case of market power, we compare the
non-Annex I countries’ payoffs Π˜PN and ΠPN . The comparison shows that, sim-
ilar to the competitive market case, payoffs for one participating non-Annex I
country are higher than payoffs for two participating non-Annex I countries,
i.e. ΠPN > Π˜PN holds.9 Hence, similar to the competitive market case, three
cases can arise:
(i) Π˜PN < 0,ΠPN < 0, i.e. the no-lose target is neither profitable in case of
two nor in case of one participating non-Annex I country;
(ii) Π˜PN > 0,ΠPN > 0, i.e. the no-lose target is profitable if one as well as two
non-Annex I countries participate;
(iii) Π˜PN < 0,ΠPN > 0, i.e. the no-lose target is profitable if one non-Annex I
country participates, but is not profitable if both non-Annex I countries
participate
In the first case, non-participation is the dominant strategy for both non-
Annex I countries. Hence, the Nash equilibrium is given by (n,n) and payoffs
9The proof is given in Appendix B.
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are (0, 0). From the participation constraint for two non-Annex I countries it
follows that under market power conditions the first case occurs for
TN
TA
>
α
√
2α + 1
3α + 1 +
√
2α + 1
. (3.40)
In the second case, all payoffs are positive and, hence, participation is the
dominant strategy for both non-Annex I countries. That is, participation is
profitable, independent of the other non-Annex I country’s decision. The Nash
equilibrium is given by (p,p) with payoffs (Π˜PN , Π˜PN). From the participation
constraint follows that the second case results if
TN
TA
<
α
1 +
√
2α + 1
(3.41)
holds.
The third case again yields two asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria10
with (p,n) and (n,p). That is, participation is only profitable for a non-Annex I
country if the other non-Annex I country decides not to participate. The
payoffs are given by (ΠPN , 0) and (0,ΠPN). This case occurs if the following
condition applies for the target ratio TN
TA
α
1 +
√
2α + 1
>
TN
TA
>
α
√
2α + 1
3α + 1 +
√
2α + 1
. (3.42)
As in the competitive market case, the conditions for one, respectively two,
participating non-Annex I countries being the Nash equilibria of the partici-
pation game are solely determined by α. In contrast to the conditions in the
competitive market, the reductions from the no-lose target are, however, not
limited. In particular, the contribution from no-lose targets to global emission
reductions can, thus, be higher than 50% of the global emission reduction effort
and, hence, larger than the contribution from the Annex I community. The
same result was found to be true for one participating non-Annex I country in
chapter 2. As it is an important result, it is mentioned again here.
In the following sections, we will derive implications of applying no-lose
targets to two non-Annex I countries on global emission reductions and impacts
10Here as well, a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium exists where participation is played
with a probability of Π
P
N
Π˜PN+Π
P
N
. The mixed-strategy equilibrium will not be included in this
analysis.
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on the international emissions trading market based on the formula derived
above. We will begin by applying the same fixed no-lose targets for the case
of one and two participating non-Annex I countries and analyze the impacts
on the emissions trading market in section 3.4. That part of the analysis
provides general insights on the effects of increased participation by non-Annex
I countries. However, the analysis of fixed no-lose targets does not take into
account if the no-lose target is profitable for one or two non-Annex I countries
at all. Hence, we determine and analyze the impacts of the “optimal no-
lose targets” in section 3.5 which take into account the Nash equilibria of
the participation game analyzed above. Before turning to the analysis of the
impacts of no-lose targets, a short analysis of the main decision parameter of
the non-Annex I countries, the payoffs, is provided in the following section.
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Figure 3.2: Payoffs Π˜CN and ΠCN for two non-Annex I countries in a competitive market game
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Figure 3.3: Payoffs Π˜PN and ΠPN for two non-Annex I countries in a game with market power
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3.3 Characteristics of non-Annex I countries’ pay-
offs
In the modeling framework introduced in the previous chapter, the main factor
determining whether a no-lose target is profitable are the non-Annex I coun-
tries’ payoffs, which were derived in the last section. As the formula in the
last section showed, while the participation constraints are determined by the
countries’ reduction potential ratio α only, the non-Annex I countries’ payoffs
are determined by the countries’ slope of the marginal abatement cost curves
αA and αN as well as the targets TA and TN . We will use this section to derive
the main characteristics of the non-Annex I countries’ payoff functions, i.e. the
monotonicity with respect to αA, αN , TA and TN . The analysis will show that
differences exist in the payoff functions depending on the market form.
The following proposition indicates the payoff’s dynamics with respect to
αA and αN .
Proposition 7. For the non-Annex I country’s payoffs in case of no-lose tar-
gets, the following holds:
(i) The non-Annex I countries’ payoffs increase with αA independent of the
number of participating non-Annex I countries and independent of the
market form.
(ii) In a competitive market, the non-Annex I countries’ payoffs increase
with αN for TNTA <
2αA−αN
4αA+6αN
in the case of two participating non-Annex I
countries, and for TN
TA
< αA−αN
αA+3αN
in the case of one participating non-
Annex I country.
In the case of market power, the non-Annex I countries’ payoffs decrease
with αN independent of the number of participating non-Annex I coun-
tries.
The proof is presented in Appendix B. One insight from Proposition 7 is
that the dynamics of the payoff functions are independent of the number of
participating non-Annex I countries. Hence, the results can be generalized for
a larger number of symmetric non-Annex I countries facing no-lose targets.
Further, as part (i) of the proposition states, the non-Annex I countries’
payoffs in case of no-lose targets are positively correlated with the slope of the
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Annex I community’s marginal abatement cost curve. Hence, higher abate-
ment costs, i.e. lower reduction potential, in the Annex I community results
in higher payoffs for the non-Annex I countries. This is immediately appar-
ent as higher marginal abatement costs in the Annex I community allow the
participating non-Annex I country/ countries to sell more emission certificates
and, hence, the revenues from emissions trading increase. This applies inde-
pendently of the market form.
In contrast, the impact of αN can be ambiguous (part (ii) of the proposi-
tion) in the case of a competitive market. The impact is determined by the
relationship of the target levels and the slopes of the marginal abatement cost
curves. In particular, α needs to be larger than 1/2 and 1, respectively in case
of two and one participating non-Annex I countries for a positive correlation.
That is, only then does an increasing αN result in an increase in the non-
Annex I countries’ payoff. Further, the non-Annex I country’s share on global
emission reduction efforts cannot be too large compared to α. More precisely,
let an individual non-Annex I country’s share in global emission reductions be
given by 1/k and the Annex I community’s share be given by (k − 2)/k and
(k− 1)/k in the case of two and one participating non-Annex I countries. For
the correlation to be positive, the following needs to hold:
α <
−(k + 4)
8− 2k
in case of two participating non-Annex I countries and
α <
−(k + 2)
2− k
in case of one participating non-Annex I country. Hence, for larger values of
k, i.e. a smaller share of the individual non-Annex I country in global emission
reduction efforts, α can be smaller, i.e. the Annex I community’s reduction
potential compared to the non-Annex I country’s reduction potential can be
larger.
The impact of αN in case of market power is again unambiguous, as is the
case for αA. Hence, here higher marginal abatement costs, i.e. larger values
for αN , result in lower payoffs as the costs increase.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 give an example of the NAI countries’ payoff functions.
The values for the target levels and the slopes of the marginal abatement cost
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Figure 3.4: Non-Annex I country’s payoff for two (left), respectively one (right)
participating non-Annex I countries in a competitive market for TA = 4 and
TN = 1
Figure 3.5: Non-Annex I country’s payoff for two (left), respectively one (right)
participating non-Annex I countries in a market power case for TA = 4 and
TN=1
curves are chosen for illustrative purposes and are not meant to represent real-
istic values. Figure 3.4 shows the payoff function in the case of a competitive
market. The impact of the ambiguous effect of αN can clearly be seen in the
shape of the function in the right picture. In contrast, the payoff function in
the case of market power increases with αA and decreases with αN as can be
seen in Figure 3.5.
The shape of the payoff function in the case of the competitive market has
an important implication. It indicates that, under certain circumstances in the
competitive market, the non-Annex I country is not interested in bringing down
its marginal abatement costs as that would lower its payoffs. Bringing down the
marginal abatement costs could lower the price for emission certificates and,
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hence, lead to a decrease in the country’s payoffs, as it has to act as a price-
taker in the market. This further implies that measures like R&D cooperation
are not necessarily in the best interests of the non-Annex I country as would
normally be assumed. This effect can, however, be prevented if the no-lose
target is stringent enough.
In contrast to αA and αN , the influence of the targets TA and TN on the
non-Annex I country’s payoff is always unambiguous.
Proposition 8. For the non-Annex I country’s payoffs applying no-lose tar-
gets, the following holds:
(i) The non-Annex I country’s payoff increases with an increasing Annex I
community’s target.
(ii) The non-Annex I country’s payoff decreases with an increasing non-
Annex I country’s no-lose target.
The proof is also provided in Appendix B. The effects of the target lev-
els are independent of the number of participating non-Annex I countries as
well as of the market form. The AI community’s target has an impact on
the price for emission certificates, while not changing the non-Annex I coun-
try’s abatement costs. Higher target levels increase the demand for emission
certificates from Annex I countries, thus leading to an increase in the price
for emission certificates. The higher price increases the non-Annex I coun-
try’s revenue from selling certificates, hence leading to increases in the payoffs.
In contrast, a higher no-lose target level increases the non-Annex I country’s
abatement costs and reduces the supply of emission certificates. The proposi-
tion states that these effects in sum cannot be compensated by higher prices
for certificates, hence resulting in lower payoffs.
3.4 Effects of increased participation
As indicated above, the remainder of this chapter will be used to derive the
implications of no-lose targets for the international emissions trading market
and for global emission reduction efforts. For the analyses in this section,
we apply the same fixed reduction targets TN and TA in the case of one and
two participating non-Annex I countries. Global emission reductions would
be T˜ = TA + 2TN in the case of two participating non-Annex I countries and
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T = TA + TN in the case of one participating non-Annex I country. However,
the no-lose targets are not necessarily profitable for one or two non-Annex I
countries, hence it is not guaranteed that these global emission reductions are
realized. Analyses of the optimal no-lose targets which take into account the
Nash equilibria of the participation game will follow in section 3.5.
As in the case of fixed reduction targets it is not guaranteed that the no-lose
targets are profitable and, hence, will result in one or two of the non-Annex I
countries contributing to global emission reduction efforts, we do not need to
analyze the effects on global emission reductions. Instead, we immediately turn
to the analysis of the impacts on the emissions trading market. Comparing
optimal emission reductions and market prices in the case of one and two
participating non-Annex I countries yields the following results.
Proposition 9. Let TA and TN be the exogenously fixed emission reduction
targets for the AI community and the NAI countries. Independent of the mar-
ket form, the following holds:
(i) Optimal emission reductions of the Annex I community negatively depend
on α and the Annex I community’s optimal emission reductions are lower
for two participating non-Annex I countries than for one participating
non-Annex I country, i.e. r˜CA < rCA and r˜PA < rPA.
(ii) Optimal emission reductions of the participating non-Annex I country
positively depend on α and the non-Annex I country’s optimal emission
reductions are lower for two participating non-Annex I countries than for
one participating non-Annex I country, i.e. r˜Ci < rCi and r˜Pi < rPi .
(iii) The market price for emission certificates positively depends on αA and
αN and is lower for two participating non-Annex I countries than for one
participating non-Annex I country, i.e. p˜C < pC and p˜P < pP .
Proof. The first derivatives with respect to α are given by
dr˜CA
dα
=− 2
(2α + 1)2
T˜ < 0
drCA
dα
=− 1
(α + 1)2
T < 0
dr˜PA
dα
=− 2
(3α + 1)2
TA − 6
(3α + 1)2
TN < 0
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drPA
dα
=− 1
(2α + 1)2
TA − 2
(2α + 1)2
TN < 0
and
dr˜Ci
dα
=
1
(2α + 1)2
T˜ > 0
drCi
dα
=
1
(α + 1)2
T > 0
dr˜Pi
dα
=
1
(3α + 1)2
(T˜ + TN) > 0
drPi
dα
=
1
(2α + 1)2
(T + TN) > 0 .
Thus, the first parts of (i) and (ii) are proved.
For the second part of (i) in a competitive market it is
r˜CA < r
C
A
⇔ 1
2α + 1
(TA + 2TN) <
1
α + 1
(TA + TN)
⇔ (α + 1− 2α− 1)TA < (2α + 1− 2α− 2)TN
⇔ TN
TA
< α .
This is always fulfilled if the targets applied are no-lose targets (condition
(3.1)).
For the market power case it is
r˜PA < r
P
A
⇔ 1
3α + 1
(TA + 2TN) +
α
3α + 1
TA <
1
2α + 1
(TA + TN) +
α
2α + 1
TA
⇔ (α + 1)TN < (α + 1)αTA
⇔ TN
TA
< α .
Again, this is fulfilled if (3.1) holds.
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For the second part of (ii) in a competitive market it is
r˜Ci < r
C
i
⇔ α
2α + 1
(TA + 2TN) <
α
α + 1
(TA + TN)
⇔ (α + 1− 2α− 1)TA < (2α + 1− 2α− 2)TN
⇔ TN
TA
< α .
This is always fulfilled when applying no-lose targets (condition (3.1)).
In case of market power it is
r˜Pi < r
P
i
⇔ α
3α + 1
(TA + 3TN) <
α
2α + 1
(TA + 2TN)
⇔ (6α + 3− 6α− 2)TN < (3α + 1− 2α− 1)TA
⇔ TN
TA
< α .
This follows from (3.1). Hence, the second part of (ii) is proved.
For the first part of (iii), from p = αArA follows:
dp
dαA
= rA + αA
drA
dαA
and
dp
dαN
= αA
drA
dαN
.
From drA
dαN
= drA
dα
dα
dαN
and dα
dαN
= − αA
α2N
follows
dp
dαN
> 0
for the derivatives with respect to αN .
The following holds for the first derivative of α with respect to αA:
dα
dαA
=
1
αN
.
For the first derivative of the market price p with respect to αA it follows from
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the above derivatives and the derivatives drA
dα
that
dp˜C
dαA
=
1
(2α + 1)2
T˜ > 0 ,
dpC
dαA
=
1
(α + 1)2
T > 0 ,
dp˜P
dαA
=
3α2 + 2α + 1
(3α + 1)2
TA +
2
(3α + 1)2
TN > 0 ,
dpP
dαA
=
2α2 + 2α + 1
(2α + 1)2
TA +
1
(2α + 1)2
TN > 0 .
The second part of (iii) follows in both cases from (i) with p = αArA.
As global emission reductions resulting in the case of one and two partici-
pating non-Annex I countries differ in the above proposition, comparing results
with regards to emission reductions and prices is difficult. Nonetheless, two
effects can be found. First, although participation by two non-Annex I coun-
tries results in higher global emission reductions, the market price for emission
certificates in the case of two participating non-Annex I countries is lower
than in the case of only one participating non-Annex I country. This result is
reasonable, as the non-Annex I countries act as sellers of emission certificates
in the international emissions trading market. Hence, increased participation
from non-Annex I countries increases the supply of emission certificates in the
market and, thus, lowers the price.
Second, the lower price for emission certificates affects both the Annex I
community’s and the non-Annex I countries’ optimal emission reductions. In
the case of the non-Annex I countries’ optimal emission reductions, the lower
price leads to a decrease in the individual countries’ optimal emission reduc-
tions. In contrast, non-Annex I countries’ total emission reductions increase,
thereby allowing the Annex I community to reduce less emissions at home
and buy more certificates in the international emissions trading market. That
means, if one of the non-Annex I countries drops out of the emissions trading
market, the remaining non-Annex I country can increase its emission reduc-
tions. Hence, the number of emission certificates it can sell to the Annex I
community increases. However, the increase is not high enough to compensate
for the supply of emission certificates from the second non-Annex I country.
Hence, from the point of view of a non-Annex I country, participation of
another non-Annex I country has two negative effects: it reduces the number
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of certificates it can sell and, at the same time, lowers the price for emission
certificates. Both factors negatively affect the non-Annex I country’s payoff.
In contrast, for the Annex I community, participation of two non-Annex I
countries is favorable: it decreases the price for emission certificates and, at
the same time, increases the supply of emission certificates in the market.
This allows the Annex I community to reduce their domestic emission reduc-
tion efforts and buy cheaper emission certificates instead. These effects hold,
independent of the market form.
The following proposition compares the impacts of no-lose targets on the
emissions trading market in the case of market power with the impacts on a
competitive market. Again, the same exogenously fixed reduction targets TA
and TN are applied. The comparison shows the inefficiencies resulting from
market power.
Proposition 10. Let TA and TN be exogenously fixed emission reduction tar-
gets for the Annex I community and the non-Annex I countries. In the case of
one, respectively two, participating non-Annex I countries, the following holds:
(i) The Annex I community’s optimal emission reductions are higher in the
case of market power than in the competitive market, i.e. r˜PA > r˜CA and
rPA > r
C
A .
(ii) The non-Annex I countries’ optimal emission reductions are lower in the
case of market power than in the competitive market, i.e. r˜Pi < r˜Ci and
rPi < r
C
i .
(iii) The market price for emission certificates is higher in the case of market
power than in the competitive market, i.e. p˜P > p˜C and pP > pC.
Proof. For the Annex I community’s emission reductions in the case of two
participating non-Annex I countries, the following applies
r˜PA − r˜CA =
1
3α + 1
T˜ − α
2α + 1
TA − 1
2α + 1
T˜
=
2α
(2α + 1)(3α + 1)
(αTA − TN) .
For this to be greater than zero, the term in brackets needs to be greater than
zero, hence
αTA − TN > 0⇔ TN
TA
< α .
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This follows from (3.1).
For the Annex I community’s emission reductions in the case of one par-
ticipating non-Annex I country, the following applies
rPA − rCA =
1
2α + 1
T +
α
2α + 1
TA − 1
α + 1
T
=
α
(2α + 1)(α + 1)
(αTA − TN)
The rest follows as above.
To show part (ii) of the proposition for two participating non-Annex I
countries, the following applies:
r˜Ci − r˜Pi =
α
2α + 1
T˜ − α
3α + 1
(T˜ + TN)
=
α
(2α + 1)(3α + 1)
(αTA − TN) .
For this to be greater than zero, the term in brackets needs to be greater than
zero which follows from (3.1).
Similarly, in the case of two participating non-Annex I countries the fol-
lowing inequality needs to hold
rCi − rPi =
α
α + 1
T − α
2α + 1
(T + TN)
=
α
(2α + 1)(α + 1)
(αTA − TN) .
The rest follows as above.
Part (iii) of the proposition follows from the inequalities for the Annex I
community and p = αArA.
The results of Proposition (10) are well-known results for market power
(see e.g. Hahn, 1984). In general, market power has the following effects
on an emissions trading market: for a given target, the non-Annex I coun-
try/countries with market power realize less emission reductions than in the
competitive market. Hence, the supply of emission certificates in the market is
reduced. This results in higher prices for emission certificates, on the one hand,
leading to higher domestic emission reductions by the Annex I community, on
the other hand.
The higher market prices in case of market power compared to the com-
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petitive market also indicate that the emissions trading market in the case
of market power does not allow reaching a given global reduction target cost
efficiently. Although in general market power has a negative effect on the
economic efficiency of an emissions trading market, we will show in the next
section that market power can be used to increase the non-Annex I countries’
no-lose targets. Thus, the negative effect on the economic efficiency can in
parts be offset by an increase in the environmental effectiveness of the no-lose
targets.
3.5 Optimal no-lose targets and their impact
3.5.1 The optimal no-lose target
In the last section, we analyzed the implications of increased participation by
non-Annex I countries applying fixed no-lose targets. The fixed no-lose targets
did not take into account Nash equilibria of the participation game determined
in the last section. Hence, the no-lose targets analyzed so far were not nec-
essarily profitable. In this section, we will restrict the analyses to profitable
no-lose targets. Similar to the analyses in chapter 2, we define “optimal no-lose
targets” which account for the Nash equilibria of the participation game and,
hence, are profitable for one or two non-Annex I countries.
Definition 2. A no-lose target is called optimal if it meets the following two
requirements:
(i) The no-lose target is as ambitious as possible.
(ii) The sum of the non-Annex I country’s costs and revenues from emission
reduction and trading are zero.
It is easy to see that the optimal no-lose target for one and two participating
non-Annex I countries is given by the limits of the participation constraints.
Proposition 11. The optimal no-lose targets in a competitive market are given
by
T˜CN =
α
2(α + 1)
TA
in the case of two participating non-Annex I countries and by
TCN =
α
α + 2
TA
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in the case of one participating non-Annex I country.
Similarly, in case of market power the optimal no-lose targets are given by
T˜ PN =
α
√
2α + 1
3α + 1 +
√
2α + 1
TA
in case of two participating non-Annex I countries and by
T PN =
α
1 +
√
2α + 1
TA
in case of one participating non-Annex I country.
Proof. The limits of the participation constraints are the highest no-lose target
that one, respectively two, non-Annex I countries are willing to accept with
the conditions for a Nash equilibrium still being intact. Hence requirement (i)
is met. Since the optimal no-lose target is determined by the participation con-
straint which is determined by the non-Annex I country’s payoff, requirement
(ii) is fulfilled.
Hence, in the case of two non-Annex I countries facing no-lose targets, the
optimal no-lose targets are characterized by three properties. First, they ensure
that participation by one, respectively two, non-Annex I countries is a Nash
equilibrium of the participation game introduced in section 3.2. This char-
acteristic arises from the induced interaction between non-Annex I countries
and was, hence, left out in chapter 3. The other two characteristics are iden-
tical to the characteristics of the optimal no-lose targets discussed in chapter
3: second, the optimal no-lose targets ensure that the non-Annex I countries’
contribution to emission reductions is as large as possible. Third, the opti-
mal no-lose targets do not allow the participating non-Annex I countries to
generate positive payoffs from trading in the international emissions trading
market. Hence, they prevent that large financial profits can be generated by
the non-Annex I countries.
We discussed before that the third characteristic is a good reason to make
no-lose targets more acceptable for Annex I countries, which have to carry the
total costs of the emission reductions through the emissions trading market,
although non-Annex I countries provide part of the reductions themselves.
For the following analyses, the characteristics one and two are, however, more
important. They ensure that the no-lose targets are profitable and that they
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are chosen in a way to maximize the non-Annex I countries’ contribution to
global emission reductions for one and two non-Annex I countries.
A comparison of the payoffs in section 3.2 showed that, for a given no-
lose target, the payoff in the case of one participating non-Annex I country
is always higher than the payoff in case of two participating non-Annex I
countries. From this follows immediately that the participation constraint for
one non-Annex I country is stricter than the participation constraint for two
non-Annex I countries. Hence, the optimal no-lose target in the case of one
participating non-Annex I country is more ambitious than the optimal no-lose
target in the case of two participating non-Annex I countries.
The following proposition provides a comparison of the optimal no-lose
targets in the case of market power and a competitive market.
Proposition 12. For one or two participating non-Annex I countries, the
following holds:
(i) The optimal no-lose target in the case of market power is more ambitious
than the optimal no-lose target in the case of a competitive market, i.e.
T˜ PN > T˜
C
N and T PN > TCN .
(ii) The target ratios T˜ PN /T˜CN and T PN /TCN increase with α.
Proof. For the first part of the proposition, we need to compare the optimal
no-lose targets in the case of market power and in a competitive market. In the
case of two participating non-Annex I countries, a comparison of the optimal
no-lose targets yields
T˜ PN > T˜
C
N
⇔ α
√
2α + 1
3α + 1 +
√
2α + 1
TA >
α
2(α + 1)
TA
⇔ 2α + 1
3α + 1
>
√
1
2α + 1
⇔ α2(8α + 3) > 0
which is always fulfilled for positive α.
In the case of only one participating non-Annex I country, the comparison
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yields
T PN > T
C
N
⇔ α
1 +
√
2α + 1
TA >
α
α + 2
TA
⇔ α + 1 > √2α + 1
⇔ α2 > 0
which is always fulfilled.
For the second part of the proposition, we need to derive the first derivatives
of the target ratios. For two participating non-Annex I countries, it is given
by
d
(
T˜PN
T˜CN
)
dα
=
d
(
2(α+1)
√
2α+1
3α+1+
√
2α+1
)
dα
=
(
2
√
2α + 1 + 2(α+1)√
2α+1
) (√
2α + 1 + 3α + 1
)− 2(α + 1)√2α + 1( 1√
2α+1
+ 3
)
(3α + 1 +
√
2α + 1)2
=
(4α + 2)
√
2α + 1 + 6α2 − 2√
2α + 1(3α + 1 +
√
2α + 1)2
.
For the first derivative to be greater than zero, the nominator needs to be
greater than zero. This follows from α > 0 and (4α + 2)
√
2α + 1 > 2.
For one participating non-Annex I country, the first derivative is given by
d
(
TPN
TCN
)
dα
=
d
(
α+2
1+
√
2α+1
)
dα
=
1 +
√
2α + 1− (α+2)√
2α+1
(1 +
√
2α + 1)2
=
√
2α + 1 + 2α + 1− α− 2√
2α + 1(1 +
√
2α + 1)2
.
The first derivative is positive for
√
2α + 1 + α− 1 > 0
which is true because of α > 0.
The comparison shows that, in the case of market power, the no-lose target
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can be more ambitious than in the competitive market and still induce partic-
ipation by one, respectively two countries. The higher prices that have to be
paid by the Annex I community due to market power and that would result
in higher payoffs for the non-Annex I countries can be used to increase the
non-Annex I country’s target and, thus, the global emission reduction target.
A similar effect was found in the modeling results for one non-Annex I country
in the last chapter. The above proposition shows that the result prevails in
the duopoly market where two non-Annex I countries participate, although
the market power is reduced compared to the monopoly case with only one
participating non-Annex I country.
Part (ii) of the proposition determines for which market form the optimal
no-lose targets are more affected by α, hence, for which market form the dif-
ferences in the countries’ reduction potential has the greater impact on the
optimal no-lose target.In the case of one as well as in case of two participat-
ing non-Annex I countries, the target in the case of market power is more
affected than the target in the competitive market case. Hence, the target
ratio increases with α in both cases.
3.5.2 Implications for global emission reduction targets
The analyses in the last section provided two properties of the optimal no-
lose targets. First, the optimal no-lose target in the case of market power is
more ambitious than the optimal no-lose target in the case of a competitive
market. Second, the optimal no-lose target in the case of one participating
non-Annex I country is more ambitious than the optimal no-lose target in
the case of two participating non-Annex I countries. A follow-up question is
whether the more ambitious no-lose target in the case of only one participating
non-Annex I country can compensate the emission reduction efforts from the
second non-Annex I country. As Proposition 13 shows, this is not the case for
two symmetric non-Annex I countries.
Proposition 13. For total non-Annex I emission reduction targets resulting
from optimal no-lose targets, the following holds:
(i) The total non-Annex I emission reduction target is higher for two partici-
pating non-Annex I countries than for only one participating non-Annex I
country, i.e. 2T˜CN > TCN and 2T˜ PN > T PN , independent of the market form.
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(ii) The target ratio between the optimal no-lose targets with two and one
participating non-Annex I countries T˜CN /TCN and T˜ PN /T PN decreases with
α independent of the market form.
(iii) For large α and in a competitive market, the difference between the to-
tal non-Annex I countries’ reduction target in the case of two and one
participating non-Annex I countries approaches zero.
For large α and in the case of market power, the difference between the
total non-Annex I countries’ reduction target in the case of two and one
participating non-Annex I countries approaches ∞.
Proof. To show part (i) of the proposition, we need to compare the global
emission reduction targets. For a competitive market, the following relation
2T˜CN > T
C
N
⇔ 2α
2(α + 1)
TA >
α
α + 2
TA
⇔ 2α + 4 > 2α + 2
holds for all α.
In case of market power, the relation is given by
2T˜ PN > T
P
N
⇔ 2α
√
2α + 1
3α + 1 +
√
2α + 1
TA >
α
1 +
√
2α + 1
TA
⇔ α + 1 +√2α + 1 > 0
This holds for all positive α.
To show part (ii) of the proposition, we need to calculate the first derivatives
of the target ratios. In the competitive market, it is given by
d
(
T˜CN
TCN
)
dα
=
d
(
α+2
2(α+1)
)
dα
=
2(α + 1)− 2(α + 2)
4(α + 1)2
= − 1
2(α + 1)2
,
which is smaller than zero for all α.
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Similarly, the first derivative for the market power case is given by
d
(
T˜PN
TPN
)
dα
=
d
(
2α+1+
√
2α+1
3α+1+
√
2α+1
)
dα
=
(
2 + 1√
2α+1
) (
3α + 1 +
√
2α + 1
)− (2α + 1 +√2α + 1) (3 + 1√
2α+1
)
(3α + 1 +
√
2α + 1)2
=
−α− 1−√2α + 1√
2α + 1(3α + 1 +
√
2α + 1)2
which is smaller than zero for all α > 0.
For part (iii) we need to derive the limit of the difference in the non-Annex I
countries’ total reduction targets for α→∞:
lim
α→∞
α
(α + 1)(α + 2)
TA = 0
lim
α→∞
α
(
α + 1 +
√
2α + 1
)
3α + 2 + 3α
√
2α + 1 + 2
√
2α + 1
TA =∞ .
Proposition 13 states that for symmetric non-Annex I countries the global
emission reduction target which results when applying the optimal no-lose tar-
get for two non-Annex I countries is higher than the global emission reduction
target which results when applying the optimal no-lose target for one non-
Annex I country. The increase in the optimal no-lose target due to the fact
that it has to be profitable for only one participating non-Annex I country, thus
does not compensate for the contributions from the second non-Annex I coun-
try. Hence, to reach the maximal global emission reduction target applying
no-lose targets, both symmetric non-Annex I countries need to be integrated
into the international emissions trading market. This result holds not only for
a competitive market, but also in the case of market power.
For both market forms, the difference between the optimal no-lose targets
for one and two non-Annex I countries increases with increasing differences in
the reduction potential between the Annex I community and a non-Annex I
country, i.e. an increasing α. In the competitive market, the non-Annex I
countries’ total emission reduction target converges for one and two partic-
ipating non-Annex I countries for large α. That is, for large differences in
the abatement costs of Annex I and non-Annex I countries, it becomes less
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relevant for the global emission reduction target whether the optimal no-lose
target for one or two non-Annex I countries is applied. In contrast, in the
case of market power, the difference in non-Annex I countries’ total emission
reduction targets between one and two non-Annex I countries increases. This
implies that in the case of market power even for large α, it is important to
include both non-Annex I countries to increase the environmental effectiveness
of the no-lose targets.
The share of an individual non-Annex I country’s contribution to global
emission reduction efforts is determined by α. In the competitive market case,
it is given by
T˜CN
TA
=

1
2
for α→∞
1
4
for α = 1
0 for α→ 0
(3.43)
for two participating non-Annex I countries and by
TCN
TA
=

1 for α→∞
1
3
for α = 1
0 for α→ 0
(3.44)
for one participating non-Annex I country.
If symmetry exists between the Annex I community and the non-Annex I
countries, i.e. α = 1, the optimal no-lose target is 1
4
of the Annex I community’s
reduction target in the case of two participating non-Annex I countries and
significantly higher with 1
3
of the Annex I community’s reduction target in the
case of one participating non-Annex I country. That is, total non-Annex I
countries’ emission reductions are 1
2
TA in the case of two participating non-
Annex I countries versus 1
3
TA in the case of one participating non-Annex I
country. For large α the difference in the total non-Annex I countries’ reduction
target between one and two participating non-Annex I countries is negligible.
In the case of market power, the share in case of one and two participating
non-Annex I countries is given by
T˜ PN
TA
=

∞ for α→∞√
3
4+
√
3
for α = 1
0 for α→ 0
. (3.45)
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Figure 3.6: Optimal no-lose targets for one and two participating non-Annex I
countries
for two participating non-Annex I countries and
T PN
TA
=

∞ for α→∞
1
1+
√
3
for α = 1
0 for α→ 0
. (3.46)
for one participating non-Annex I country.
In contrast to the competitive market, the optimal no-lose targets in the
case of market power assuming symmetry between Annex I and non-Annex I
are higher. Further, the limit for large values for α shows that the optimal no-
lose target in the case of market power can increase indefinitely, compared to
the Annex I community’s reduction target (see also Figure 3.6). This in partic-
ular shows that the non-Annex I country’s share in global emission reduction
efforts is not limited to 50% as in the case of a competitive market.
Before turning to the impact of the optimal no-lose targets on the emissions
trading market, we will close this section with a comparison of the level of
ambition of the optimal no-lose targets.
Proposition 14. Let TA be an exogenously given Annex I community’s re-
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duction target. For α > 1+
√
5
2
the optimal no-lose target for two non-Annex I
countries in the market power case does not even induce participation by one
non-Annex I country in the competitive market.
Proof.
T˜ PN
TA
=
α
√
2α + 1
3α + 1 +
√
2α + 1
>
TCN
TA
=
α
α + 2
⇔ √2α + 1(α + 1) > 3α + 1
⇔ 2α(α2 − 2α− 1) > 0
⇔ α > 1 +
√
5
2
Hence, in particular for high reduction potential in the non-Annex I coun-
tries compared to the Annex I community, i.e. α > 1+
√
5
2
, the differences in
the reduction targets and the participation incentives vary greatly for market
power and a competitive market (see also Figure 3.6). Hence, large differences
in the marginal abatement costs in favor of the non-Annex I countries allow
significantly higher global emission reductions in the case of market power than
in the case of a competitive market.
3.5.3 Implications for the emissions trading market
Finally, we will analyze the impacts of the optimal no-lose targets on the
international emissions trading market. In contrast to Proposition 9, where the
impacts of fixed no-lose targets on the emissions trading market were analyzed,
applying the optimal no-lose targets takes into account that the no-lose targets
should be profitable to induce fulfilling of the target. A comparison of the
optimal no-lose targets in the previous section showed that, when applying
the optimal no-lose targets, the fact remains that global emission reduction
targets differ in the case of one and two participating countries. Hence, the
comparison of the results with respect to costs and prices is limited. The
following proposition can be taken as a generalization of Proposition 9 for
optimal no-lose targets.
80 3. INTERACTION OF TWO NON-ANNEX I COUNTRIES
Proposition 15. Applying the optimal no-lose targets in the case of one, re-
spectively two, non-Annex I countries, independent of the market form, the
following holds:
(i) The Annex I community’s optimal emission reductions in the case of two
participating non-Annex I countries are always lower than in the case
of one participating non-Annex I country, i.e. r˜CA(T˜CN ) < rCA(TCN ) and
r˜PA(T˜
P
N ) < r
P
A(T
P
N ).
(ii) The non-Annex I country’s optimal emission reductions in the case of
two participating non-Annex I countries are always lower than in the
case of one participating non-Annex I country, i.e. r˜Ci (T˜CN ) < rCi (TCN )
and r˜Pi (T˜ PN ) < rPi (T PN ).
(iii) The market price for emission certificates in the case of two participating
non-Annex I countries is always lower than in the case of one participat-
ing non-Annex I country, i.e. p˜C(T˜CN ) < pC(TCN ) and p˜P (T˜ PN ) < pP (T PN ).
Proof. In the case of a competitive market, the following equation applies for
the Annex I community’s optimal emission reductions:
r˜CA(T˜
C
N )− rCA(TCN ) =
1
2α + 1
(TA + 2T˜
C
N )−
1
α + 1
(TA + T
C
N )
=
2α + 1
(2α + 1)(α + 1)
TA − 2α + 2
(α + 1)(α + 2)
TA
=
−α
(α + 1)(α + 2)
TA < 0 .
In the case of market power, the Annex I community’s optimal emission
reductions are given by
r˜PA(T˜
P
N )− rPA(T PN ) =
1
3α + 1
(TA + 2T˜
P
N ) +
α
3α + 1
TA − 1
2α
(TA + T
P
N ) +
α
2α + 1
TA
=
(
3α2 + 4α + 1 + (3α + 1)
√
2α + 1
(3α + 1)(3α + 1 +
√
2α + 1)
− 2α + 1 + (1 + α)
√
2α + 1
(2α + 1)(1 +
√
2α + 1)
)
TA
=− 6α
3 + 5α2 + α +
√
2α + 1(3α3 + 4α2 + α)
(2α + 1)(3α + 1)(1 +
√
2α + 1)(3α + 1 +
√
2α + 1)
TA .
For α > 0 this is smaller than zero.
The non-Annex I country’s optimal emission reductions in a competitive
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market are given by
r˜Ci (T˜
C
N )− rCi (TCN ) =
α
2α + 1
(TA + 2T˜
C
N )−
α
α + 1
(TA + T
C
N )
=
−3α3 − 2α2
(2α + 1)(α + 1)(α + 2)
TA < 0 .
In the case of market power, the non-Annex I country’s optimal emission
reductions are given by
r˜Pi (T˜
P
N )− rPi (T PN ) =
α
3α + 1
(TA + 3T˜
P
N )−
α
2α + 1
(TA + 2T
P
N )
=α
(
1 +
√
2α + 1
3α + 1 +
√
2α + 1
− 2α + 1 +
√
2α + 1
(2α + 1)(1 +
√
2α + 1)
)
TA
=− α
2(2α− 1−√2α + 1)
(2α + 1)(1 +
√
2α + 1)(3α + 1 +
√
2α + 1)
TA .
For α > 0 this is smaller than zero.
Part (iii) of the proposition follows from (i) and p = αArA.
Hence, the results found in Proposition 9 prevail when applying optimal
no-lose targets instead of fixed no-lose targets. Due to the property of the
optimal no-lose target being profitable, this allows us to draw a more general
conclusion. The results imply that integration of two non-Annex I countries
applying optimal no-lose targets is beneficial for two reasons: it allows higher
global emission reduction targets and, at the same time, lowers the price for
emission certificates in the emissions trading market and leads to a decrease
in the Annex I community’s domestic emission reductions. Hence, it increases
the environmental effectiveness, while also resulting in a higher efficiency in
the international emissions trading market.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, a two-player framework was presented to analyze the situation
of two symmetric non-Annex I countries facing the decision to fulfill a no-
lose target and participate in the international emissions trading market. The
two countries’ decision is directly linked, via the market price which affects
the revenue effect. To model this link, the modeling framework introduced in
chapter 2 was extended and a game-theoretical component was added.
82 3. INTERACTION OF TWO NON-ANNEX I COUNTRIES
The analyses show that three cases with differing Nash equilibria exist, two
of which result in the participation of at least one non-Annex I country. The
subsequent analyses of the impacts on the emissions trading market provided
three main insights. First, to maximize the global emission reduction target,
the optimal no-lose targets in the case of two non-Annex I countries need
to be implemented, although the optimal no-lose target in the case of one
participating non-Annex I country is higher than the optimal no-lose target in
the case of two participating non-Annex I countries. Second, applying optimal
no-lose targets, the market price for emission certificates is lower in the case
of two participating non-Annex I countries than in the case of one. This
results in lower domestic reductions in the Annex I community as well as the
non-Annex I countries. Hence, participation of both non-Annex I countries
does not only result in environmental benefits, but also in economic efficiency.
Third, similar to the case of one non-Annex I country in chapter 2, the analyses
of two non-Annex I countries facing a no-lose target show that market power
can result in significantly higher optimal no-lose targets than a competitive
market. This is in particular the case when large differences exist between
the marginal abatement costs in the Annex I community and the non-Annex I
countries. The effect that participation of two non-Annex I countries results
in higher global emission reduction targets is intensified if market power exists
on the part of the non-Annex I countries.
Another important point, in particular from a political point of view, was
found in the analysis of the non-Annex I countries’ payoff functions. It showed
that, for particularly lenient no-lose targets and a large reduction potential in
the non-Annex I country, compared to the Annex I community, in a compet-
itive market a non-Annex I country is not necessarily interested in bringing
down its marginal abatement costs. In contrast, under certain circumstances,
lower marginal abatement costs in the non-Annex I country would lower the
country’s payoffs. This finding is particularly important, if no-lose targets are
to be complemented with other policies like e.g. R&D cooperation which di-
rectly focuses on reducing a country’s marginal abatement costs. Hence, this
finding indicates that further research in that area is necessary.
While the model introduced can be seen as a starting point for analyses
of no-lose targets in emissions trading markets, it presents a highly stylized
version of an emissions trading market. We restricted the analysis to two
symmetric countries. Asymmetry of non-Annex I countries with respect to
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abatement costs can have major impacts on the emissions trading market, as
well as on the profitability of a no-lose target and, hence, the decision of a
non-Annex I country to fulfill the target. Extending the asymmetry to the
level of the no-lose targets further allows us to model the effects of individual
no-lose targets. Also, extending the model to allow analyses of more than
two non-Annex I countries, while significantly increasing the complexity of the
participation game, would provide further valuable insights into the impacts of
no-lose targets on global emission reductions and the emissions trading market
under more realistic assumptions. In order to overcome these obstacles in the
theoretical analyses, the following chapter provides a quantitative analysis of
no-lose targets including 137 heterogeneous countries, 18 of which face no-lose
targets and, hence, the decision to participate in the international emissions
trading market.
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Chapter 4
Can no-lose targets contribute to
the 2◦C target?1
4.1 Introduction
The last two chapters focused on the economic analysis of no-lose targets. In
particular, two aspects were addressed: the the potential of no-lose targets
to result in a non-Annex I country’s contribution to emission reduction ef-
forts (chapter 2) and the effects of competition of more than one non-Annex I
country facing a no-lose target (chapter 3). For the economic analysis, two
theoretical frameworks were presented that model the application of no-lose
targets in a highly stylized setting. Particularly, three aspects were simplified.
First,in the theoretical framework, the number of non-Annex I countries facing
no-lose targets was limited to one and two, respectively to reduce the complex-
ity of the model. In contrast, in reality a much higher number of non-Annex I
countries qualifies for an application of no-lose targets. Second, the analyses
in chapter 3 were limited to symmetric non-Annex I countries while in reality
countries are heterogeneous. Third, the form of the marginal abatement cost
curves was assumed to be linear to reduce the complexity of the derivatives
and formula.
We will use this chapter to complement the economic analysis with a quan-
titative analysis of the application of no-lose targets. Although quantitative
analyses also face a large number of assumptions and restrictions, the analysis
shall help to provide a first more realistic estimation of contributions from
1This is a preprint of an article submitted for consideration in Climate Policy
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non-Annex I countries to global emission reductions applying no-lose targets.
Empirical analyses of no-lose target systems are rare and mainly relate to
sectoral no-lose targets. J. Schmidt et al. (2008) analyze sectoral no-lose targets
for the cement, the iron and steel and the electricity sector but do not consider
participation in emissions trading as incentive mechanism. Amatayakul et al.
(2008) analyze the potential for emission reductions applying no-lose targets
in the electricity sector in seven developing countries. They estimate that a
reduction of about 10% below baseline could be achieved generating about 410
to 540 million certificates per year between 2012 and 2020. However, they do
not model the demand for emission certificates nor the market price for certifi-
cates. den Elzen et al. (2010) allow developing countries to participate, among
others, in international emissions trading via no-lose targets prior to accepting
an agreement involving binding reduction targets. They model emission re-
ductions of 10% below baseline in 2020 being realized through no-lose targets.
However, they do not check if fulfilling the no-lose target is profitable.
The only study taking into account that the reduction target for a non-
Annex I country should be profitable is R. C. Schmidt and Marschinski (2010).
In this study, however, analyses are limited to one non-Annex I country (China).
Applying marginal abatement cost curves they estimate that China can con-
tribute up to 1.1 GtCO2e to global emission reductions if participating in an
emissions trading market with the USA and the EU. The analyses are based
on the assumption that China maximizes its revenues from emissions trading.
In this chapter, we quantitatively analyze the non-Annex I countries’ po-
tential to contribute to global emission reductions applying no-lose targets. In
particular, we attempt to assess if no-lose targets can help in keeping mean
temperature increase below 2◦C. As before, we consider the economic incen-
tives that need to be fulfilled for a no-lose target to be profitable and hence the
non-Annex I country to meet the target and participate in the international
emissions trading market. We further focus on analyzing given no-lose targets
rather than modeling the negotiation process and endogenously deriving no-
lose targets as a result of the negotiation process. Hence, we move away from
the target-setting approach (bottom-up or top-down) and the optimal no-lose
targets analyzed in the subsequent chapters.
Methodologically, we rely on marginal abatement cost curves derived from
policy simulations with the global partial equilibrium model POLES to analyt-
ically solve the participation decision of several non-Annex I countries facing
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no-lose targets while taking into account cost and revenue effects. The algo-
rithm implemented allows us to determine participation incentive-compatible
constellations of no-lose targets for non-Annex I countries, associated emission
reductions and their effects on global emissions.
We use the commonly accepted and politically discussed burden-sharing
proposal by the IPCC as starting point for the analyses (Metz et al., 2007).
According to den Elzen and Hoehne (2010a)2 the increase in global GHG emis-
sions must not exceed 1990 levels by more than 10% to 30% by 2020 in order
to limit mean temperature increase to 2◦C above pre-industrial levels. Annex I
countries must decrease their GHG emissions by 25% to 40% below 1990 levels
by 2020 (Metz et al., 2007) while emissions from non-Annex I countries need
to stay 15% to 30% below baseline in 2020 (den Elzen & Hoehne, 2010a). We
analyze the IPCC burden-sharing scenario assuming uniform reduction targets
for non-Annex I countries. That is, all non-Annex I countries facing a no-lose
target face the same reduction target (measured as percentage below baseline
emissions). In a second step we explore options for increasing participation
from non-Annex I countries like applying less ambitious uniform no-lose tar-
gets or individualizing no-lose targets for large developing countries like China,
India and Brazil. Finally, we show how uniform no-lose targets may effectively
contribute to achieving the 2◦C target once the burden-sharing arrangements
between Annex I and non-Annex I countries is altered appropriately.
In contrast to the subsequent chapters, we restrict the quantitative anal-
ysis to the case of a competitive market and do not analyze the effects of
strategically acting non-Annex I countries.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the modeling
approach including data and the algorithm derived to calculate no-lose tar-
gets. Section 4.3 presents the results of the scenarios derived from the IPCC
burden-sharing approach. Section 4.4 includes the findings for the alternative
reduction scenarios. Finally, section 4.5 discusses the main findings and offers
guidance for no-lose targets policy design.
2The analysis provides background information on the derivation of the IPCC analyses
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4.2 Methodology
This section presents the methodology developed to analyze the effects of no-
lose targets. Section 4.2.1 introduces the markets modeled and the flow of
traded certificates. In section 4.2.2 the countries’ optimization problems to-
gether with the solution algorithm are introduced. Sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4
describe the data and the assignment of countries to the different markets.
4.2.1 Trading markets
For the subsequent analyses, we distinguish three groups of countries:
(i) Annex I countries, which all commit to binding targets for 2020 (AI),
(ii) non-Annex I countries, which are eligible to participate in a no-lose target
scheme (NAI_NLT) and
(iii) the remaining non-Annex I countries, which do not face any emission
targets (NAI_REST).
Two different markets are modeled: an international emissions trading mar-
ket (IETM) and an offsetting market (OM)3. Countries within the IETM can
freely trade emission certificates among each other, but may be required to
meet a minimum share of their individual targeted emission reductions domes-
tically (“domestic quota”). Countries within the OM can sell offsetting credits
to the countries within the IETM but can neither trade among each other nor
buy emission certificates from the countries within the IETM. Similarly, coun-
tries within the IETM face an “offsetting limit”, which is the maximum share
of the individual targeted emission reductions that can be met via offsetting
credits.
The countries within the three different country groups are assigned to
the two markets as follows (see also Figure 4.1). AI countries are allowed to
participate in the international emissions trading market and are subject to
domestic quotas and offsetting limits. NAI_NLT countries can participate in
the international emissions trading market if they decide to fulfill their no-lose
targets. Unlike AI countries, NAI_NLT countries can only sell certificates and
are not allowed to buy offsetting credits. Hence, a NAI_NLT country has to
3In essence, the offsetting market represents the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
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fulfill 100% of its no-lose reduction commitment domestically if it wants to sell
cerfiticates.4 NAI_REST countries are assigned to the offsetting market and
can sell offsetting credits to the AI countries, but not to NAI_NLT countries.
These rules can lead to differences in the prices for emission certificates
and offsetting credits. Because of arbitrage, however, the price of the emission
certificates traded among AI countries and of the emission certificates sold by
NAI_NLT countries must be identical.
We assume the levels of the domestic quota and the offsetting limit to be
the same for all AI countries. We set the default value for the domestic quota
at 10% and for the offsetting limit at 20% (for the remaining 90% of emission
reductions). Hence, AI countries must meet at least 72% of the emission
reductions by domestic action or via certificate trading in the international
emissions trading market. We further assume that only a fraction of the total
emission reduction potential of a NAI_REST country can be used for offsetting
purposes at the prevailing certificate price. Following Castro (2010), we set
this share at 20%.5
The post-Kyoto negotiations involve discussions about additional mecha-
nisms to help finance abatement activities in NAI countries. To avoid double
funding, we assume that countries with no-lose targets will not be eligible for
such financing mechanisms.
4.2.2 The modeling of no-lose targets
Formal model
In this section, we formalize the objectives of the three country groups. The
assumptions are similar to the modeling framework applied in chapters 2 and
3. In particular, we assume that a NAI_NLT country i with a no-lose target
4It is assumed that non-Annex I countries cannot choose whether they want to be in
the NAI_REST group or the NAI_NLT group. Hence, a NAI_NLT country is not allowed
to become a member of the offsetting market and sell its emission reductions as offsetting
credits instead.
5For six developing countries, Castro (2010) estimates that between 1% and 31% of their
emission reduction potential is captured via CDM projects. The figure for China for the
year 2020 is, for example, 21%.
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Figure 4.1: Types of markets and the flow of traded certificates
Ti faces the following optimization problem:
TCi = Ci(ri)− pC(ri − Ti)→ min
ri
(4.1)
s.t. TCi = Ci(ri)− pC(ri − Ti) ≤ 0 , (4.2)
where pC is the market price for emission certificates, ri stands for the real-
ized emission reductions in country i compared to baseline and Ci(ri) are the
associated abatement costs. A country’s no-lose target Ti is given as emission
reductions below baseline and is exogenously given as the outcome of climate
negotiations.6 Hence, country i is assumed to minimize its total costs TCi,
i.e. abatement costs (for the entire emission reductions) minus revenues from
selling emission certificates (the difference between actual and targeted reduc-
tions). Condition (4.2) reflects that a rational country will participate in the
international emissions trading market and hence fulfill its no-lose target if
revenues from selling certificates are not lower than abatement costs (partic-
ipation constraint). Hence, the no-lose target must be profitable. Otherwise,
a country’s emissions are assumed to take on baseline levels (i.e. ri = 0).
Figure 4.2 illustrates condition (4.2) for a NAI_NLT country facing a no-lose
target of Tj. For a certificate price of p, the revenues from selling certificates
(r∗j−Tj) minus abatement costs for the associated emission reductions (beyond
6We do not model the negotiation process, but rather explore whether a given no-lose
target will be realized.
4.2 Methodology 91
Tj) is given by the area B + B′. The country will participate in the no-lose
target if these profits from certificate trading B + B′ exceed the abatement
costs associated with the no-lose target Tj (area A). The area B + B′ − A
may also be termed the country’s payoff. For a lower certificate price p′, the
costs of the no-lose target are still A, but they are now lower than the profits
from certificate trading (B′). Hence, if the certificate price is at p′ the country
will not participate in the no-lose target. In this case, the country’s payoff
is zero as the country will not reduce any emissions (i.e. r∗j = 0) and, hence,
B +B′ − A = 0.
Price/t CO2e
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Figure 4.2: Abatement costs and revenues from trading for a no-lose target
country
The optimization problem for an AI country j is given by
TCj = Cj(rj)− pC(rj − Tj)→ min
rj
. (4.3)
Thus, AI countries are also assumed to minimize their compliance costs, i.e.
the sum of abatement costs Cj and the costs/revenues from emissions trading.
Finally, the optimization problem for a NAI_REST country k is given by
TCk = 0.2(Ck(rk)− qcrk)→ min
rk
(4.4)
where qC is the market price for offsetting credits. As NAI_REST countries
only sell offsetting credits but do not face an emission reduction target their
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total costs are given by the profits from selling offsetting credits.
In addition, the following market clearing condition must hold:∑
j∈AI
rj +
∑
i∈NAI_NLT
ri +
∑
k∈NAI_REST
rk =
∑
j∈AI
Tj +
∑
i∈NAI_NLT,
Ti profitable
Ti . (4.5)
Equation (4.5) requires that the sum of emission reductions in all countries
equals the sum of all targeted emission reductions which are met. The latter
include all reduction targets from AI countries plus the no-lose targets of those
NAI_NLT, where the participation constraint is satisfied.
Finally, the following sets of inequalities need to hold:
for all j ∈ AI:
rj 5 DQjTj (4.6)
and
OLj(1−DQj)Tj ≥ Tj − rj −
∑
i∈NAI_NLT
ECi,j −
∑
l∈AI
l 6=j
ECl,j . (4.7)
The inequalities (4.6) ensure that in each AI country domestic emission reduc-
tions are equal or higher than the required domestic quota DQ. The second
set of inequalities (4.7) ensures that in each AI country the offsetting limit OL
is fulfilled.
∑
i∈NAI_NLT ECi,j describes the number of emission certificates AI
country j buys from the participating NAI_NLT countries and
∑
l∈AI
l 6=j
ECl,j
the sum of emission certificates AI country j buys from other AI countries.
We further assume the markets for emission certificates and offsetting credits
to be perfectly competitive, so that all countries act as price takers.
Solution algorithm
Next, we briefly outline the logic of the solution algorithm for the multi-country
optimization problem, where several NAI_NLT countries face a no-lose tar-
get and decide of whether to participate in the international emissions trad-
ing market. The aim of the algorithm is to identify an equilibrium solution
IETM∗ of AI and NAI_NLT countries participating in the international emis-
sions trading market. This equilibrium solution IETM∗ is characterized by
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two conditions. First, for all NAI_NLT countries in IETM∗ the participation
condition (4.2) is fulfilled, i.e. participation is profitable (“internal stability”).
Second, if any NAI country outside of IETM∗ joined IETM∗, participation in
IETM∗ would no longer be profitable for at least one NAI country in IETM∗
(“external stability”7).
Our algorithm employs a recursive function to identify the countries with
profitable no-lose targets and consists of four steps (see Appendix C.1 for a
more formal description). In step 1, all AI and all NAI_NLT countries are as-
sumed to participate in the IETM. In step 2, the prices for certificates pC and
offsetting credits qC as well as the numbers of emission certificates and offset-
ting credits traded are determined by solving the optimization problem for all
countries within the IETM and for the NAI_REST countries. The results are
then used to calculate total costs for the NAI_NLT countries within the IETM.
Step 3 checks if the no-lose targets are profitable for the NAI_NLT countries
participating in the IETM. If the no-lose target of at least one NAI_NLT
country within the IETM is found to be unprofitable, the NAI_NLT country
with the highest loss, i.e. the largest negative payoff is eliminated from the
IETM.8 We then return to step 2 for the resulting new IETM and calculate
prices and costs for all country groups. In this way, the countries for which
no-lose targets are not profitable, are excluded from the market step-by-step
until an IETM is found where the no-lose targets of all NAI_NLT countries
within the IETM are profitable (internal stability). Finally, in step 4, our al-
gorithm checks whether the IETM found in step 3 satisfies external stability.
To do so, excluded NAI_NLT countries are individually added to the IETM,
beginning with the largest (in terms of emissions) remaining eligible NAI. For
the resulting new IETM we return to step 2 to calculate prices and costs and
check if the IETM is internally stable. If one of the new IETMs is found to
be internally stable, it is the new IETM∗ and we restart step 4. If external
stability holds for all these constellations, the IETM from step 4 is IETM∗.
7Note that our definition of external stability differs from the game-theoretical criterion
of external stability applied to describe stability of coalitions. For an application to climate
policy see for example Brèchet et al. (2010)
8Of course, using a different selection criterion like loss per capita or loss per unit of GDP
would lead to different outcomes.
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4.2.3 Marginal abatement cost curves and data
Our analyses refer to reduction targets for the year 2020. Calculations are
based on marginal abatement cost curves for the year 2020 calculated with
the global energy system model POLES9. To generate the marginal abatement
cost curves, the POLES model was calibrated to the World Energy Outlook
2010, New Policies Scenario (IEA, 2010). To derive marginal abatement cost
curves for the year 2020 the model was solved in one-year-steps from 2008 to
2020 with a linearly increasing price for GHG emissions. This implies that
emission reduction targets become stricter over time, while the Kyoto Period
(2008-2012) is not explicitly modeled.
The POLES model generates marginal abatement cost curves for 58 coun-
tries and regions. To further disaggregate the regional level for the analy-
ses most recent historic emissions data from UNFCCC inventories (United
Nations, 2012) and the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2011) were used.
Combining historic data and the growth and abatement rates from the POLES
scenario marginal abatement cost curves for 137 countries for the year 2020
were derived.
The marginal abatement cost curves are calculated at the country level
and include abatement potentials for all six Kyoto GHGs but exclude emis-
sions and abatement potentials from land-use, land-use change and forestry
(LULUCF) and deforestation (REDD)10. World total emissions also include
emissions from international bunker fuels. Following the World Energy Out-
look 2010, we assume a growth rate of 90% between 1990 and 2020 for bunker
fuels (IEA, 2010). Emission reduction targets and measures for bunker fuels
are not included. Historic and baseline GHG emissions by country groups are
displayed in Table 4.1.
4.2.4 Country groups
For the subsequent analyses we define the three country groups introduced
above as follows:
9For a description and applications of the POLES model see for example, Criqui (2001)
or Russ and Criqui (2007). POLES is a partial equilibrium model, hence the marginal
abatement cost curves do not include macro-economic effects.
10Including emissions and emission reduction potential from LULUCF and REDD could
change quantitative as well as qualitative results in particular for non-Annex I countries like
Brazil or Indonesia.
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Country group 1990 2005 2020
[Gt CO2e] [Gt CO2e] [Gt CO2e]
AI 18.4 18.5 18.3
NAI_NLT 8.8 15.8 28.4
NAI_REST 3.5 5.0 6.7
Table 4.1: Historic and baseline GHG emissions from 1990 - 2020 by country
groups
AI: All 39 countries listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol (including the
USA) and Turkey. An aggregate Annex I target for 2020 is defined and all
AI countries are assumed to commit to the same percentage reduction in
2020 compared to 1990 levels, i.e. uniform reduction targets are applied
to all AI countries. For a few countries this assumption results in emission
targets which are above baseline emissions in some scenarios (“hot air”).11
NAI_NLT: To reduce computation time not all NAI countries are consid-
ered eligible for no-lose targets. Instead, the group of NAI_NLT coun-
tries only includes countries whose total baseline GHG emissions in 2020
exceed 300 MtCO2e. These 18 countries cover more than 80% of NAI
countries’ projected GHG emissions in 2020.12
NAI_REST: The remaining 79 NAI countries.
4.3 “IPCC” scenarios
4.3.1 “IPCC” scenario definition
The first set of policy scenarios is based on the burden-sharing proposed in
the 4th IPCC assessment report (Metz et al., 2007).13 Accordingly, emission
reductions in the range of 25% to 40% below 1990 levels for Annex I countries
and a “substantial deviation from baseline in Latin America, Middle East, East
Asia and Centrally-Planned Asia” for non-Annex I countries for the year 2020
11These countries are typically countries from the former Soviet Union like Russia, Belarus
and the Ukraine as well as Eastern European States.
12The countries included in NAI_NLT are Argentina (ARG), Brazil (BRA), China (CHN),
Egypt (EGY), Indonesia (IDN), India (IND), Iran (IRN), Kazakhstan (KAZ), Republic of
Korea (KOR), Malaysia (MYS), Mexico (MEX), Nigeria (NGA), Pakistan (PAK), Saudi
Arabia (SAU), Thailand (THA), Taiwan (TWN), Vietnam (VNM) and South Africa (ZAF).
13For a detailed overview of different burden-sharing approaches see den Elzen et al.
(1999), Kartha, Kjellen, Baer, and Athanasiou (2009) and den Elzen and Hoehne (2010b).
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are necessary to stay on a path to the 2 ◦C target. den Elzen and Hoehne
(2010a) quantify the quantifying the emission reductions from non-Annex I
countries as 15% to 30% below baseline in 2020. Further, global emissions in
2020 should not exceed 1990 levels by more than 10% to 30%.
Based on these emission ranges compatible with the 2 ◦C target, we define
the subsequent three “IPCC” scenarios applying uniform reduction targets for
AI and NAI_NLT countries:
IPCC_amb: a global target of 10% above 1990 levels and an Annex I target
of 40% below 1990 levels,
IPCC_med: global emission target of 30% above and an Annex I target of
25% below 1990 levels and
IPCC_low: a global emission target of 30% above and an Annex I target of
40% below 1990 levels.
The IPCC_amb scenario combines the more ambitious end of the global
reduction range (10% global emission growth) with the more ambitious target
for Annex I countries. The IPCC_low scenario combines the less ambitious
end of the global reduction range (30% global emission growth) with the lower
reduction target for Annex I countries. Hence, the two scenario represent the
more ambitious and the less ambitious end of the reduction range for global
emission reduction efforts as well as for the Annex I countries’ reduction efforts.
The IPCC_med scenario combines the less ambitious global reduction target
with the higher reduction target for Annex I countries. Hence, for this scenario
no-lose targets are expected to be particularly profitable. In sum, the analyzed
scenarios represent the upper and the lower end of the global emission reduction
range for 2020 compatible with a 2 ◦C target.
Following the approach by den Elzen and Hoehne (2010a), the non-Annex I
countries’ aggregate emission target is derived from the global emission tar-
get by subtracting the Annex I countries’ emission target. To calculate the
NAI_NLT countries’ emission targets we further subtracted baseline emissions
for the NAI_REST countries applying our modeling baseline. The resulting
emission targets were then translated into emission reduction targets below
baseline in 2020.
Compared to our modeling baseline the reduction targets for NAI_NLT
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countries correspond to emission reductions of 43%, 30% and 20% below base-
line in IPCC_amb, IPCC_med and IPCC_low, respectively (see Table 4.2).
Scenario global AI NAI_NLT
to 1990 [%] to baseline [Gt CO2e] to 1990 [%] to baseline [%]
IPCC_amb 10 -19.1 -40 -43
IPCC_med 30 -12.6 -25 -30
IPCC_low 30 -12.6 -40 -20
Table 4.2: Global and regional emission reduction targets for 2020 in the
“IPCC” scenarios
4.3.2 Results for “IPCC” scenarios
Results for the “IPCC” scenarios in the equilibrium solution IETM∗ appear in
Table 4.3. Table 4.4 presents the findings for prices of certificates and offsetting
credits (in 2005e/tCO2e given in columns one and two) and for changes in
total compliance costs (TC) and in AI countries’ total compliance costs TCAI
compared to a scenario without a no-lose target scheme. Changes in global
total costs TC (are an indicator for the associated efficiency gains. Changes
in AI countries’ aggregated total costs TCAI are given in column four. The
last column in Table 4.4 shows the payoffs as a share of the abatement costs
associated with meeting the no-lose targets. In terms of Figure 4.2, the payoff
ratio corresponds to the ratio of area (B +B′ − A) to area A.
Results in Table 4.4 indicate that the offsetting limit is not binding for any
of the “IPCC” scenarios considered since arbitrage leads to identical prices for
emission certificates and offsetting credits. Prices are highest in IPCC_amb,
but since no-lose targets are also ambitious participation is not profitable for
any NAI_NLT country in IPCC_amb. As a consequence, the 10% global
emission growth target will be missed.
For different reasons, prices are substantially lower in the two other “IPCC”
scenarios, both of which aim for the 30% global emission growth target. In
IPCC_med, targets for AI countries are more lenient than in IPCC_amb and
the high amounts of “hot air”, which are traded within IETM∗, also dampen
the price for certificates. As a result, none of the NAI_NLT countries finds
it profitable to participate in the IETM even though their no-lose targets are
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less ambitious than in the IPCC_amb scenario. Thus, IPCC_med misses the
envisaged 30% global emission growth target.
In contrast, in scenario IPCC_low, where AI countries’ targets are rather
ambitious and no-lose targets are rather weak, eleven NAI_NLT countries
find it profitable to participate in the IETM. Realized emission reductions
from NAI_NLT countries add up to 1.8 GtCO2e, resulting in global emission
reductions of 8.8 GtCO2e. Also, IPCC_low allows for substantial efficiency
gains compared to a scenario without NAI_NLT countries’ participation. No-
tably, global compliance costs decrease by 19% and compliance costs for AI
countries decrease by 14% compared to a scenario without a NLT scheme. In
particular, those AI countries, which face relatively stringent targets, benefit
from purchasing large numbers of certificates from NAI_NLT countries (about
1.5 GtCO2e accounting for about 20% of the AI countries’ aggregated emission
reduction target). NAI_NLT countries are also better off: NAI_NLT coun-
tries’ aggregate revenues from selling certificates are 41% higher than would
be needed to make participation by these countries profitable. The uniform
no-lose targets applied also result in substantial differences in the participat-
ing NAI_NLT countries’ payoffs. For example, for Nigeria payoffs are than 10
times larger than needed to meet its participation constraint. They are “only”
30% higher for Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam.
Although scenario IPCC_low induces participation by non-Annex I coun-
tries and, hence, increases global emission reductions, only 31% of the envis-
aged emission reductions for NAI_NLT countries are realized and the 30%
global emission growth target is missed. It should be noted though that emis-
sions in IPCC_low are lower than in IPCC_amb.
Besides the levels of the NLT, the profitability of the no-lose targets also
depends on the domestic quota, the offsetting limit and the amount of hot air.
While a high domestic quota and a high offsetting limit reduce the demand
for certificates from the IETM, “hot air” certificates are a low-cost alterna-
tive to certificates from NAI_NLT countries. A sensitivity analysis for the
IPCC_low scenario shows that varying the domestic quota and the offsetting
limit within reasonable limits does not affect the profitability of the no-lose
targets. Similarly, limiting “hot air” by applying a more sophisticated burden-
sharing among Annex I countries or prohibiting Annex I countries from selling
“hot air” also does not lead to changes in the profitability of no-lose targets
for NAI_NLT countries in the analyzed scenarios either. An overview on the
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results of the sensitivity analyses is provided in Appendix C.2.
In sum, only scenario IPCC_low induces several NAI_NLT countries (in-
cluding India but not China) to participate in no-lose targets, but still fails to
achieve the envisaged global emission targets.14 According to our quantitative
analysis, reduction ranges of 25% to 40% below 1990 levels for Annex I coun-
tries in combination with no-lose targets of 15% to 30% below baseline will
not lead to global emission levels considered compatible with the 2 ◦C target.
The results also imply that either Annex I countries’ targets are too lenient or
that NAI_NLT countries’ no-lose targets are too stringent.
14For completeness we also analyzed a scenario targeting at a global emission target of
10% above 1990 levels and applying a reduction target of 25% below 1990 levels for An-
nex I countries. Similar to the IPCC_amb scenario, no NAI_NLT countries were found to
participate in NLT.
100
4.C
A
N
N
O
-LO
SE
T
A
R
G
E
T
S
C
O
N
T
R
IB
U
T
E
T
O
T
H
E
2 ◦C
T
A
R
G
E
T
?
Scenario No. of part.
NAI_NLT
Envisaged
reductions by
NAI_NLT
Realized
reductions by
NAI_NLT
Certificates
sold by
NAI_NLT
Realized
global
reductions
“Hot Air”
[MtCO2e] [MtCO2e] [%] [MtCO2e] [MtCO2e] [MtCO2e]
IPCC_amb 0 11 454 - 0 - 7 097 80
IPCC_med 0 8 357 - 0 - 4 287 219
IPCC_low 11* 5 653 1 749 31 1 530 8 846 80
*IND, IDN, KAZ, MYS, NGA, PAK, KOR, ZAF, TWN, THA, VNM
Table 4.3: Participation and emission reductions by NAI_NLT in 2020 in “IPCC” scenarios
Scenario Price IETM Price OM Global
compliance costs
AI compliance
costs
Payoff ratio
[e/tCO2e] [e/tCO2e] [%] [%] [%]
IPCC_amb 152.73 152.73 0 0 0
IPCC_med 63.78 63.78 0 0 0
IPCC_low 101.81 101.81 -19 -14 41
Table 4.4: Prices and compliance costs in 2020 in “IPCC” scenarios
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4.4 Alternative scenarios
In this section we explore three alternative ways to the “IPCC” scenarios to
increase participation by NAI_NLT countries. First, we continue to apply
uniform targets for NAI_NLT countries but lower the ambition of the no-
lose targets compared to the “IPCC” scenarios. Hence, by design, in these
“lenient no-lose target” scenarios (LT) the global emission target of 30% will
be missed. More lenient no-lose targets may result in lower global emissions
than more ambitious targets, as was the case in IPCC_low. Varying the
target levels offers more general insights on the properties of no-lose targets
and also allows identifying the level of NLT where global emissions are lowest.
Then we consider two types of alternative scenarios which are compatible with
the 2 ◦C target. First, we allow the reduction targets to differ across three
large NAI_NLT countries Brazil, India and China (BIC). Second, in the BuS
scenarios we alter the burden-sharing of emission reductions compared to the
IPCC scenarios, such that no-lose targets for NAI_NLT countries become more
lenient while targets for AI countries become more ambitious. Details on the
alternative scenarios implemented can be found in Table 4.5.
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Scenario global AI NAI_NLT
to 1990 [%] to 1990 [%] to baseline [%]
LT scenarios > 30 -40 -2 to -22
BIC_10 > 30 -40 Brazil: -12, India: -16,
China: -15, Other: -10
BuS_10_FP 10 -84 -13
BuS_30_FP 30 -56 -9
BuS_10 10 -72 -31
BuS_30 30 -46 -21
Table 4.5: Global and regional emission reduction targets for 2020 in the alternative scenarios
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4.4.1 Results for scenarios with lenient no-lose targets
When no-lose targets become more lenient, there are two countervailing ef-
fects on global emissions. On the one hand, lower no-lose targets imply lower
emission reduction contributions by an individual NAI_NLT country. On the
other hand, more countries will participate in no-lose targets. Thus, neither
a high ratio of realized to envisaged emission reductions nor a large number
of participating NAI_NLT countries necessarily imply global emission reduc-
tions.
The LT (lenient targets) scenarios are based on the IPCC_low scenario.
The uniform NLT is then gradually increased from 20% to 0%, while the 40%
reduction target for AI countries is kept constant. Results of this sensitivity
analysis are displayed in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4.
As the NLT becomes more ambitious, the gab between the envisaged and
the realized NAI_NLT emission reductions by NAI_NLT countries widens in
Figure 4.3. Up to a uniform reduction rate of 6% below baseline, all NAI_NLT
will participate. Further, the maximum emission reductions from NAI_NLT
are achieved for a reduction rate of 18%. In this case seven out of 18 eligible
NAI_NLT countries reduce emissions by 3.8 GtCO2e compared to baseline;
but this is still shy of meeting envisaged global emission reductions. For higher
uniform reduction rates, the payoff for China becomes negative (as indicated
by the large drop in realized emission reductions in Figure 4.3). For tighter
no-lose targets the certificate price in Figure 4.4 continues to rise, and the
revenue effect induces participation by some smaller NAI_NLT countries, but
they cannot make up for China’s dropping out of the IETM∗.
It is worth noting that the realized emission reductions from NAI_NLT
countries in the scenarios with no-lose targets between 7% and 18% are larger
than in the IPCC_low scenario, because many more NAI_NLT countries par-
ticipate. This illustrates that more lenient NLT may actually result in lower
global emissions, lower global compliance costs and lower compliance costs for
Annex I countries than under IPCC_low.
4.4.2 Results for scenarios with individual no-lose targets
for large emitters
Section 4.4.1 illustrates the importance of considering the participation in-
centives of large emitters when deciding on the level of reduction rates for
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Figure 4.3: Participation and emission reductions from NAI_NLT countries
under a 40% reduction scenario for AI countries in 2020 - Sensitivity analysis
for no-lose targets levels
NAI_NLT countries. Further, the results of IPCC_low in section 4.3.2 showed
that in case of uniform reduction targets low cost countries can realize high
payoffs from profitable no-lose targets. In this section, we deviate from the
assumption that all NAI_NLT countries face a uniform reduction target. In-
stead, we allow individual no-lose targets for the largest emitters among the
NAI_NLT countries, i.e. Brazil, India and China (BIC). Individual targets
may better account for heterogeneity across NAI_NLT countries, e.g. with re-
spect to abatement costs. Hence, individual no-lose targets may lead to lower
payoffs for some NAI_NLT countries, higher global emission reductions than
uniform targets, and lower total costs at the global level and for AI countries.
For NAI_NLT countries other than BIC we assume a uniform reduction target
of 10% below baseline while AI countries face a uniform 40% reduction target
as before (BIC scenario).
Our solution algorithm now starts with a uniform no-lose reduction tar-
get of 10% for BIC and for all other NAI_NLT countries. In this starting
scenario, no-lose targets turn out to be profitable for all NAI_NLT countries
but Mexico. The reduction rates are then individualized and increased for
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BIC beginning with China followed by India and Brazil until participation in
the international emissions trading market is no longer profitable for at least
one of the BIC countries. We refer to the three reduction targets, where the
participation constraints for all three BIC countries becomes binding, as the
“threshold reduction targets”. Since tighter reduction targets for BIC result
in a lower supply of certificates from these countries certificate prices increase
as no-lose targets for BIC become tighter. Because other NAI_NLT coun-
tries benefit via the revenue, they continue to participate in the international
emissions trading market.
For IETM∗, we find threshold reduction targets for Brazil, India and China
of 12%, 16% and 15%.15 More detailed results on the scenario as well as the
starting scenario are provided in Table C.2 in Appendix C.3. Compared to the
starting scenario with uniform NLT of 10% for all NAI_NLT countries, the
15If lower uniform targets than 10% are chosen for NAI_NLT countries other than BIC,
the country-specific targets for BIC will be lower and global emissions will be higher because
of the revenue effect. Lower targets for other NAI_NLT countries imply higher supply and
lower prices of certificates, and hence lower country-specific threshold reduction targets for
BIC. For example, a uniform target of 5% for other NAI_NLT countries results in threshold
reduction targets for Brazil, India and China of 11%, 14% and 13%, respectively.
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BIC scenarios leads to higher emission reductions of about 1 GtCO2e and to
lower compliance costs for AI countries. In general, the additional effects of
individualizing reduction targets for some countries compared to the starting
scenario is smaller, the closer the uniform targets in the starting scenario are
to the “threshold reduction targets”. Compared to the IPCC_low scenario, in
the BIC scenario global compliance costs are 20% lower, compliance costs of
AI countries are 25% lower, while global emission reductions are 22.5% higher.
In sum, individualizing the no-lose targets for the largest emitters leads
to lower global emissions than the “IPCC” scenarios and to similar emissions
as the “best” LT scenarios are able to achieve. However, the envisage global
emission growth targets of 30% and 10% will be missed by about 1.8 GtCO2e
or 8.3 GtCO2e, respectively.
4.4.3 Results for alternative burden-sharing scenarios
Since none of the scenarios considered so far resulted in participation by all eli-
gible NAI_NLT countries, the envisaged global emission growth targets of 10%
and 30% were missed. Emission levels for NAI_NLT countries were too high
either because no-lose targets were too ambitious as in the “IPCC” scenarios
or because reduction targets were too lenient as in the LT and BIC scenarios,
so that even high ratios of realized versus envisaged reductions were not suffi-
cient to meet global emission targets. In this section, we explore the effects of
shifting the burden of emission reductions between Annex I and non-Annex I
countries, while requiring that the global emission growth targets of 10% or
30% are met. All alternative burden-sharing scenarios (BuS scenarios) assume
that AI and NAI_NLT countries are subject to uniform reduction targets.
We distinguish two kinds of alternative burden-sharing scenarios. In the
“full participation” BuS_10_FP and BuS_30_FP scenarios, we calculate the
no-lose target level at which all NAI_NLT countries participate in the no-lose
target scheme.16 In comparison, for the BuS_10 and BuS_30 scenarios, we
no longer require all eligible non-Annex I countries to participate in no-lose
targets, but continue to enforce the global emission growth rates of 10% and
30%, respectively.
16This scenario corresponds to an international emissions trading scenario, where – just
like the AI countries – all NAI_NLT countries have to meet binding emission targets. Im-
plementing the equivalent outcome (in terms of global emissions) via binding targets for all
countries, however, would not recognize the participation constraints of NAI_NLT countries.
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Our findings for the BuS_FP scenarios suggest that a global emission
growth target of 10% can be reached if AI countries reduce emissions by 84%
compared to 1990 levels and if uniform no-lose targets are set at 13%. For the
30% global emission growth target, Annex I countries face a reduction rate
of 56% and the no-lose target is 9%. In both scenarios, NLT emission reduc-
tions in NAI_NLT countries (reductions up to Tj in Figure 4.2) account for
about 20% of global emission reductions. An additional 45% of global emission
reductions is realized in the NAI_NLT countries but paid for via certificate
trading by AI countries (reductions between Tj and r∗j in Figure 4.2). In this
case, about 2/3 of global emission reductions are realized in NAI_NLT coun-
tries. The prices for emission certificates and offsetting credits are 68e/tCO2e
and 144e/tCO2e for the 30% and the 10% global emission growth targets,
respectively (see Table 4.6).
In comparison, the BuS_10 and BuS_30 scenarios imply more lenient re-
duction targets for AI countries, but stricter NLT for NAI_NLT and consid-
erably less NAI_NLT countries which participate in the NLT scheme. For
the 10% global emission growth target in 2020, Annex I countries need to re-
duce emissions by 72% below 1990 levels and the NLT for the five NAI_NLT
countries is 31%. For the global emission growth target of 30%, the reduction
rate for AI countries is 46% and the NLT for the seven NAI_NLT countries
is 21%. NAI_NLT countries’ own contribution to global emission reductions
(reductions up to Tj in Figure 4.2) increases to about 45% for the 10% global
emission growth target and even 47% for the 30% global emission growth tar-
get. In addition, 25% (for the 10% global emission growth target) and 19% (for
the 30% global emission growth target) of global emission reductions are real-
ized in NAI_NLT countries but paid for by AI countries (reductions between
Tj and r∗j in Figure 4.2). Similar to the BuS_FP scenarios, in the BuS_30 sce-
nario (Bus_10 scenario) emission reductions in NAI_NLT countries account
for about 2/3 (70%) of global reductions. The prices for emission certificates
and offsetting credits are somewhat higher than in the BuS_FP scenarios (see
Table 4.6).
Table 4.7 compares the main findings of the alternative burden-sharing
scenarios to the “IPCC” scenario with the lowest global emissions, i.e. the
IPCC_low scenario. Interestingly, BuS_30_FP not only leads – by design –
to lower global emissions (by 43%), but also to lower global costs (by 2%),
suggesting that this setting is not only more environmentally effective but
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also globally more cost-efficient. In this case, NAI_NLT countries enjoy large
payoffs because of the uniform NLT scheme, while AI countries face higher
compliance costs because of more ambitious reduction targets in BuS_30_FP
compared to IPCC_low. From the perspective of AI countries both these
aspects may render BuS_30_FP politically unacceptable. For all other BuS
scenarios the higher global emission reductions also result in higher global
compliance cost, in particular for the 10% global emission growth target.
The findings further suggest that for the 10% and the 30% global emissions
growth targets “full participation” results in lowest total compliance costs, but
compliance costs for AI countries are significantly higher than in the BuS
scenarios. This finding illustrates again that, in case of uniform reduction
targets, the more (high cost) non-Annex I countries are to participate in no-
lose targets, the higher are the additional costs Annex I countries have to
bear. From this perspective, Annex I countries should favor no-lose targets
that induce participation by large, low-cost non-Annex I countries, rather than
by all eligible non-Annex I countries.
4.4
A
lternative
scenarios
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Scenario Price IETM Price OM No. of part.
NAI_NLT
Envisaged reductions
by NAI_NLT
Realized reductions
by NAI_NLT
Certificates sold
by NAI_NLT
[e/tCO2e] [e/tCO2e] [MtCO2e] [MtCO2e] [%] [MtCO2e]
BuS_10_FP 143.67 143.67 18 3 675 3 675 100 8 628
BuS_30_FP 67.81 67.81 18 2 544 2 544 100 5 648
BuS_10 152.73 151.19 5* 8 616 6 193 72 3 623
BuS_30 85.65 85.65 7** 5 936 4 487 76 3 162
* CHN, IND, KOR, NIG, PAK
** CHN, IDN, IND, KAZ, KOR, NIG, PAK
Table 4.6: Alternative burden-sharing scenarios for a 2 ◦C stabilization scenario
Scenario Global emission reductions* Global compliance costs AI compliance costs
[%] [%] [%]
BuS_10_FP 170 141 258
BuS_30_FP 43 -2 31
BuS_10 172 220 201
BuS_30 44 24 15
* Differences in global emission reductions between BuS_10_FP and BuS_10 and BuS_30_FP and BuS_30 are due to rounding errors.
Table 4.7: Global emission reductions and costs in the alternative burden-sharing scenarios compared to the IPCC_low scenario
110 4. CAN NO-LOSE TARGETS CONTRIBUTE TO THE 2◦C TARGET?
4.5 Conclusions
The model-based quantitative analyses presented in this chapter for the year
2020 illustrate that properly designed no-lose targets may benefit eligible non-
Annex I countries, contribute to global emission reductions, and reduce com-
pliance costs for Annex I countries. In this respect, climate policy faces the
challenge of identifying burden-sharing arrangements which are acceptable to
Annex I and non-Annex I countries and to determine no-lose targets which in-
duce participation by a sufficient number of non-Annex I countries to meet the
global climate target without causing undesirable distributional effects such as
excessive payoffs (rents) for some non-Annex I countries at the expense of
Annex I countries.
More specifically, the findings provide guidance for policy making. In par-
ticular, our findings suggest that implementing no-lose targets for non-Annex I
countries under the burden-sharing as discussed in the latest IPCC assessment
report (Metz et al., 2007) will not lead to global emission levels considered
compatible with the 2 ◦C target, because participation in no-lose targets is
profitable for a few non-Annex I countries, at best. More lenient no-lose tar-
gets than those implemented in our “IPCC” scenarios may actually result in
lower global emissions, lower global compliance costs and lower compliance
costs for Annex I countries than more ambitious no-lose targets. Likewise, in-
dividualizing no-lose target levels for large emitters may increase participation
by non-Annex I countries, lower global emissions and reduce payoffs for non-
Annex I countries. While both options may offer a politically less challenging,
yet environmentally and economically effective way for non-Annex I countries
to contribute to global emission reductions, resulting global emission levels are
not consistent with the 2 ◦C target.
Our findings also show that no-lose targets may help achieving the 2 ◦C
target in a more environmentally effective and cost-efficient way, if the burden
sharing is adjusted appropriately, that is binding emission targets for Annex I
countries become more stringent while no-lose targets for non-Annex I coun-
tries become more lenient compared to the “IPC” scenarios. In this case, re-
quiring full participation by all non-Annex I countries in no-lose target scheme
results in the lowest total compliance costs, but meeting the participation con-
straint of the high-cost non-Annex I countries may involve high compliance
costs for Annex I countries and large payoffs for low-cost non-Annex I coun-
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tries. Alternatively, requiring participation in no-lose targets by the largest
five to seven emitters only to reach the 2 ◦C target, involves no-lose targets
of 21% and 31% below baseline in 2020 for the 10% and 30% global emis-
sions growth scenarios, respectively, and, hence, in the range considered in the
“IPCC” scenarios. The required emission reductions for Annex I countries of
72% (for the 10% global emissions growth scenario) and 64% (for the 30%
global emissions growth scenario) by 2020 compared to 1990 levels are much
more ambitious than envisaged in the “IPCC” scenarios, though. Also, in this
alternative burden-sharing scenario non-Annex I countries realize about 2/3 of
required global emission reductions in 2020. While the reduction targets found
in our alternative burden-sharing scenarios are less balanced than the burden-
sharing suggested by the IPCC, they are in line with other burden-sharing
scenarios suggested in the academic literature (Winkler, Vorster, & Marquard,
2009) or in the policy arena such as the Carbon Space approach (Kanitkar et
al., 2010), the Brazilian Proposal (United Nations, 1997), or the Greenhouse
Development Rights approach (Baer, Athanasiou, Kartha, & Kemp-Benedict,
2008). From a political, economical or technical perspective, however, these
alternative burden-sharing proposals are likely to be even more difficult to
implement than an IPCC-type burden-sharing.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and outlook
The global emission reductions necessary to limit the increase in mean global
temperature to 2◦C above pre-industrial levels require contributions from all
large emitters. In order to extend the range of countries contributing to global
emission reductions beyond the Annex I community, new instruments need
to be found and introduced. One possible instrument, no-lose targets, was
analyzed in this thesis. No-lose targets provide non-Annex I countries with
an incentive to contribute to global emission reductions by allowing them to
sell excess emission certificates, which are generated by reducing emissions
beyond the target, in the international emissions trading market. The aim of
this thesis was to determine whether no-lose targets are a suitable instrument
to commit non-Annex I countries to global emission reduction efforts and to
deepen the economic understanding of the instrument by providing economic
analyses that have been missing from the literature so far.
This thesis presented two theoretical frameworks to analyze no-lose targets
from an economic perspective. First, the simplest constellation, that of one
non-Annex I country facing a no-lose target and interacting with the Annex I
community in the international emissions trading market was analyzed. A two-
stage model was introduced to analyze the participation decision of the non-
Annex I country, based on the revenues from selling excess emission certificates
in the emissions trading market and the abatement costs for meeting the no-
lose target. In a second step, this framework was extended to model two
non-Annex I countries facing a no-lose target. A game-theoretical component
was added to the framework to analyze the impacts that the decision of one
non-Annex I country has on the decision of the other non-Annex I country.
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The analyses focused on two symmetric non-Annex I countries.
As a complement to the highly stylized economic analyses, a quantitative
analysis applying marginal abatement cost curves from a global partial equi-
librium model was carried out. In particular, the quantitative analysis allowed
us to include a larger number of non-Annex I countries facing no-lose targets
(18) and to take the heterogeneity of non-Annex I countries into account when
analyzing the potential of no-lose targets to contribute to reaching the 2◦C
target.
Subsequently, a short summary of the main results is provided, followed by
a critical reflection of the methods applied and an outlook to further research.
5.1 Conclusions
Analyses in this thesis focused on three different aspects of no-lose targets.
First, a quantification of the contribution from no-lose targets to global emis-
sion reductions, applying the theoretical frameworks, shows that, in the case
of symmetry between the Annex I community and the non-Annex I country,
the burden-sharing is 3 to 1 in a competitive market. That is, the Annex I
community has to accept at least 3/4 of the global emission reduction effort
for the non-Annex I country’s no-lose target to be profitable. At the same
time, large numbers of certificate transfers from the non-Annex I country to
the Annex I community via the international emissions trading market are
necessary to create profitability. Skipping the symmetry assumption between
the Annex I community and the non-Annex I country, and assuming that the
non-Annex I country’s potential to reduce emissions is larger than the Annex I
community’s, increases the non-Annex I country’s share in global emission re-
duction efforts. Yet, in a competitive market, the non-Annex I countries’ share
in global reduction efforts always has to remain below 50% for the no-lose tar-
get to be profitable, independent of the number of non-Annex I countries facing
a no-lose target.
The quantitative analysis results in emission reductions of 46% and 72%
below 1990 levels for Annex I countries and 21% and 31% below baseline for
non-Annex I countries by 2020, when applying no-lose targets and targeting at
global emission targets of 30% and 10% above 1990 levels as suggested to keep
mean temperature increase below 2◦C above pre-industrial levels. These target
levels are found to be significantly more ambitious for Annex I countries than
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the reduction range of 25% to 40% below 1990 levels proposed in the IPCC
4th assessment report. The reduction range for non-Annex I countries is found
to be at the lower target level of the corresponding reduction range for non-
Annex I countries.
Hence, the analyses show that no-lose targets can result in contributions
from non-Annex I countries to global emission reductions, but that the de-
cidedly larger share of the reduction efforts is still the responsibility of the
Annex I community, due to the profitability condition.
Second, the theoretical analysis of the interaction of two symmetric non-
Annex I countries facing no-lose targets shows the optimal no-lose targets to
be lower in the case of two participating non-Annex I countries than in the
case of just one. Global emission reductions, however, are found to be higher
for two participating non-Annex I countries. Hence, higher participation does
not only result in a higher efficiency in the emissions trading market, but also
in higher environmental benefits, due to higher global emission reductions. For
large differences in abatement costs between the Annex I community and the
non-Annex I countries, this effect lessens in a competitive market.
Results from the quantitative analysis counteract these findings, in partic-
ular when applying uniform reduction targets for all non-Annex I countries.
In that case, the heterogeneity of the non-Annex I countries and the uniform
reduction rate result in high profits for some of the non-Annex I countries.
The large profits indicate a large supply of emission certificates in the emis-
sions trading market, which lowers the price for those certificates. Hence, the
high profits for some non-Annex I countries prevent higher emission reduction
contributions from the non-Annex I countries in general. Instead, the best
environmental effects are seen for uniform no-lose reduction targets that in-
duce participation by all major emitting non-Annex I countries (in particular
China and India). Hence, the higher economic efficiency does not automati-
cally result in a better outcome for the environment. Individualized targets
can reduce this effect, however, as determining the individual optimal no-lose
target in reality and for a large number of non-Annex I countries may prove
very difficult. Hence, the quantitative results allow the conclusion that smaller
negotiating groups that contain the largest emitters may be a good alterna-
tive to the UNFCCC in the search for finding an environmentally effective
agreement.
The third aspect particularly analyzed are the effects of market power on
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the no-lose target. The theoretical analyses show that market power on the
part of the non-Annex I country/countries facing a no-lose target allows the
non-Annex I country’s/countries’ share in global emission reduction efforts to
increase. In particular, the share of non-Annex I countries in global emission
reduction efforts can exceed the 50% limit identified in the competitive market.
Increasing the no-lose target is possible, as strategically acting non-Annex I
countries can generate higher prices and hence larger revenues from emissions
trading.
As a result of adapting the no-lose target level accordingly, the non-Annex I
country/countries cannot use their market power to generate profits, as is usu-
ally the case. Instead, the strategic behavior of the non-Annex I country
can be used to increase the global reduction target (bottom-up target-setting
approach) or the non-Annex I country’s contributions to global emission re-
ductions (top-down approach). Hence, Annex I countries do not necessarily
need to regard market power on the side of the non-Annex I country/countries
as a problem, due to the positive effects on emission reductions. The analyses
show, however, that market power still results in welfare losses and, hence,
increases the costs for the Annex I community.
In addition, the analyses of market power show a noteworthy effect of the
optimal no-lose target on the non-Annex I country’s optimal emission reduc-
tions in the case of a bottom-up target-setting approach, where the Annex I
community’s aggregated emission reduction target remains constant. If dif-
ferences between the Annex I community’s and the non-Annex I country’s
abatement costs become large enough, the optimal emission reductions of the
non-Annex I country, in the case of market power, are lower than in the case
of a perfectly competitive market applying the respective optimal no-lose tar-
get. This finding is surprising, as usually a non-Annex I country with market
power would reduce less emissions than in the competitive market, to increase
the price. However, the higher target level of the optimal no-lose target in
case of market power forces the non-Annex I country to make higher emission
reductions than in the case of a competitive market. This finding is limited to
the bottom-up target-setting approach. In contrast, in the case of a top-down
approach, the decrease of the Annex I community’s reduction target in the
wake of an increasing non-Annex I country’s no-lose target prevents such an
effect.
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5.2 Critical reflection and outlook
The analyses presented in this thesis can be seen as a starting point to exploring
the economic understanding of no-lose targets. In particular, the theoretical
frameworks presented in chapters 2 and 3 which are suitable for determin-
ing the main economic effects of no-lose targets are, however, highly stylized
and supplementary quantitative analyses show that not all results are main-
tained when a more realistic framework is applied. A possible extension of the
theoretical frameworks is introducing heterogeneous non-Annex I countries to
account for heterogeneity of countries in reality. It would further allow analy-
ses of different market power concepts, like the effects of market power of one
non-Annex I country on smaller non-Annex I countries (Stackelberg leader-
ship model). Similarly, the standard game-theoretical framework of modeling
the participation decision of two non-Annex I countries chosen in this thesis
could be extended to include uncertainty (Bayesian games). While allowing
us to model the link between the decisions of non-Annex I countries facing
no-lose targets, this would further allow us to account for the fact that one
non-Annex I country does not necessarily have full information on the exact
decision parameters of the other non-Annex I countries facing no-lose targets
when making the decision.
Finally, for these analyses no-lose reduction targets were taken as given. In
reality, the target level of no-lose targets would be the outcome of international
negotiations. Hence, further research is necessary to analyze the strategic
aspects of the target-setting procedure as a part of the negotiation process.
In particular, the optimal no-lose targets introduced in this thesis present a
socially optimal outcome of burden-sharing negotiations. Hence, they do not
necessarily present the individually optimal outcome in terms of welfare from
the point of view of a non-Annex I country. Further, the quantitative analysis
in this thesis highlighted the important role of China (and India). Analyses
of the negotiation process should take this into account (e.g. by modeling a
right of veto for these countries), as it can be assumed – and the analyses in
this thesis stressed this point – that no effective international agreement will
be found that does not include at least these two non-Annex I countries.
While the complementary quantitative analysis helps to overcome the ab-
stract character of the economic analyses, a number of shortcomings still ap-
ply. The analysis mainly focused on uniform no-lose reduction targets while in
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reality country-specific targets are much more likely. Introducing individual-
ized no-lose targets as done for China, India and Brazil in this thesis appears
promising. This approach could be extended to other non-Annex I countries to
increase the contribution of global emission reduction efforts and limit the prof-
its from emissions trading, although the effects should be smaller for smaller
non-Annex I countries. Also, different selection criteria to identify the non-
Annex I countries facing a profitable no-lose target could be implemented, in
order to check the robustness of the results obtained in this analysis.
The marginal abatement cost curves applied were derived from a partial
global equilibrium model. In general, to get more reliable modeling results,
similar analyses could be performed with a wider range of models and the mod-
eling results be compared. That approach reduces the model-induced effects
and allows us to determine the economic effects of the analyzed instrument in
more general terms. In particular, similar analyses could be conducted, ap-
plying a general equilibrium model to account for the welfare effects of no-lose
targets which can be positive, although the no-lose target restricted to abate-
ment costs and revenues from selling emission certificates is not profitable.
The present thesis focused on economic and environmental analyses of no-
lose targets. While economic understanding of market-based instruments is
important, economic barriers are not the only factor that can prevent non-
Annex I countries from meeting their no-lose targets and hence contributing
to global emission reductions. A very important factor in international nego-
tiations on climate change are political barriers. Therefore, a more integrated
approach is necessary to identifying the potential of no-lose targets. Apart
from further analyses in both disciplines on no-lose targets, it includes bring-
ing together work from the political science perspective (see e.g. Thompson,
2006) and the economic perspective to identify whether no-lose targets are
an economically efficient and politically acceptable instrument that can lead
non-Annex I countries to contribute to global emission reduction efforts.
Also, no-lose targets are only one possible instrument discussed to include
non-Annex I countries in global emission reduction efforts. Similar analyses
of the other instruments are necessary to adequately assess no-lose targets in
the context of international emission reduction efforts. This would allow us
to identify the instrument most suited to integrating non-Annex I countries
from an economic, a political as well as an environmental perspective. The
analysis of the non-Annex I country’s payoff function in this thesis implied
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that, under certain circumstances, a no-lose target could counteract policies
targeting at a reduction of a non-Annex I country’s marginal abatement costs
like R&D cooperation. Hence, it is necessary to analyze the interaction of
different instruments to determine whether combining different instruments
might help to reach the goal of keeping the global temperature increase below
2◦C, or even counteract this.
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Appendix A
Emissions by country
Country GHG emissions [MtCO2e]
1990* 2005* 2010** 2020***
Australia 410 572 366 591
Austria 76 94 63 93
Belarus 154 85 59 126
Belgium 151 167 1121 140
Bulgaria 113 68 41 71
Canada 588 746 518 825
Croatia 32 31 na 40
Czech Republic 187 143 109 151
Denmark 73 69 44 59
Estonia 43 21 na 22
EU 27 5 547 5 332 na 4 990
Finland 72 71 63 72
France 555 575 363 533
Germany 1 214 1 005 763 883
Greece 113 139 91 138
Hungary 101 84 50 75
Iceland 3 4 na 4
Ireland 54 72 41 79
Italy 515 582 408 530
Japan 1 217 1 390 1 138 1 274
Latvia 27 12 na 13
Lithuania 47 20 14 27
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Country GHG emissions [MtCO2e]
1990* 2005* 2010** 2020***
Luxembourg 12 14 na 14
Malta 3 5 na 3
Netherlands 252 288 181 217
New Zealand 62 80 29 80
Norway 48 55 51 57
Poland 440 374 310 429
Portugal 63 86 56 79
Romania 241 132 78 163
Russian Federation 2 963 1 955 1 689 2 493
Slovakia 71 50 32 62
Slovenia 17 20 na 22
Spain 295 471 275 443
Sweden 73 75 48 64
Switzerland 55 57 39 50
Turkey 261 397 295 495
Ukraine 948 495 280 476
United Kingdom 734 684 493 598
United States of America 6 108 7 051 5 492 6 835
Total 18 391 18 549 13 591 18 326
* Data from CAIT 8.0
** Data from CDIAC (Boden & Blasing, 2011), CO2 only
*** Projections from POLES based on historic data from IEA (IEA, 2011)
1 Belgium & Luxembourg
na: not available
Table A.1: Annex I countries’ historic and projected emissions
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Country GHG emissions [MtCO2e]
1990* 2005* 2010** 2020***
Argentina 245 333 190 413
Brazil 695 1 025 420 1 533
China 3 599 7 273 8 241 14 810
Egypt 131 234 233 359
India 1 114 1 876 2 070 3 609
Indonesia 334 580 477 997
Iran 254 573 575 998
Kazakhstan 315 203 240 390
Malaysia 103 236 200 388
Mexico 437 642 466 723
Nigeria 183 296 na 417
Pakistan 146 244 167 471
Republic of Korea 314 608 563 671
Saudi Arabia 215 388 494 686
South Africa 341 433 452 457
Thailand 193 366 299 540
Taiwan 141 298 265 444
Vietnam 79 180 160 361
Others 3 525 5 016 4 408 6 655
Total 12 364 20 804 19 920 34 922
* Data from CAIT
** Data from CDIAC (Boden & Blasing, 2011), CO2 only
*** Projections from POLES based on historic data from IEA (IEA, 2011)
na: not available
Table A.2: Non-Annex I countries’ historic and projected emissions
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Appendix B
Derivation of formula and proofs
to chapter 3
B.1 Derivation of optimality conditions
Two participating non-Annex I countries in a competitive market
From the first order condition of the optimization problem (3.3) follows
r˜CA =
αN
αA
r˜Ci .
Applying market clearing condition (3.4) yields optimal emission reductions of
the Annex I community of
r˜CA =
αN
2αA
(TA + 2TN − r˜CA)
⇔ r˜CA(1 +
αN
2αA
) =
αN
2αA
(TA + 2TN)
⇔ r˜CA =
2αAαN
2αA(2αA + αN)
(TA + 2TN)
=
αN
2αA + αN
(TA + 2TN) .
From market clearing condition (3.4) follows for the optimal emission reduc-
tions of the non-Annex I country
r˜Ci =
1
2
(TA + 2TN − r˜CA)
=
1
2
(
TA + 2TN − αN
2αA + αN
(TA + 2TN)
)
125
126 B. DERIVATION OF FORMULA AND PROOFS TO CHAPTER 3
=
αA
2αA + αN
(TA + 2TN)
for the optimal emission reductions of the non-Annex I countries. For market
price p˜C follows
p˜C = αN r˜
C
i =
αAαN
2αA + αN
(TA + 2TN) .
Hence, the payoff Π˜CN of the non-Annex I countries is given by
Π˜CN = p˜
C(r˜Ci − TN)− CN(r˜Ci )
=
ααN
2α + 1
T˜
(
α
2α + 1
T˜ − TN
)
− 1
2
α2αN
(2α + 1)2
T˜ 2
=
α2αN
(2α + 1)2
T˜ 2 − α
2αN
2(2α + 1)2
T˜ 2 − ααN
2α + 1
T˜ TN
=
ααN
2α + 1
(
α
2(2α + 1)
T˜ 2 − T˜ TN
)
.
For the payoff to be positive we need to show that
α
2(2α + 1)
T˜ − TN > 0
⇔ αTA − 2(α + 1)TN > 0
⇔ TN
TA
<
α
2(α + 1)
.
One participating non-Annex I country in a competitive market
In case of one participating non-Annex I country i optimal emission reductions
are derived applying market clearing condition (3.5). From solving the Annex I
communities optimization problem we get
rCA =
αN
αA
rCi =
αN
αA
(TN + TA − rCA)
⇔ rCA(1 +
αN
αA
) =
αN
αA
(TA + TN)
⇔ rCA =
αN
αA + αN
(TA + TN) .
The participating non-Annex I country’s optimal emission reductions are
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given by
rCi = TA + TN − rCA
= TA + TN − αN
αA + αN
(TA + TN)
=
αA
αA + αN
(TA + TN)
and the market price results as
pC = αNr
C
i =
αAαN
αA + αN
(TA + TN) .
The participating non-Annex I country’s payoff ΠCN is then given by
ΠCN = p
C(rCi − TN)− CN(rCi )
=
ααN
α + 1
T
(
α
α + 1
T − TN
)
− 1
2
α2αN
(α + 1)2
T 2
=
α2αN
(α + 1)2
T 2 − α
2αN
2(α + 1)2
T 2 − ααN
α + 1
TTN
=
ααN
α + 1
(
α
2(α + 1)
T 2 − TTN
)
.
For the payoff to be positive
α
2(α + 1)
T − TN > 0
⇔ αTA − (α + 2)TN > 0
⇔ TN
TA
<
α
α + 2
has to hold.
Two participating non-Annex I countries with market power
The market-clearing condition that needs to hold in case of two non-Annex I
countries participating in the emissions trading market is given by (3.4). De-
riving the first order condition for a price-taking Annex I country (3.3) and
applying the Annex I country’s emission reductions given by (3.24) results in
p˜P = αAr˜
P
A = αA(TA − (r˜PN1 − TN)− (r˜PN2 − TN)) .
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Applying the market price we can solve the non-Annex I country’s N1 opti-
mization problem (3.3). Calculating the first derivative and equating it to zero
yields
αN r˜
P
N1 − αA(TN − r˜PN1)− αA(T˜ − r˜PN1 − r˜PN2) = 0
⇔ r˜PN1(2αA + αN) = αA(T˜ + TN − r˜PN2)
⇔ r˜PN1 =
αA
2αA + αN
(T˜ + TN − r˜PN2) .
(B.1)
From symmetry between the two non-Annex I follows
r˜PN2 =
αA
2αA + αN
(T˜ + TN − r˜PN1) . (B.2)
Applying (B.2) to (B.1) yields
r˜PN1 =
αA
2αA + αN
(T˜ + TN − αA
2αA + αN
(T˜ + TN − r˜PN1))
⇔
(
1− α
2
A
(2αA + αN)2
)
r˜PN1 =
αA
(2αA + αN)2
(αA + αN) (TA + 3TN)
⇔ r˜PN1 = r˜PN2 =
αA
3αA + αN
(TA + 3TN) =
α
3α + 1
(TA + 3TN) .
Optimal emission reductions of Annex I (3.30) result from
r˜PA = TA − (r˜PN1 − TN)− (r˜PN2 − TN)
= TA − 2
(
α
3α + 1
(TA + 3TN)− TN
)
=
1
3α + 1
T˜ +
α
3α + 1
TA .
Applying (3.30) to (3.26) yields a market price p˜P of
p˜P = αAr˜
P
A =
αA
3α + 1
T˜ +
αAα
3α + 1
TA .
The non-Annex I countries’ payoff Π˜PN is then given by
Π˜PN =p˜
P (r˜Pi − TN)− CN(r˜Pi )
=αA
(
αN
3αA + αN
(TA + 2TN) +
αA
3αA + αN
TA
)(
αA
3αA + αN
(TA + 3TN)− TN
)
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− 1
2
αN
α2A
(3αA + αN)2
(TA + 3TN)
2
=
αA
(3αA + αN)2((
α2A +
1
2
αAαN
)
T 2A −
(
2αAαN + α
2
N
)
TATN −
(
9
2
αAαN + 2α
2
N
)
T 2N
)
.
For Π˜PN to be positive the term in brackets above needs to be greater than
zero:(
α2A +
1
2
αAαN
)
T 2A −
(
2αAαN + α
2
N
)
TATN −
(
9
2
αAαN + 2α
2
N
)
T 2N > 0
⇔
(
TA
TN
)2
− 2αN
αA
TA
TN
−
9
2
αAαN + 2α
2
N
α2A +
1
2
αAαN
> 0.
This holds for
TA
TN
>
αN
αA
+
√
α2N
α2A
+
9
2
αAαN + 2α2N
α2A +
1
2
αAαN
=
αN
αA
+
√
αN(3αA + αN)2
α2A(2αA + αN)
=
αN + (3αA + αN)
√
αN
2αA+αN
αA
.
Taking the reciprocal value yields (3.33).
One participating non-Annex I country with market power
The market clearing condition from the previous case needs to be replaced by
(3.5). Solving Annex I’s optimization problem and applying Annex I’s reaction
function in case of one participating non-Annex I country (3.25) yields
pP = αAr
P
A = αA(TA − (rPi − TN)) .
Applying the above condition and solving the non-Annex I country’s optimiza-
tion problem results in a first order condition of
αATA − 2αA(rPi − TN)− αNrPi = 0
⇔ αA(TA + 2TN) = (2αA + αN)rPi
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⇔ rPi =
αA
2αA + αN
(TA + 2TN)
=
α
2α + 1
(TA + 2TN) .
Optimal emission reductions of the Annex I community are hence given by
rPA = TA − (rPi − TN)
= TA − ( αA
2αA + αN
(TA + 2TN)− TN)
=
1
2αA + αN
((αA + αN)TA + αNTN) .
Market price pP is given by
pP = αAr
P
A =
αA
2αA + αN
((αA + αN)TA + αNTN) .
The non-Annex I country’s payoff ΠPN can be derived as
ΠPN =p
P (rPi − TN)− CN(rPi )
=
αA
2αA + αN
((αA + αN)TA + αNTN)
(
αA
2αA + αN
(TA + 2TN)− TN
)
− 1
2
αN
α2A
(2αA + αN)2
(TA + 2TN)
2
=
αA
2αA + αN
(
1
2
αAT
2
A − αNTATN − αNT 2N
)
.
For the payoff ΠPN to be positive it is sufficient to check that the term in
brackets is greater than zero
1
2
αAT
2
A − αNTATN − αNT 2N > 0
⇔
(
TA
TN
)2
− 2αN
αA
TA
TN
− 2αN
αA
> 0 .
This holds for
TA
TN
>
αN
αA
+
√
α2N
α2A
+
2αN
αA
=
αN
αA
+
√
α2N + 2αAαN
α2A
=
1 +
√
1 + 2α
α
.
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Taking the reciprocal value yields (3.39).
B.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. The first derivative of the non-Annex I country’s payoff with respect to
αA in general is given by
dΠ
dαA
=
dp
dαA
(ri − TN) + p dri
dαA
− dCN
dri
dri
dαA
. (B.3)
In the competitive market the following holds
dCN
dri
= αNri = p .
Hence, the first derivative can be simplified to
dΠ
dαA
=
dp
dαA
(ri − TN) . (B.4)
The first derivatives of the market price in a competitive market are given
by
dp˜C
dαA
=
α2N
(2αA + αN)2
T˜ (B.5)
and
dpC
dαA
=
α2N
(αA + αN)2
T . (B.6)
Applying (B.5) and (B.6) to (B.4) yields
dΠ˜CN
dαA
=
α2N
(2αA + αN)3
T˜ (αATA − αNTN)
and
dΠCN
dαA
=
α2N
(αA + αN)3
T (αATA − αNTN) .
The first derivatives are in both cases positive if
TN
TA
<
αA
αN
which is fulfilled for (3.1).
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In the case of market power, the following first derivatives are needed to
solve (B.3):
dp˜P
dαA
=
(3α2A + 2αAαN + α
2
N)TA + 2α
2
NTN
(3αA + αN)2
dpP
dαA
=
(2α2A + 2αAαN + αN)TA + α
2
NTN
(2αA + αN)2
dr˜Pi
dαA
=
αN
(3αA + αN)2
(TA + 3TN)
drPi
dαA
=
αN
(2αA + αN)2
(TA + 2TN) .
The first derivatives of the payoffs are then given by
dΠ˜PN
dαA
=
1
(3αA + αN)3
(
αA
(
3α2A + 3αAαN + α
2
N
)
T 2A
−α2N(αA + αN)TATN − α2N(3αA + 2αN)T 2N
)
and
dΠPN
αA
=
1
(2αA + αN)3
(
αA(2α
2
A + 3αAαN + α
2
N)T
2
A
−α2N(2αA + αN)TATN − α2N(2αA + αN)T 2N
)
.
To show that the first derivatives are positive, we need to show that the terms
in brackets are positive. In case of two participating non-Annex I countries,
this yields the following condition:
αA(2α
2
A + 3αAαN + α
2
N)T
2
A − α2N(2αA + αN)TATN − α2N(2αA + αN)T 2N > 0
⇔ T
2
N
T 2A
+
αA + αN
3αA + 2αN
TN
TA
− 3α
3
A + 3α
2
AαN + αAα
2
N
3αAα2N + 2α
3
N
< 0 .
This holds for
TN
TA
< − αA + αN
2(3αA + 2αN)
+
√
36α4A + 60α
3
AαN + 37α
2
Aα
2
N + 10αAα
3
N + α
4
N
4α2N(3αA + 2αN)
2
=
−(αAαN + α2N) + (6α2A + 5αAαN + α2N)
2αN(3αA + 2αN)
=
6α4A + 4αAαN
6αAαN + 4α2N
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=
αA
αN
which is fulfilled for (3.1).
In case of one participating non-Annex I country, this yields the following
condition:
αA(2α
2
A + 3αAαN + α
2
N)T
2
A − α2N(2αA + αN)TATN − α2N(2αA + αN)T 2N > 0
⇔ T
2
N
T 2A
+
TN
TA
− αA(2α
2
A + 3αAαN + α
2
N)
α2N(2αA + αN)
< 0 .
This holds for
TN
TA
< −1
2
+
√
1
4
+
αA(2α2A + 3αAαN + α
2
N)
α2N(2αA + αN)
= −1
2
+
√
(2αA + αN)2
4α2N
=
αA
αN
which is fulfilled for (3.1).
The first derivatives with respect to αN are given by
dΠ˜CN
dαN
=
α2A
2(2αA + αN)3
(
(2αA − αN)T 2A − 8αNTATN − (8αA + 12αN)T 2N
)
dΠCN
dαN
=
α2A
2(αA + αN)3
(
(αA − αN)T 2A − 4αNTATN − (αA + 3αN)T 2N
)
dΠ˜PN
dαN
=
α2A
(3αA + αN)3
(
−
(
1
2
αA +
1
2
αN
)
T 2A −
(
27
2
αA +
15
2
αN
)
TATN − (6αA + 4αN)T 2N
)
dΠPN
dαN
=
α2A
(2αA + αN)2
(
−1
2
T 2A − 2TATN − 2T 2N
)
.
For the first derivatives to be positive, the terms in brackets need to be
positive. In case of a competitive market, the conditions are given by
(2αA − αN)T 2A − 8αNTATN − (8αA + 12αN)T 2N < 0
⇔
(
TN
TA
)2
+
2αN
2αA + 3αN
TN
TA
− 2αA − αN
8αA + 12αN
< 0
⇔ TN
TA
<
2αA − αN
4αA + 6αN
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for two participating non-Annex I countries and
(αA − αN)T 2A − 4αNTATN − (αA + 3αN)T 2N > 0
⇔
(
TN
TA
)2
+
4αN
αA + 3αN
− αA − αN
αA + 3αN
< 0
⇔ TN
TA
<
αA − αN
αA + 3αN
for one participating non-Annex I country.
In case of market power, it is easy to see that the first derivatives are
negative for positive αA, αN , TA and TN .
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. The first derivatives of the payoffs with respect to TA are
dΠ˜CN
dTA
=
αAαN
(2αA + αN)2
(αATA − αNTN)
dΠCN
dTA
=
αAαN
(αA + αN)2
(αATA − αNTN)
dΠ˜PN
dTA
=
αA
(3αA + αN)2
(
(2α2A + αAαN)TA −
(
9
2
αA + 2αN
)
TN
)
dΠPN
dTA
=
αA
2αA + αN
(αATA − αNTN) .
In all cases, the first derivatives are positive if the term in brackets is
positive. For Π˜CN , ΠCN and ΠPN this holds if
TN
TA
<
αA
αN
.
In case of Π˜PN , for the term in brackets to be positive, the following needs
to hold:
(2α2A + αAαN)TA −
(
9
2
αA + 2αN
)
TN > 0
⇔ TN
TA
<
2α2A + αAαN
9
2
αA + 2αN
⇔ TN
TA
<
4α2 + 2α
9α + 4
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This is fulfilled if at least one non-Annex I country has an incentive to
participate, i.e. if (3.39) holds:
4α2 + 2α
9α + 4
>
α
1 +
√
2α + 1
⇔ 2(2α + 1)√2α + 1 > 5α + 2
⇔ 32α3 + 48α2 + 24α + 4 > 25α2 + 20α + 4
⇔ 32α3 + 23α2 + 4α > 0 ,
which is fulfilled for positive α.
The first derivatives of the payoffs with respect to TN are given by
dΠ˜CN
dTN
=
αAαN
(2αA + αN)2
(−(αNTA + 4αATN + 4αNTN))
dΠCN
dTN
=
αAαN
(αA + αN)2
(−(αNTA + αATN + 2αNTN))
dΠ˜PN
dTN
=
αA
(3αA + αN)2
(
−
(
9
2
αAαN + 2α
2
N
)
TA −
(
4αAαN + 2α
2
N
)
TN
)
dΠPN
dTN
=
αA
2αA + αN
(−(αNTA + 2αNTN)) .
It is easy to see that they are smaller than zero for positive αA, αN , TA and
TN .
Proof of Π˜CN < ΠCN & Π˜PN < ΠPN
Proof. In the competitive market the following applies:
ΠCN − Π˜CN =
αAαN
(αA + αN)2
(
−
(
1
2
αA + αN
)
T 2N − αNTATN +
1
2
αAT
2
A
)
− αAαN
(2αA + αN)
(
−2 (αA + αN)T 2N − αNTATN +
1
2
αAT
2
A
)
=
(
3
2
αAα
2
N + α
3
N
)
T 2N +
(
3
2
α3A + α
2
AαN
)
T 2A
− (5α2AαN + 6αAα2N)TATN
=
(
3
2
αA + αN
)
(αATA − αNTN)2 > 0 .
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In the market power case the following applies:
ΠPN − Π˜PN =
αA
2αA + αN
(
1
2
αAT
2
A − αNTATN − αNT 2N
)
− αA
(3αA + αN)2((
α2A +
1
2
αAαN
)
T 2A −
(
1
2
αAαN + 2α
2
N
)
TATN −
(
2αAαN + α
2
N
)
T 2N
)
=
αA
(2αA + αN)(3αA + αN)2
((
9α2A + 6αAαN + α
2
N
)(1
2
αAT
2
A − αNTATN − αNT 2N
)
− (2αA + αN)
(
α2A +
1
2
αAαN
)
T 2A + (2αA + αN)
(
9
2
αAαN + 2α
2
N
)
TATN
+ (2αA + αN)
(
2αAαN + α
2
N
)
T 2N
)
=
αA (5αA + 2αN)
(2αA + αN)(3αA + αN)2
(
1
2
α2AT
2
A +
1
2
α2NTATN − αAαNT 2N
)
For positive αA, αN , TA and TN the term in brackets needs to be greater
than zero:
1
2
α2AT
2
A +
1
2
α2NTATN − αAαNT 2N >0
⇔ T
2
N
T 2A
− 1
2α
TN
TA
− α
2
<0
⇔ TN
TA
<
1 +
√
8α3 + 1
4α
(B.7)
To show that this is fulfilled we need to show that (B.7) is always fulfilled
if at least one non-Annex I country faces a profitable no-lose target. This
is fulfilled if (B.7) is larger than the participation condition in case of one
participating non-Annex I country (4.2):
1 +
√
8α3 + 1
4α
>
α
1 +
√
2α + 1
⇔ 1 +
√
8α3 + 1 +
√
2α + 1 +
√
8α3 + 1
√
2α + 1 > 4α2
⇔ 1 +
√
8α3 + 1 +
√
2α + 1 +
√
16α4 + 8α3 + 2α + 1 > 4α2
This holds for positive α due to
√
16α4 + 8α3 + 2α + 1 > 4α2 .
Appendix C
Appendix to chapter 4
C.1 Solution algorithm
In the following we provide a formal description of the algorithm implemented
to model the participation and non-participation of non-Annex I countries in
no-lose targets.
Step 1 First definition of the IETM: all AI countries (1, ...m) and all NAI_NLT
countries (1, ...n) belong to the IETM, i.e.
IETM := {AI1, ...AIm, NAI_NLT1, ...NAI_NLTn}
Step 2 Solving the optimization problems given in section 4.2.2 subject to the
market clearing condition and the domestic quota and offsetting limit
equations. The market prices and trading amounts of emission certifi-
cates and offsetting credits are used to calculate compliance costs TCi
for all NAI_NLT countries within the IETM.
Step 3 Without loss of generality we assume
TC1 > TC2 > ... > TCn .
If TC1 > 0 then the new IETM is defined as
IETM := {AI1, ...AIm, NAI_NLT2, ...NAI_NLTn}
and go back to Step 2.
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If TC1 ≤ 0 continue.
Step 4 Let k = {1, ...K} be the NAI_NLT countries included in the IETM and
l = {K + 1, ...L} be the NAI_NLT countries excluded from the IETM.
For each l redefine
IETM = {AI1, ...AIm, NAI_NLT1, ...NAI_NLTK , NAI_NLTl} .
Solve the optimization problems given by (4.1) subject to the market
clearing condition and the domestic quota and offsetting limit equations.
The market prices and trading amounts of emission certificates and offset-
ting credits are used to calculate compliance costs TCi for all NAI_NLT
countries within the IETM. If for all i ∈ {1, ...K, l} : TCi > 0 restart
Step 4 with new IETM.
C.2 Sensitivity analyses
This Appendix contains the results of the sensitivity analyses for the domes-
tic quota, offsetting limit and the amount of “hot air”. To save space, and
since results are qualitatively similar for the other scenarios, we restrict these
sensitivity analyses to the IPCC_low scenario.
Results of the sensitivity analysis for the domestic quota in the IPCC_low
scenario are shown in Figure C.1. Accordingly, varying the domestic quota
between 5% and 40% has no impact on the outcome. A higher domestic
quota of 60% and 80% lowers the price for emission certificates and offsetting
credits, because a higher domestic quota lowers the demand for certificates
and offsetting credits. For a domestic quota of 80%, participation decreases
from 11 to 6 NAI_NLT countries, because the lower prices render participation
unprofitable (revenue effect).
Figure C.2 displays the results of the sensitivity analysis for the offsetting
limit in the IPCC_low scenario. Varying the offsetting limit between 5% and
20% does not change the number of participating countries. Due to the lack of
demand for offsetting credits, however, prices decrease for very low offsetting
quota.
Finally, Table C.1 presents the results of varying the amounts of “hot air”.
Since “hot air” puts downward pressure on certificate prices and reduces de-
mand for certificates from NAI_NLT countries, reducing “hot air” is expected
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incl. “hot air” excl. “hot air” excl. “hot air”,
adj. AI targets
Price IETM [e/t CO2e] 101.81 103.50 101.81
Price OM [e/t CO2e] 101.81 103.50 101.81
No. of part. NAI_NLT 11 11 11
Global reductions [Mt CO2e] 8 846 8 926 8 846
Table C.1: Sensitivity analysis for “hot air” in the IPCC_low scenario
to increase participation by NAI_NLT countries. Results in Table C.1 (second
column) suggest that eliminating “hot air” leads to slightly higher prices, but
they are not sufficient to entice additional participation by NAI_NLT coun-
tries. While excluding “hot air” automatically results in an increase in the
global target, column 3 in Table C.1 gives results for a scenario where global
emissions are kept constant and AI countries’ targets are adjusted accordingly.
In this scenario, prices and the number of NAI_NLT countries participating
in the no-lose target scheme remain unchanged, though.
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
40
60
80
100
120
Number of NAI_NLT 
countries in IETM*
€/t CO2
0
2
4
0
20
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Domestic Quota
Price IETM Price Offsets No of NAI_NLT participating in IETM
Figure C.1: Sensitivity analysis for the domestic quota in the IPCC_low sce-
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C.3 Results for BIC scenarios
Scenario Price IETM Price OM No. of part.
NAI_NLT
Envisaged reductions
by NAI_NLT
Realized reductions
by NAI_NLT
Realized global
reductions
[e/t CO2e] [e/t CO2e] [Mt CO2e] [Mt CO2e] [%] [Mt CO2e]
BIC_10 52.70 52.70 17* 3 814 3 742 98 10 839
LT_10 44.30 44.30 17* 2 827 2 754 97 9 851
* All NAI_NLT countries but MEX
Table C.2: Results for the BIC_10 scenario
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